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Abstract
Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) emphasise the centrality of
human rights in their domestic and external policies. Despite their common attachment
to human rights and a potential affinity of seemingly common transatlantic approaches
to human rights issues in external policies, the EU and the US have diverged considerably
in their respective promotion of human rights abroad. Drawing on the historical and
legal underpinnings of human rights promotion in the EU and the US, the purpose of the
present study is to provide a comparative analysis of how human rights are integrated
and mainstreamed into their respective external policies, thereby using case studies such
as EU Special Representatives/US Special Envoys, Democracy Promotion, the Human
Rights Council and the International Criminal Court to contextualise the argument. To
this end, the study outlines the intricacies behind the institutional set-up of EU and US
external action, and delves into the specificities of human rights-related policy-making in
the realm of traditional foreign policy, international trade and international
development. The study concludes with the formulation of recommendations for the
further integration of human rights in EU external policies, as well as to the future
collaboration between the EU and the US on human rights.
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Executive Summary
This study provides a comparative analysis of how human rights are integrated and mainstreamed into
EU and US external action. It examines practices, opportunities and challenges across a broad range of
EU and US external policies, including trade, development cooperation, democracy promotion, the role
of special representatives/special envoys, as well as the participation of the EU and the US in the Human
Rights Council (HRC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). By means of a comparative analysis in
each of these areas, the study points to major similarities and differences between the EU and the US,
highlights best practices and challenges on both sides, and points out avenues for future cooperation.
The study concludes with a set of tailor-made recommendations which aim to foster the continuous
effort of integrating and mainstreaming human rights into all aspects of EU external action.
Both the EU and the US aim to promote human rights throughout their external action. While the
Lisbon Treaty has enshrined human rights as a guiding principle and objective of the Union’s external
action, in the US the basis for human rights in foreign policy lies in federal legislation. At the same time,
both in the EU and the US a multiplicity of institutional actors have an impact on the promotion of
human rights. In the US the Presidential office can be identified as the centre of gravity of human rights
promotion through foreign policy, whereas in the EU the High Representative/Vice President of the
Commission and the EEAS assume the role of mainstreaming human rights coherently into various
fields of EU external action. With regards to the instruments of external action, the study shows several
similar and distinctive tools to promote human rights. The impact of these instruments is studied in
greater detail in each of the case studies:
 In EU trade policy, the enforcement of human rights provisions tends to be rather weak, even in
those cases where complaint mechanisms are available; at the same time the US can be seen as
taking a more proactive approach.
 In development cooperation policies, human rights and the broader question of
democratization have become closely intertwined with development assistance frameworks both
in the EU and the US. The study finds that both actors see development assistance as a tool to
incentivize partner countries’ compliance with human rights obligations by suspending or
increasing development aid.
 With regard to Special Representatives in the EU and Special Envoys in the US, it was noted
that the EU has opted for an explicit and transversal Special Representative, while the US does not
seem to approach human rights from a cross-cutting perspective when mandating Special
Envoys; rather, it focuses on sub-thematic priorities within the broader realm of human rights.
 With regard to democracy promotion and assistance, the EU and the US make considerable
investments in both top-down democratic reforms and democratic actors at the ‘grassroots’ level.
The US is regarded as being less risk-averse in its support for democratic reformers, although
recent developments indicate a renewed engagement by the EU.
 At the HRC, EU and US priorities show a significant amount of overlap, both in terms of
institutional, country-specific and thematic issues, with a few notable exceptions. Due to its
political and diplomatic clout, the US is perceived as a strong negotiator at the HRC, while the
EU’s institutional architecture is identified as one of the root causes for its often inflexible and less
forceful positions, as well as its aim to reach consensus.
 EU and US policies towards the ICC and international criminal justice reveals a multitude of
measures, from direct financial support for the Court by the EU, to military assistance for the
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capture of ICC fugitives by the US. It is argued that enhanced cooperation between the EU and US
would ensure greater consistency and efficiency.
Given the detailed findings in each of the above mentioned topical areas, the study concludes with
three sets of recommendations concerning (i) EU inter-institutional co-operation on human rights, (ii)
the strengthening of EU human rights policies and (iii) EU-US collaboration on human rights. They
address in particular the need for the European External Action Service to take up its role as the
‘guardian of consistency’, the importance of an effectively implemented Strategic Framework/Action
Plan and a comprehensive foreign policy strategy on human rights, which ensures greater cohesion
between the various tools and instruments at hand, as well as the value of greater EU and US
cooperation in order to coordinate more effectively their external policies in the field of human rights at
various levels of decision-making. Given the overlap and similarities between the EU’s and the US’s
strategies and tools for advancing human rights through their external action, much greater synergies
and collaboration could be exploited as is currently the case.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) emphasise the centrality of human rights in
their domestic and external policies. Despite their common attachment to human rights and a potential
affinity of the transatlantic approaches to human rights issues in external policies, the EU and the US
differ in their approaches to human rights promotion. Indeed, on occasions these approaches vary
pointedly. The purpose of the present study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s (EP)
Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), is to provide a comparative analysis on how human rights
are practically integrated and mainstreamed into the external policies of the EU and the US, using
selected case studies to contextualise the argument. To this end the study will not only look into the
general making and promotion of human rights policies in the broader context of the EU’s and the
US’s external policies, but also inquire into the efforts of the EU and the US in mainstreaming human
rights policies across external policy fields.1
Drawing on the categorical division of human rights into ‘three generations’ as originally put forward by
Karel Vasak,2 this study will approach human rights as consisting of civil and political rights (‘first-
generation human rights’); economic, social and cultural rights (‘second-generation human rights’);
and collective rights which transcend the former two categories (‘third-generation human rights’).3
Furthermore, following the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights, which
reaffirmed that ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’,4 this
study will approach human rights in a transversal manner and use the different generations of human
rights interchangeably. With regard to the analysis of EU human rights policies in particular, such an
approach also implies that the prevailing distinction between ‘internal’ fundamental rights and
‘external’ human rights will not be taken up here, as has been done elsewhere.5
Research questions The present study has been commissioned by the European Parliament. Its aim is to
identify similarities and differences in the EU’s and the US’s human rights policies in their respective
external action. Moreover, it looks into possible ways of cooperation between the EU and the US in
human rights policies. The following research questions guide the study in view of the above
mentioned objectives:
 How have the integration of human rights and the corresponding legal bases into external
relations evolved in the EU and US respectively?
 What actors are prominently involved in integrating human rights into external policies? Who
is the agenda-setter for human rights priorities in external policies?
1 This study partially benefited from research carried out in the context of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under the grant agreement on ‘Fostering Human Rights Among European policies’, or ‘FRAME’
(project n° 320000). For more information about FRAME, please visit http://www.fp7-frame.eu.
2 Vasak, K., ‘A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’,
UNESCO Courier, 1977.
3 For a more detailed discussion of the categorization of human rights into ‘three generations’, see Alston, P., ‘A Third
Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?’, Netherlands
International Law Review, Vol. 29(3), 1982, p. 307-322; Marks, S., ‘Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?’,
Rutgers Law Review, 33, 1980, p. 435-453.
4 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25.6.1993,
§1(5). Available online http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx, accessed on 28.8.2014.
5 Wouters, J. et al, ‘Enhancing Cooperation between the European Parliament and EU National Parliaments on EU Human
Rights Policy’, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, EXPO/B/DROI/2013/20, March 2014.
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 How do the EU and US mainstream human rights in their respective external action policies?
What policy instruments and tools are at their disposal? How are human rights priorities
developed?
 How are human rights priorities represented/projected externally? Who are the main actors
involved?
 What are the policy priorities regarding the enforcement of human rights policies? How and
why do the EU and US differ from each other?
In order to answer the research questions, the study will present the subsequent evolution of policy
approaches to human rights focussing on the legal basis of the current respective policies in the EU and
US; the similarities and differences of the institutional set-up of the EU and US external policies and
their potential impact on human rights, and the policy of mainstreaming human rights, i.e. the
integration of human rights norms, principles and standards throughout the various strands of external
action. To structure the analysis of external action/foreign policy, three areas are identified; central
decision making on foreign policy (section 3); trade policies (section 4) and development cooperation
policies (section 5). To examine in further depth the differences and similarities between EU and US
approaches, four case studies are included reflecting four specific policy areas: the use of Special
Representatives and Special Envoys (section 6.1.), the promotion of democracy in third countries
(section 6.2.), policies and positions towards the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) (section 6.3.), and
policies and positions towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) (section 6.4.).
Methodology The comparative analysis of human rights policies in the EU and the US and
mainstreaming of human rights relies primarily on the following sources and methods of data
collection: primary sources: analyses of official EU, US, United Nations (UN) and ICC documents,
including legislative acts, policy documents and working documents; secondary sources: review of
literature on human rights policy in the external relations of the EU and the US, including scholarly
research, think tank reports and civil society assessments. More than 20 semi-structured interviews with
EU and US officials in respectively the European Commission, the EEAS, USAID etc. as well as civil society
actors, conducted in Brussels and in Washington, D.C. Thirteen interviews were conducted with officials
in the EEAS and the European Commission in Brussels as well as 1 interview with an EU official in
Washington, D.C. Six further interviews were conducted with official experts of USAID and the National
Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. In addition, interviews were conducted with civil
society organizations in Brussels. In the case of civil society actors, interview partners were selected
based on their access to the respective human policy-making in the EU and the US. To ensure
objectivity of this assessment and to foster an open dialogue with the interview partners, all names and
affiliations have been kept confidential.
A comparison of EU and US human rights approaches in external relations poses considerable
challenges due to the distinct institutional frameworks and competences of both actors.6 The
characteristics of the EU as a union of 28 Member States necessitated certain methodological choices to
ensure comparability with the US. It is important to underline that the dynamics of interaction between
the EU institutions and the EU Member States is crucial in shaping EU policy, a dimension which - given
the scope of this study - cannot be fully explored for every instrument, policy or measure presented in
this study. None the less, the matter of EU-wide coherence, consistency, and coordination is highlighted
throughout this study, in particular in the various recommendations. The comparison focuses primarily
6 For a discussion of the distinct nature of the EU and the US institutional frameworks in external action, see De Baere, G.,
and Gutman, K., ‘Federalism and International Relations in the European Union and the United States: A Comparative
Outlook‘, Modern Studies in European Law, Vol. 33, 2012, p. 131-166.
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on the similarities and differences of the EU and the US in terms of the development of their
institutional-set up in terms of executive and legislative politics (and its impact on human rights
policies), the comparison of policies and human rights mainstreaming (with a focus on foreign policy,
development cooperation and trade) and a selection of specific areas (the four case studies).
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2. ‘MAINSTREAMING’ HUMAN RIGHTS
The concept of ‘mainstreaming’ human rights can be defined as ‘a strategic process of deliberately
incorporating human rights considerations into processes or organisations which are not explicitly
mandated to deal with human rights’.7 Alternatively, it has been described as the ‘[…] reorganization,
improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a human rights perspective is
incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages’.8 The concept emerged prominently on the
policy agenda of the UN as part of the 1997 reform programme which called for a full integration of
human rights into the broad range of UN activities.9 Since then, the mainstreaming of human rights has
become a much referred to concept within and outside the UN architecture.
Generally speaking, a mainstreaming policy is said to be instrumental for:10
 achieving greater coherence (and consistency) within a given policy domain wherein several
actors operate, as is the case of external action and foreign policy;
 improving the involvement of civil society, and enhancing the transparency and accountability
of policy making;
 improving coordination between different services, and fostering transformative policies as it
aims to tackle the underlying causes of problems rather than their symptoms.
However, mainstreaming can vary widely as institutions and organizations operationalize ‘human
rights mainstreaming’ according to their role and mandate:
 Internal mainstreaming: ensuring organizational capacity and coherence through, inter alia,
establishing standard procedures, investing in staff training, fostering an internal ‘human rights
culture’, and other related measures.
 Mainstreaming human rights in bilateral relations and policies: ensuring human rights are
embedded in bilateral dialogues, carrying out country level reporting and elaborating human
rights country strategies, etc.
 Mainstreaming at the multilateral level: consistently addressing human rights in international
fora and within multilateral organizations, engaging with the UN human rights architecture, etc.
7 Benoit-Rohmer, F. et al., ‘Human Rights Mainstreaming in EU’s External Relations’, European Parliament, Directorate-General
for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, EXPO/B/DROI/2008/66, September 2009, p. 15.
8 McCrudden, C., ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’, in Harvey, C. (ed.), Human Rights in the Community: Rights as Agents for
Change, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005, p. 9.
9 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly, ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’,
A/51/950, 14.7.1997, para.79. Available online:
http://www.undg.org/docs/1400/Renewing_the_UN_A_Programme_for_Reform_A51_950.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
10 For an overview of the policy benefits of human rights mainstreaming, see De Schutter, O., ‘The New Architecture of
Fundamental Rights Policy in the EU’, in Benedek, W., Benoît-Rohmer, F., Wolfram, K., and Nowak, M. (eds.), European
Yearbook on Human Rights 2011, Vienna 2011, p. 131-133.
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3. FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Although human rights are ‘commonly understood as inalienable fundamental rights to which a person
is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being’,11 EU and US actors have come to a
markedly different understanding of what these rights precisely entail. Indeed, whereas the EU
delineates its human rights policy as encompassing ‘civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
[…], the rights of women, of children, of those persons belonging to minorities, and of displaced
persons’12, the US seems to emphasise a slightly different brand of human rights issues, thereby listing
anti-Semitism; business and human rights; civil society; democracy; disability rights; freedom of
expression; internet freedom; human rights; labour rights; Leahy vetting of military assistance; lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights; religious freedom and the Universal Periodic Review
(UPR).13
This section focuses on the foreign policy of the EU and the US, especially in view of human rights. It will
systematically analyse the development of human rights in foreign policy, the main actors, objectives
and instruments regarding the mainstreaming of human rights into EU and US foreign policy.
3.1 Human rights in the European Union’s foreign policy
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is now considered to have reached the ‘high point
of its engagement with human rights’,14 as it codified its commitment to put human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law at the heart of its internal and external policies. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU), the EU is ‘founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities’.15 With regard to the Union’s external action in particular, Article 3(5) obliges
the EU to uphold and promote these values ‘[i]n its relations with the wider world’ and to contribute to
the protection of human rights. Article 21(1) TEU provides that ‘the universality and indivisibility of
human rights’ shall be one of the principles and objectives to guide ‘[t]he Union’s action on the
international scene’ whereas Article 21(3) TEU adds that these principles must be respected and these
objectives pursued ‘in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s
external action […] and of the external aspects of its other policies’. As human rights have become one
of the fundamental principles and objectives for the EU’s policies in their entirety, the EU is also bound
to ‘pursue common policies and actions, and […] work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of
international relations, in order to […] consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and the principles of international law’ (Article 21(2)(b) TEU). Although Article 2 TEU
unequivocally declares human rights to be one of the founding values of the EU, an analysis of the
Union’s legal evolution reveals that, although preliminary discussions on their integration into the
founding 1957 Rome Treaty were already prevalent,16 human rights have only gradually emerged in EU
law through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The decisions in the Stauder
11 Sepulveda, M. et al, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, 2004, p. 3.
12 Mission statement of the ‘EU and human rights’ on the homepage of the European External Action Service. Available
online: http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/index_en.htm, accessed on 28.8.2014.
13 List of human rights issues provided by the designated human rights website of the US Government. Available online:
http://www.humanrights.gov/issues/, accessed on 28.8.2014.
14 de Búrca, G., 'The Road not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor', American Journal of International
Law, No 105, 2011, p. 649.
15 Article 2 TEU.
16 de Búrca, supra, n. 14
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(1969), Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970), Nold (1974), and Hauer (1979) cases can be
seen as milestones in this regard.17 This observation has led some scholars to point out that the EU has
been evoking a ‘fundamental rights myth’18 throughout its internal and external policies. In fact, as will
be elaborated on below, the EU not only shares its claim to this normative disposition with the US, but
both actors have also only started to effectively consolidate their policy-orientation towards human
rights from the 1970s onwards.
3.2 Human rights in the United States’ foreign policy
In a rhetoric similar to the EU’s evocation of human rights as a foundational value, the US claims that
‘the protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United
States over 200 years ago’, and that ‘since then, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy has been the
promotion of respect for human rights’.19 This ‘foundation stone’,20 as the prominent US scholar Louis
Henkin pointed out, is embodied by the US Bill of Rights which was added to the US Constitution in
1791.21 Even so, the legal framework in the US differs from the EU in that the basis for human rights in
foreign policy lies in various acts of Congressional legislation, rather than in the Constitution itself.
Indeed, the Constitution, while recognizing a variety of ‘individual’ human rights and determining the
allocation of competences with regard to foreign policy decision-making, is silent on the objectives of
US external action. This ought to be understood in light of the ‘constitutional limitation’22 which was
placed on the federal government from its very inception, following the ‘epic struggle’ between
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.23 With the ideological triumph of limited government to
protect basic individual rights in the Lockean definition,24 the founding fathers initially ‘did not see it
necessary to include rights that they did not imagine could be invaded by that new government of
limited powers’.25 In addition, given that the Bill of Rights had to be introduced by way of constitutional
amendment, this process is said to have discouraged a comprehensive reflection on what those rights
precisely ought to entail.26 This historical development has generated a specific political culture with
strong implications for US policy-making. Or, to put it in the words of one US official, ‘we very much
believe in the idea of the self-made man, in picking yourself up by your bootstraps’.27
17 See, for an overview, De Witte, B., ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human
Rights’, in Alston, P., Bustelo, M. and Heenan, J. (eds.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 859;
Jacobs, F., ‘Human Rights in the European Union: The Role of the Court of Justice’, European Law Review, Vol. 26, 2001, p. 331;
Tizzano, A., ‘The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Fundamental Rights’, in Arnull, A., Eeckhout, P. and Tridimas, T. (eds.),
Continuity and change in EU law : essays in honour of Sir Francis Jacobs, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 125.
18 Smismans, S., ‘The European Union’s Fundamental Rights Myth’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48(1), 2010, p. 45.
19 Mission Statement of the US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Available online:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/, accessed on 28.8.2014.
20 Henkin, L., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p. 94.
21 The US Bill of Rights consists of the first 10 amendments (I-X) of the US Constitution, covering various rights such as
‘freedom of speech, or of the press’, ‘the right of the people peaceably to assemble’, the right to freedom of religion, the
right ‘to keep and bear arms’, ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures‘, ‘the right to a speedy and public trial’, ‘right of trial by jury ‘, etc.
22 Henkin, supra, n. 20, p. 93.
23 Simon, J., What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create a United States, Simon &
Schuster, New York, 2003.
24 Simmons, A., The Lockean Theory of Rights, Princeton University Press, 1994.
25 Henkin, supra, n. 20, p. 93.
26 Ibid.
27 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 13.3.2014.
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3.3 EU, US and international agreements
Despite their commitment to human rights and their promotion, neither the EU nor the US have signed
and ratified several of the major international human rights treaties, but for very different reasons.
The EU was initially hindered from concluding international agreements due to its lack of legal
personality. While the pre-Lisbon European Treaty framework only provided for legal personality of the
Communities, not of the Union,28 Article 47 TEU now explicitly states that ‘[t]he Union shall have legal
personality’.29 Nevertheless, the EU can still only become a party to those international human rights
treaties that contain a so called ‘regional (economic) integration organization’ (REIO/RIO) clause. A
prominent example is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which
provides in Article 42 that it ‘shall be open for signature by all States and by regional integration
organizations’. It was signed by the EU on 30 March 2007. After the Council adopted the Decision to
conclude the UNCRPD on 26 November 2009,30 the treaty entered into force for the EU on 22 January
2011, thereby binding the EU to the extent of its competences as enumerated in an Annex to the
Council Decision. This is the first time that the EU has become a party to an international human rights
convention.31 As has been noted elsewhere, the EU’s ratification of the UNCRPD has set an
interesting precedent because of the Convention’s ‘strikingly experimentalist architecture’32 and the
European Commission’s strengthened role as the guardian of the Convention. Indeed, pursuant to
Article 3 of the Council Decision, ‘[w]ith respect to matters falling within the Community’s competence
and without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States, the Commission shall be a
focal point for matters relating to the implementation of the UN Convention in accordance with Article
33.1 of the UN Convention’.
Furthermore, the EU is in the process of acceding to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in line with Article 6(2) TEU. The way for EU accession
was already paved by the entry into force of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR which added in a new Article
59(2) that ‘[t]he European Union may accede to this Convention’. The negotiations on the Accession
Agreement were launched in July 2010 and finalized in April 2013.33 Due to a number of yet unsolved
legal issues, however, the conclusion of the agreement may still require some additional time.34 The
eventual accession of the EU to the ECHR will not only have significant symbolic and political value35 but
28 Article 281 TEC.
29 Some scholars have asserted that the EU already enjoyed de facto legal personality before the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty, notwithstanding the silence of the Treaties. See, for instance, Laatikainen, K.V., ‘Multilateral Leadership at the
UN after the Lisbon Treaty’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 14, 2010, p. 475; Wouters, J., Coppens, D., and De Meester,
B., ‘The European Union’s External Relations after Lisbon’, in Griller, S. and Ziller, J. (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty. European
Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty?, Springer, 2008, Vienna-New York, p. 143, at 147.
30 EU Council, ‘Council Decision concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, OJ L 23/35, 27.1.2010.
31 For the latest progress report on the implementation of the UNCRPD see European Commission, Commission Staff
Working Document, ‘Report on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
by the European Union’, SWD(2014) 182 final, Brussels, 5.6.2014.
32 de Búrca, G., ‘The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’, European Law Review, Vol. 35(2), 2010, p. 1.
33 Odermatt, J., ‘The EU’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: An International Law Perspective’, New
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 46, forthcoming.
34 Gragl, P., ‘A giant leap for European human rights? The final agreement on the European Union's accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights‘, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51, 2014, p. 16.
35 Odermatt, supra, n. 31.
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also legally strengthen the human rights system in the Union by subjecting the EU to the jurisdiction of
an external international human rights court.36
The patchy ratification record of the US, in contrast, is not only due to legal obstacles but also to a lack
of political consensus. As one interviewee confirmed, the US reluctance to ratify certain international
human rights treaties is ‘more a political argument than a legal one’.37 At present, the US has ratified
among others the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), the four Geneva
Conventions and the major terrorism conventions, though often entering extensive reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs). However, the US has not signed or ratified a large number of
other, (quasi-) universal treaties. The most frequently cited example is the Convention on the Rights of
the Child which the US signed in 1995 but has not yet ratified due to concerns that it might restrict
parental freedom of child education, including the freedom to resort to domestic corporal punishment
and the freedom not to attend classes on sexual education.38 The US thereby finds itself in the company
of only two other countries who have not ratified the Convention – Somalia and South Sudan.39 A
similar picture emerges with regard to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), the almost universally ratified backbone of international women’s rights protection.
Though signed by President Carter and supported by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama, it has not
yet been ratified due to concerns about possible implications for US sovereignty, laws, policies and
culture.40 Other treaties which have not been ratified or acceded to by the US include the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), highlighting the fact that the enshrined
rights are not recognized as human rights by the US, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions and the Rome Statute establishing the ICC (see infra, section 6.4). This reluctance to
endorse the most widely accepted international human rights instruments while simultaneously
claiming the role of a champion of human rights, has given rise to the criticism of hypocrisy.41
3.4 Main actors in EU and US foreign policy
While in the EU distribution of competences between the EU and Member States and across EU external
action policies contributes to a decentralized and multi-actor character of the EU’s foreign policy
system, the US has evolved over time towards an increasingly centralized system of decision making.42
While the Constitution of the United States foresees strong federal competences and powers of
Congress, it has been the President whose institution has acquired most powers for the conduct of
foreign affairs over time.43
36 Gragl, supra, n. 34, p.16.
37 Interview with US official, Washington, D.C., 13.3.2014.
38 McBain, S., ‘Why is the US so reluctant to sign human rights treaties?’, New Statesman, 7.10.2013. Available online:
http://www.newstatesman.com/north-america/2013/10/why-us-so-reluctant-sign-human-rights-treaties, accessed on
28.8.2014.
39 The Legislative Assembly of South Sudan passed a bill on the ratification of the Convention in late November 2013. At the
time of writing, it awaits to be signed in order to enter into force.
40 Blanchfield, L., ‘The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Issues in
the U.S. Ratification Debate’, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, June 2011.
41 Bradley, C.A. ‘The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism’, Chinese
Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 2010, p. 321.
42 Smith, R.A., The American Anomaly – US Politics and Government in Comparative Perspective, Routledge, London, 2014.
43 Kegley, C. W, and Wittkopf, E.R., American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, p. 420.
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3.4.1 European Union
European Council and Council of Ministers In the field of EU foreign policy and human rights, the
European Council has a decisive role to play. In fact, as regards Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) the TEU foresees in its Article 26: ‘The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic
interests, determine the objectives and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security
policy, including for matters with defence implications. It shall adopt the necessary decisions.’ In this
regard all major objectives and general guidelines for CFSP and Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) are adopted in the European Council. In 2003, the European Council adopted the European
Security Strategy (ESS), which to this day serves as a framework for EU action in the field of CFSP/CSDP
and which contains a variety of guidelines regarding human rights and democracy. At the same time,
the Council of Ministers’ role in CFSP/CSDP is clearly defined in Article 26 TEU, too: ‘The Council shall
frame the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and
implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European
Council.’
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the
European Commission (HR/VP) and Special Representative The HR/VP is key to the coordination
efforts of the EU to create one EU external action based on several types of external policies. In this
regard, the role of the HR/VP is essential for the mainstreaming of human rights. THE HR/VP’s joint
communication with the Commission ‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External
Action’44 and the proposal of the HR/VP to adopt the ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human
Rights and Democracy’ (see infra, section 3.5.1) can be seen as a major contribution to the field. Human
rights being one of the overarching objectives of the EU in external action (see Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU
supra), the HR/VP has to keep a critical eye on the implementation of the EU’s human rights policy in
CFSP/CSDP.
European External Action Service (EEAS) and Commission DGs The EEAS assists the HR/VP in the
conduct of foreign policy and human rights policies. Conversely, in the EEAS there is a department for
human rights and a department for democracy. Each department is composed of three divisions – one
on democracy, two on human rights. As one EU official explained,45 ‘the two human rights divisions
act as if they were both part of one whole. The divisions share the responsibility, both thematically and
for the country-based work’. The reason why there are nonetheless two divisions working on human
rights within the EEAS, is purely managerial. As another EU official added, ‘both divisions do the same
work: thematic issues, bilateral relationships and human rights mechanisms.’46 Moreover, human rights
focal points in all geographic directorates are also in charge of mainstreaming human rights. Finally,
there are focal points in all EU Delegations around the world, which are equally tasked with
mainstreaming human rights, both in the political and in the operational section.
The relationship between the EEAS and the Commission’s DGs is often seen as crucial for the EEAS’
transversal overview of human rights coordination on the field. Because of their dossier-specific nature,
some DGs are seen as more ‘natural’ sparring partners in the realm of human rights policies, such as DG
44 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Human Rights And Democracy At The Heart Of EU External
Action – Towards A More Effective Approach’, COM(2011) 886 final, Brussels, 12.12.2011.
45 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 28.2.2014.
46 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
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DEVCO.47 As clarified in the Council Decision on the organization and functioning of the EEAS, the latter
indeed coordinates the ‘programming’ part of policy-making with DG DEVCO, while DG DEVCO is in
charge of the effective implementation of policy-making in the area of development cooperation.48
Moreover, the EEAS and DG DEVCO are key actors in the provision of democracy assistance to third
countries (see section 6.2), and thus collaborate intensively on the issue of human rights and democracy
promotion. Similarly, the EEAS and DG Enlargement jointly engage into the issue of human rights
promotion in countries that are yet in the stage of pre-accession to the EU. With other Commission DGs,
such as DG Justice and Home Affairs, an ‘increased distance’ has been noted by some EU officials, as
‘external aspects are not [the DG’s] priority’ and the internal decision-making structures are seen as
‘completely different’ than the ones of the EEAS.49 However, when it comes to consultations and
negotiations with the US on a wide range of human rights issues, our respondent added, it is the EEAS
that coordinates with DG Home and DG Justice, rather than with DG DEVCO.
While it was reported that the EEAS has not been the main driver of human rights mainstreaming in
external action – with DG DEVCO perceived as being more active on than the EEAS on the matter50 – it
has nevertheless been lauded for its strategic guidance in developing a ‘comprehensive approach’
towards EU external action.51 This comprehensive approach (see infra, section 3.6.1), in turn, also meant
that the principles of the landmark EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights (see infra, section 3.5.1),
were reassembled and reaffirmed into one policy approach, thereby covering the role of all EU actors
and Member States in arriving at a more coherent external action.
Working Group COHOM Another key actor in the field is the Council Working Group COHOM.52 As one
official mentioned, COHOM’s mandate has clearly widened with regard to human rights: while in the
past human rights was in the first place associated with CFSP, COHOM is now dealing with human rights
in other areas of EU external policies too. As one EU official explained: ‘In COHOM, we were concerned
with CFSP most of the time in the past. In 2003 this changed and the work of COHOM was extended (by
means of a new mandate) to look into the mainstreaming of human rights in new areas and across
policy areas. For example, COHOM started dealing with CSDP and the mainstreaming of human rights
in that area. In fact, COHOM is used to trigger discourses on human rights by bringing together various
actors. For example, we bring together actors in the Commission, like DG Trade, but also CODEV.’53
European Parliament The European Parliament has often been portrayed as a champion of human
rights and democracy promotion.54 This can be seen in the Parliament’s attempts to promote human
rights and democracy via its parliamentary delegations, contacts with civil society actors and
parliamentarians in third countries. Between 2007 and 2011 the European Parliament adopted no less
47 For a recent analysis of the working arrangements between EEAS and DG DEVCO, see Tannous, I., ‘The Programming of
EU’s External Assistance and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO’, European
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18(3), 2013, p. 329–354.
48 EU Council, ‘Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External
Action Service’, OJ L 201/30, 3.8.2010, Article 9(4).
49 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 8.4. 2014.
50 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 16.4.2014.
51 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and
crises’, JOIN(2013) 30 final, Brussels, 11.12.2013.
52 See the 1987 Annex I to the mandate establishing COHOM, the Annex II of 1999 and the Annex of 2013. Available online:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/COHOM_mandates.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
53 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 16.4.2014.
54 Di Viola, D., European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the 1990s: An Investigation into the Role and Voting
Behaviour of the European Parliament's Political Groups, Ashgate, Brookfield, 2000.
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than 237 resolutions on human rights issues.55 The EP has also shown a willingness to take urgency
measures in condemning human rights violations around the globe, e.g. in the case of death penalty
imposition. In addition, the EP serves as a forum for human rights in scrutinizing EU external action and
initiating public debates. This is evident in the EP’s hearings by the DROI, INTA, DEVE or AFET
Committee, including regular contacts with the Fundamental Rights Agency in the DROI.56 Further
activity by the EP includes the Annual Reports which it completes every year on Human Rights
throughout the World.57 Moreover, the Sakharov Prize for the Freedom of Thought, which was
established in 1988 by the EP and which is annually awarded ‘to honour exceptional individuals who
combat intolerance, fanaticism and oppression’ contributes further to its efforts.58 Around the laureates,
a network is operationalized by the EP; since the inaugural meeting in 2011, the network was able to
address human rights violations worldwide.
The EP is also able to advocate human rights in its positions towards EU external action, having the right
to consent to most of the EU’s international agreements since the Lisbon Treaty. In the past, for
example, the EU has refused to ratify Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan,59 and more recently, the EP has highlighted human rights issues by its refusal to give its
consent to treaties such as the SWIFT agreement or ACTA.60 The EP has further influence in its role of
overseeing the EU budget,61 and is able to directly impact upon human rights promotion, through its
decisions upon the scope of relevant financial instruments.62 For example, under the EP’s initiative the
‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ was introduced in 1994. Building on EP
support, this budget heading evolved into a full-fledged financial instrument and its financial envelope
has expanded gradually over the past two decades.63 In addition, parliamentary diplomacy has also
become an arena of exchanges on human rights and democratisation.64 While ad-hoc missions of the EP
to third countries remain difficult to implement due to internal rules, there are standing EP
parliamentary delegations and cooperation with other third-country parliaments, as well as joint-
parliamentary assemblies, which have, for example, been established with ACP countries and in the
context of the Eastern Partnership.65 In the context of the Eastern Partnership, it has been argued that
the EP has been able to diffuse norms, such as human rights, and engage with Eastern Partnership
parliaments.66 Moreover, the participation of MEPs in electoral observatory missions is a continuing tool
in the field of human rights and democracy promotion. In the context of visits to third countries, the EP
delegations and missions are often in contact not only with other parliamentarians, but also with civil
55 Youngs, R. et al, ‘The Impact of the Resolutions and Other Activities of the European Parliament in the field of Human
Rights outside the EU’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, EXPO/B/DROI/2011/17,
December 2012, p. 16.
56 Ibid.
57 For the latest available report see European Parliament, ‘Report on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2012
and the European Union’s policy on the matter’, 2013/2152(INI), A7-0418/2013, 29.11.2013.
58 See the homepage of the European Parliament on the ‘Sakharov Prize’. Available online:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00f3dd2249/Sakharov-Prize-for-Freedom-of-Thought.html, accessed
on 28.8.2014.
59 Keukeleire, S. and Delreux, T., The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014, p. 88.
60 Ibid.
61 Raube, K. ‘The Role of Parliaments in EU Foreign Policy’, in Wilga, M. and Karolewski, I.P. (eds), New Approaches to EU Foreign
Policy, Routledge, Oxford, 2014 (forthcoming).
62 Keukeleire and Delreux, supra, n. 59, p. 88.
63 Ibid.
64 Youngs, supra, n. 55, p. 17.
65 Delputte, S., ‘The ACP-EU joint parliamentary assembly seen by its members: empowering the voice of people's
representatives?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 17(2), 2012, p. 241-260.
66 Ibid.
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society actors. This is to be contrasted with the transatlantic dialogue, consisting of bi-annual meetings
between the EP and US Congress, in which legislative cooperation is perceived less enthusiastically by
the US,67 which, in turn, has a detrimental impact upon the exchange of legislative work in the field of
human rights and perceptions of joint EU and US human rights policies.
3.4.2 United States
President, Vice President and State Department The President of the United States and his
administration in the White House oversee US foreign affairs. Every administration is able to leave a
certain footprint with regard to external action in general and human rights more specifically. In
addition, the Vice-President contributes to policy-making and acts as ‘diplomatic representative of the
President and United States abroad’.68 In this regard, the Vice-President also contributes to human
rights and democracy promotion once the topic has been set on the agenda. Human rights policy in
external relations has been part of the US State Department’s (USSD) mandate,69 whereas the US’s
development agency USAID did initially not work on human rights related issues in the past.70 In the
State Department, the Secretary of State can play an important role if he or she establishes either a loyal
position to the President or a power base on his or her own.71 Furthermore, the USSD’s Under
Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (formerly the Under Secretary for
Democracy and Global Affairs) holds a mandate to ‘build and oversee one coherent capacity within
State that promotes stability and security in conflict affected and fragile states, supports and develops
democratic practices globally, and advances our human rights and humanitarian policies and
programming around the world’.72 Assistant Secretaries overlook the geographical and thematic desks
and, in the case of human rights, the Bureau “Democracy, Human Rights and Labor” (DRL) oversees
the US human rights country reports and Human Rights & Democracy Fund (HRDF).73 In this respect,
DRL is a major institutional unit informing executive decision-making on human rights and democracy.
For the EEAS, in the field of human rights, the DLR is considered to be the ‘main interlocutor’. As one
EEAS official mentioned, ‘they have more country-specific knowledge than we do. But we engage with
them in intense thematic coordination’.74 In addition to reporting, the DRL bureau also disposes of
significant resources to engage in democracy assistance and reaching out to human rights defenders.
State agencies and Non-State Actors Over the time of its existence the state agency USAID received a
human rights mandate too. Regarding USAID’s ability to sustain and extend its role in the field of
human rights, one US official commented: ‘There is nothing more permanent in Washington than a
temporary agency.’75 In terms of inter-institutional coordination, there are inter-agency working groups,
for example on labour issues where the State Department, USAID, United States Trade Representative
67 Archick, K. and Morelli, V., ‘The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament: Evolving Transatlantic Legislative
Cooperation’, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, January 2013.
68 Foley, M., ‘The foreign policy process: Executive, Congress, intelligence’, in Cox, M., and D. Stokes (eds.), US Foreign Policy,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 113.
69 For the sake of readability, the terms ‘US Department of State’ and ‘US State Department’ will be used inter-changeably
throughout this study.
70 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 13.3.2014.
71 Hastedt, G. P., American Foreign Policy, Pearson, Boston, 2011, p. 199.
72 US Department of State and USAID, ‘Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review’, 2010, p. 42.
73 See the homepage of the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Available online:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/index.htm, accessed on 28.8.2014.
74 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
75 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 13.3.2014.
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and other institutional actors are represented. 76 Moreover, in high-profile trade agreements the
different actors convene often ‘while the iron is still hot in order to coordinate their messages when
dealing with external stakeholders – but this occurs on a rather ad hoc basis, [and] there is a lack of
structural, continuous and institutionalized coordination’.77 Furthermore, non-state actors, in particular
the National Endowment Programme (NED), contribute to democratization and human rights
projects via public finances. They add to the picture of various US actors who actively contribute to the
shaping of human rights policies and democracy promotion (see infra, section 6.2).
US Congress The two legislative bodies (the Senate and the House of Representatives) constituting the
US Congress play a key role in US foreign relations as enshrined in the Constitution.78 The Congress’s
ability to hold and determine the purse as well as its ability introduce human-rights based
legislation gives it additional powers to determine aspects of the US’s human rights policy.
Congressional activism on human rights has a long history79 and strong congressional pressure is often
a major driver for foreign policy adjustments, such as the introduction of ‘human rights vetting’ in the
provision of US security assistance to partner governments.80 Furthermore, in dealing with opposition
parties and raising concerns that the executive branch may not be willing or able to address, Congress
can also actively conduct parliamentary diplomacy and contribute to the awareness of human rights
violations in third countries. Moreover, with regard to raising awareness of human rights policies,
Special Envoys can be mandated by the President or Congress to represent the US in order to raise
certain concerns, including concerns vis-à-vis specific regions and policy themes (see infra, section 6.1).
3.5 Objectives and policy context
3.5.1 European Union
Article 2 TEU states: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’
Furthermore, Art 21(1) TEU includes the general provisions for EU external action: ‘The Union’s action
on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation,
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule
of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter and international law.’ The opening paragraph of Article 21 TEU sets the framework for all
other EU external actions, including those in the framework of CFSP and CSDP. Furthermore, Article 21
TEU foresees common action of the EU in international relations in order to ‘consolidate and support
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’. The EU’s foreign policy
objectives regarding human rights cannot only be traced back to the EU Treaties, but moreover to
certain key documents which have informed the EU’s human rights in foreign policy. As discussed in the
historical overview (see supra, section 3.1), the EU’s accession policies already set forth the so-called
76 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 14.3.2014.
77 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 14.3.2014.
78 See De Baere and Gutman, supra, n. 6, p. 153.
79 Snyder, S., ‘A Call for U.S. Leadership: Congressional Activism on Human Rights’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 37(2), 2013, p. 372-
397.
80 Serafino, N. et al, ‘”Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview’, Congressional Research
Service, CRS Report prepared for Congress, January 2014.
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Copenhagen criteria, in which respect for human rights is proclaimed to be a condition for EU
membership.
The EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy Introduced in 2012,
the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (hereafter ‘Strategic
Framework/Action Plan’) foresees 7 strategic clusters through which EU human rights mainstreaming is
to be developed.81 These are: human rights promotion throughout EU policies, promoting the
universality of human rights, pursuing coherent objectives, human rights mainstreaming in all EU
external policies, implementing EU priorities on human rights, working with bilateral partners and
working throughout multilateral institutions (see figure 1). A concrete Action Plan guarantees the
follow-up by means of targeted actions (see also figure 1). As one EU official underlined, there was a
need for having both the Framework and Action Plan at the same time: ‘The Strategic Framework
contains extremely strong commitments: to raise human rights at all levels, to integrate human rights
without exceptions. But the Strategic Framework alone is not enough to bring about change. Therefore
we also have the Action Plan. One of the biggest strengths of the Action Plan is that it has chapters
touching upon more or less all areas of external action. You have for example counterterrorism and
human rights, justice and human rights, trade and human rights, development and human rights… ‘82
Figure 1: EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy83
81 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, OJ 11855/12,
Luxembourg, 25.6.2012.
82 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 16.4.2014.
83 Wouters et al, supra, n. 5, p. 34.
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3.5.2 United States
As the pre-eminent scholar on US foreign relation Luis Henkin remarked ‘[the] principal constitutional
limitation on [the US] government that is operative today is that government must respect the rights of
the individual.’ He continues: ‘Nothing in the framers’ conception of rights suggested that respect for
individual rights should be less or different in the conduct of the foreign relations of the new republic.’84
However, individual rights not only constrained government action, but also informed government
action in the sense of human rights promotion. From an idealist perspective democracy and human
rights promotion is a ‘projection of domestic values and ethics onto the world stage’.85 In this regard,
democratisation and human rights become key ideas and elements in foreign affairs. With a view on
tackling challenges of the post-cold-war order, multilateralism and humanitarian interventionism were
seen as effective US approaches to respond to emerging crisis situations. The former focused on the US
coordination and legitimacy of foreign affairs in the context of international organizations, while the
latter concentrated on the potential to intervene or threaten third parties with the use of force in
situations of human rights violations.86 However, the Bush Jr. administration opted for an offensive
unilateral approach and was portrayed as an imperial empire, focusing on security and interests rather
than on norms and human rights. This approach was emulated in the National Security Strategy of
2002, in which the so-called ‘Bush doctrine’ was formulated, e.g. the war against terrorists and countries
that ‘harbour’ terrorists as well as the notion of pre-emptive strikes and American unilateralism.87
Obama administration has struggled to leave behind the radical shift US foreign policy has gone
through after 9/11 2001. On the one hand, a return to multilateralism has been underlined, for instance,
in the 2010 National Security Strategy “When international forces are needed to respond to threats and
keep the peace, we will work with international partners to ensure they are ready, able, and willing. We
will continue to build support in other countries to contribute to sustaining global peace and stability
operations, through U.N. peacekeeping and regional organizations, such as NATO and the African
Union.”88 The President’s strategy further emphasizes the need to “mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian,
financial, and – in certain instances – military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass
atrocities” both multilaterally and bilaterally.89
While a ‘return to multilateralism’, including in the field of human rights, is emphasized by the current
administration, other (non-)action undermines its credibility in terms of human rights protection. The
continuation of the Guantánamo detention camp90 and the use of drones in US warfare have been
widely criticized in this regard.
84 Henkin, supra, n. 20, p. 94.
85 Smith, supra, n. 42, p. 194.
86 Rowley, C. and Weldes, J., ‘Identities and US foreign policy’, in Cox, M., and Stokes, D. (eds.), US Foreign Policy, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 188.
87 Hastedt, supra, n. 71, p. 20.
88 President of the United States, National Security Strategy, Washington D.C., May 2010, p. 48.
89 Ibid.
90 The National Security Strategy, however, did foresee the closure of Guantanamo Bay. See Hastedt, supra, n. 87, p. 22.
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3.6 Main EU and US foreign policy instruments and their link to human rights
3.6.1 European Union
The EU has several instruments at its disposal to promote human rights externally. In this regard the EU
instruments regarding human rights can be seen as being tackled by the EU’s tool box that is related to
several policies.
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy EU enlargement is not only a policy of the EU towards its
immediate neighbouring countries, but also a unique tool to promote human rights. The EU offers
membership to European countries under the premise of conditionality as set out in the Copenhagen
European Council 1993 (so-called Copenhagen Criteria). The Copenhagen Criteria set out that
membership can only be granted to associated countries of the EU if the following criteria are applied:
1) stability of institutions guaranteeing, 2) democracy, 3) rule of law, 4) human rights and minority
protection, 5) functioning market economy, and 6) willingness to follow up on obligations of
membership. As such, only those countries can become members of the EU who actually fulfil the
above mentioned criteria. As such, the EU can use the criteria as a benchmark and sue ‘carrots’ and
‘sticks’ (conditionality) in the event that applicant states are not able to comply with the human rights
standards which the EU sees necessary to apply. If at the same time applicant states are able to comply
with the obligations of the EU, membership can be awarded. As such, the EU’s accession policy to the
East has been seen as a transformative policy which is about structural changes, including the
improvement of human rights conditions.91 The effect for human rights policies has been a
transformative change throughout all new Member States. This, however, does not imply that human
rights are equally well-respected within the EU, or that new Member States have all applied standards
that rule out human rights violations.
EU Enlargement Policy The accession policy of the EU has proven to be an effective tool to introduce
changes in the field of human rights through tying membership of the EU to a range of conditions.
Currently, the Western Balkan states, following the EU’s offer to join the EU, are willing to undergo
domestic changes in that regard. While Croatia joined the EU in 2013, the EU also recently signed the
Serbia Association Agreement. As the EU approach is hard to transplant into the foreign policies of a
state, the EU struggles with the difficulty of exporting its enlargement policy tool, which
transforms societies and states in political, judicial, economic and societal terms, to other regions.92
Indeed, while EU conditionality is also used in other areas and policies such as trade and development
cooperation (see sections 4 and 5), the ‘major carrot’ of membership cannot be awarded to countries
outside Europe. This, observers argue, poses a major challenge for the European Neighbourhood Policy
as well.
In the 1990s, the EU entered Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Newly independent
States (NIS). They serve as a legal framework for political, economic and trade relations between the EU
and its partners. There are differentiations of contents, but the main ‘ingredients’ are: 1) consolidating
democracy, 2) economic development, 3) promoting trade and investment, 3) conditions for a future
free trade area, 4) cooperation in various fields (e.g. social and cultural affairs) and 5) fostering political
dialogue. In 2004, the agreements were complemented with what the EU termed its European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Since 2003 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI) has been introduced to support ‘democratic transition and promot[e] human rights’, help ‘the
transition towards the market economy’, and foster the ‘promotion of sustainable development’ and
91 Keukeleire and Delreux, supra, n. 59, p. 259.
92 Ibid. p. 260.
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‘policies of common interests’.93 The ENPI is a financial instrument made available for all ENP
countries and Russia. This also includes the Northern African to the South African and Middle Eastern
countries. In the period 2010-2013 an additional 350 million Euro was added to the already existing 450
million Euro budget. In 2008, the Eastern Partnership was carved out of the ENP to develop more tailor-
made responses for the EU’s neighbouring region in the East. At the same time, the events of the Arab
Spring in the EU’s southern neighbourhood required the EU to focus on its partners in more
differentiated ways.94
The EU currently has to deal with severe setbacks within the field of human rights in the Eastern and
Southern Neighbourhood. The impoverished human rights situation in Egypt and Syria are telling
examples in this respect. Also, to the East the situation is far from consolidated. The Vilnius Eastern
Partnership Summit concluded in this regard: ‘While recognising and welcoming the progress that has
been made, they also recall that much remains to be done to tackle the persisting challenges posed to
democracy, the respect for fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.’95 Usually a compensation tool to
foster conditionality, the new Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) were only recently
signed between the EU and Moldova and Georgia, while Ukraine suspended the DCFTA in 2013.
Following the change of government in the Ukraine, the EU signed a political agreement with the
provisional government of Ukraine, while signature of the DCFTA was postponed until after the
Ukrainian general elections in May 2014. The European Council concluded in December 2013: ‘The
European Council calls for restraint, respect for human and fundamental rights and a democratic
solution to the political crisis in Ukraine that would meet the aspirations of the Ukrainian people.’96 In
2014, the European Council re-affirmed its interest in signing the DCFTA with Ukraine: ‘The European
Union and its Member States are committed to signing the remainder of the Association Agreement
and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which together with the political provisions constitute a
single instrument’.97
CFSP/CSDP The CFSP’s key instruments are its tools in civilian and military crisis management. However,
one of the key challenges in the area of CSDP is the question to which degree Member States are able to
contribute to international civilian and military missions of the EU. Since 1999, the EU has constantly
worked on improving its crisis management capacities. Over the years the EU has undertaken more
than 20 civilian and military crisis management missions. Most of the missions are civilian crisis
management missions, with the minority falling into the category of military missions. Very often,
military missions are military training missions rather than peace-enforcing humanitarian interventions.
This has led to the argument that the EU prefers to avoid high-risk situations, such as the involvement of
military on the ground.98 Nonetheless, the EU’s efforts in crisis-management have a direct impact on
human rights situations in third countries. The human rights component is especially visible in both
military and civilian crisis management missions.99 As such, the EU contribution to security in a third
country through either civilian or military missions is said to contribute to the development and human
93 See European Commission’s homepage on the ‘European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument’. Available online:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/enpi_en.htm, accessed on 28.8.2014.
94 Wouters, J. and Duquet, S., ‘The Arab Uprisings and the European Union: In Search of a Comprehensive Strategy’, Yearbook
of European Law, 2013, p. 1-36.
95 EU Council, ‘Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013. Eastern partnership: the
way ahead’, 17130/13, Press 516.
96 European Council, ‘European Council Conclusions’, EUCO 217/13, Brussels, 20.12.2013.
97 European Council, ‘European Council Conclusions’, EUCO 7/1/14, REV 1, Brussels, 21.3.2014.
98 Keukeleire, S., and Raube, K., ‘The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing
countries’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26(3), 2013, p. 556-572.
99 Ibid.
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rights situation of that third country, e.g. through security sector reforms. For example, the largest EU
mission, the EULEX civilian mission in Kosovo, has a direct impact on the rule of law and human rights in
Kosovo by providing direct civilian assistance to its judiciary. The EU’s view is that CSDP missions cannot
be seen in an isolated context. The EU has pursued this by introducing a ‘Comprehensive Approach to
External Conflict and Crises’.100 In the HR/VP-EC joint communication introducing this comprehensive
approach, the EU’s aim to contribute to both security and human rights is underlined: ‘A shared analysis
should set out the EU's understanding about the causes of a potential conflict or crisis […] It must also
identify the EU interests and objectives and our potential role to contribute to peace, security,
development, human rights and the rule of law, taking into account existing EU resources and action in
the country or region in question.’101 In this way, human rights are meant to become one of the key
objectives when launching missions abroad and determining the respective instruments to that end.
As the case of a potential intervention of the EU in Libya has shown, Member States need to agree on
taking collective action in the intergovernmental framework of CSDP, including the availability and
spending of national military and civilian capabilities. The EU is often seen as looking for alternative
ways of engagement, for example by providing assets for capacity building missions rather than putting
its ‘boots on soil’.102 Another key element in the framework of CFSP are sanctions, based on Articles 25
and 29 TEU and making use of the EU’s economic involvement, or rather reduction thereof, by
introducing restrictive measures (Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU)). Sanctions are said to bring about change in the actions of third parties, be it states or
individuals. Human rights violations in third countries can lead to the EU’s imposition of sanctions. For
example, in a standing sanction against Iran from 2011, a number of individuals are targeted with EU
sanctions ‘in view of the ongoing human rights abuses’ in the country.103 In general, smart and
comprehensive sanctions can be seen as the two different sets of available sanctions. The former
introduces restrictive measure vis-à-vis a small number of people and businesses, e.g. government
members, whereas the latter introduces measures directed against a whole country (i.e. its markets and
society), e.g. an oil embargo. Sanctions can be decided either by the EU on its own or in order to
implement sanctions decided by the UN Security Council. In 2014, more than 30 states and
organisations were targeted.104
Human Rights Country Strategies and HR dialogues The EU has introduced Local Human Rights
Country Strategies which it uses to monitor the situation of human rights and human rights violations
world-wide. With more than 140 strategies now in place, the process of drafting such Human Rights
Country Strategy for each partner country is nearly completed as of mid-2014.105 They are to be ‘taken
into account in human rights and political dialogues at all levels, in policymaking and when
programming and implementing financial assistance with third countries’ and should be ‘effectively
mainstreamed by the EEAS, Commission and Member States.’106 However, their precise role in shaping
EU foreign policy is still unclear. One EU official mentioned that they have made a significant difference,
100 Supra, n. 51.
101 Ibid. p. 5.
102 European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Time for European boots on Libyan soil?’, ECFR Blogpost, 22.8.2011.
103 EU Council, ‘Council Implementing Decision 2011/670/CFSP of 10 October 2011 implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP
concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran’, OJ L 267/13,
12.10.2011.
104 See homepage of the EEAS on ‘Restrictive Measures (sanctions) in force’, last updated on 26.5.2014. Available online: <
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
105 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2013’, 11107/14,
Brussels, 23.6.2014, p. 15.
106 OJ 11855/12, supra, n. 81, action point 31(c).
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including by informing ‘individual Member States when they have bilateral visits’, and inform ‘our
programming of financial’.107 Some criticism has been raised, notably by the EP and civil society
organizations, as these country strategies remain outside the public realm and are only accessible for EU
officials, making EU policy less transparent.108
In addition, the EU also undertakes more than 30 human rights dialogues around the world.109 Within
these dialogues, the EU is focusing on its EU human rights dialogue guidelines, adopted in 2001.110 The
EEAS website provides a good overview of the several dialogues which have been ongoing over the last
years, including those with Russia and China. However, despite these dialogues, the question remains
how international players like Russia and China can be convinced of taking a different direction in their
human rights approaches.111 While in the case of the ENP there may remain options to convince
partners of adopting different human rights policies and offering incentives, it seems questionable
whether the same approach is feasible in the case of Russia and China. Moreover, while the EU may
advocate the universality of human rights, it is the concept itself that is more and more questioned by
the outside world by favouring a cultural interpretation of human rights.112
3.6.2 United States
Regarding human rights policies or actions that impact upon the US promotion of human rights,
several instruments can be used as part of an overarching American toolkit. As one will see below, the
introduced tools resemble to a certain degree those of the EU (and vice-versa). However, differences
prevail in terms of procedures, substance and scope.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices One key tool in the US policy on human rights has been
the elaboration of Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Human Rights Reports). Congress
receives the reports from the US State Department on the basis of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and the Trade Act of 1971 (see infra, section 5). The US produces these reports on an annual basis and
uses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights treaties as benchmarks
to assess the human rights situations in countries all over the world. In his preface to the publication
of the Human Rights Reports 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry stated: ‘As we mark the 65th
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights this year, the Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices highlight the continued pursuit of ‘free and equal dignity in human rights’ in every
corner of the world. Based on factual reporting from our embassies and posts abroad, these
congressionally mandated reports chronicle human rights conditions in almost 200 countries and
territories. The reports draw attention to the growing challenges facing individuals and organizations
as ‘governments around the world fall short of their obligation to uphold universal human rights’.113 In
contrast with the EU, the DRL (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) is very transparent in
showing how the human rights reports are produced. The DRL’s indicate that the human rights reports
107 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 27.3.2014.
108 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 25.4.2014.
109 EEAS homepage on EU human rights dialogues. Available online:
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/dialogues/index_de.htm, accessed on 28.8.2014.
110 Council homepage on EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries. Available online:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/16526.en08.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
111 Wouters, J. et al, ‘EU Human Rights Dialogues – Current Situation, Outstanding Issues and Resources’, Leuven Centre for
Global Governance Studies, Policy Brief No. 1, July 2007.
112 Carothers, T. and Brechenmacher, S., ‘Closing Space – Democracy and Human Rights under Fire’, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2014.
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are produced in close cooperation with US embassies and consulates, foreign policy officials in
Washington D.C., as well as non-governmental and international organisations, with first drafts being
completed by US delegations in third countries which work closely with information sources on the
ground. Moreover, in a second phase, the reports are edited by the DRL in close coordination with other
units at the State Department. All editors at the DRL, including the editor in chief, are publicly listed on
the website of the DRL.114 Again with contrast to the EU’s human rights strategies, the human rights
reports are also publicly available. While the EU uses its reports only internally, the US has a ‘public’
approach in addressing and tracking human rights abuses. While according to DRL the human rights
reports have a direct impact on US policy-making (‘these reports are used as a resource for shaping
policy; conducting diplomacy; and making assistance, training, and other government-related resource
allocations’), the reports also perform a ‘naming and shaming’ function.
Diplomatic tools The DRL points to several measures which the US adopts to promote human rights: to
‘hold governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms and
international human rights instruments’, to ‘promote the rule of law, seek accountability, and change
cultures of impunity’, to ‘assist efforts to reform and strengthen the institutional capacity of the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Commission on Human Rights’; and to
‘coordinate human rights activities with important allies, including the EU, and regional
organizations’.115 Regarding bilateralism, US human rights dialogues with important partners, such as
the EU, and significant powers such as China are crucial diplomatic tools to accentuate the US position
on human rights vis-à-vis third countries. In 2013, for example, the 18th US-China Human Rights
Dialogue took place. Acting Assistant Secretary, Uzra Zeya (DRL), after meeting with China, mentioned
in a press conference: ‘Throughout the Human Rights Dialogue I made the [the point that] China will be
stronger and more stable and more innovative if it represents and respects international human rights
norms. I also made clear that the United States is committed to building a cooperative partnership with
China; welcomes the rise of a strong, stable and prosperous China; and reaffirmed the centrality of
human rights to our bilateral engagement.’116
Diplomatic persuasion coupled with other foreign policy instruments, such as the building of further
partnerships or – quite the opposite – the threat to use sanctions or the reduction of foreign aid
become a viable tool for the US. The diplomatic efforts of the US are complemented by financial tools,
such as the DRL’s Human Rights & Democracy Fund. Established in 1998 by Congress, the HRDF is the
‘flagship’ programme of DRL, contributing significantly to the overall financing of aid run by DRL (see
figure 2).
114 Ibid.
115 State Department’s homepage on ‘Human Rights’, available online: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/index.htm, accessed on
28.8.2014.
116 Press Conference following the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue, 2.8.2013. Available online:
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Figure 2: Overview of DRL Administered Foreign Assistance Appropriations (in millions)117
Sanctions The US, like the EU, uses smart and comprehensive sanctions in case of human rights abuses.
The Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Treasury Department acts upon presidential and
legislative acts. Such actions have been targeting businesses and individuals. The OFAC publishes the
lists of persons, countries and businesses which are targeted. In the context of the US’s war against
terrorism, sanctions have become a prominent tool to act against suspected terrorists, who are seen as
threatening not only democratization efforts but also human rights promotion. A notable example is
the Magnitsky Act. Following the death of the Russian lawyer Magnitsky, US Congress adopted this act
to black-list several Russian nationals who were involved in his murder. Several Russian counter-laws
were adopted in response to the US blacklist. Judging the effectiveness of the US sanctions remains
difficult, but, as the Washington Post commented: ‘the reaction from Russian lawmakers suggests it
hurt: [s]hortly after it was implemented, Russia passed a law banning U.S. parents from adopting
Russian children. Later, Russia responded with their own ‘black list’ of U.S. officials, and Magnitsky
himself was eventually found guilty of tax evasion – even though he was already dead’.118
Military Interventions The US, in stark contrast with the EU, is the largest military power in the world. It
can make use of its military strength in several ways; unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. Often
accused of using military power to achieve political and economic goals, the US also has a record of
taking military action in the name of human security, for example in cases when human rights are
endangered. US military spending accounted for 46% of global military spending in 2011.119 A
significant increase in military spending occurred after September 11, 2001. Between the end of the
Cold War and before 9/11, interventions ranged from small-scale missions to large exercises. Academics
have identified some of these military deployments, such as ‘Operation Restore hope’ (1992-1994), i.e.
the contribution to the NATO mission in Bosnia 1993-2001, or the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo, as
contributions to the international restoration of human rights.120 After 9/11 the US policies on
interventions took another turn, concentrating on its fight against terrorism. Following the Bush
doctrine, terrorist acts were no longer perceived as a crime, but as an act of war which could be
117 State Department homepage on ‘DRL Programs’. Available online: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/index.htm, accessed on
28.8.2014.
118 Taylor, A., ‘The man behind the Magnitsky Act explains why now is the time to go after the Russian elite’s assets’, The
Washington Post, 3.3.2014.
119 See Global Issues homepage on US Military Spending and how it relates to global levels. Available online:
http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending#USMilitarySpending, accessed on 28.8.2014.
120 Fischer, Beth A., 'Military power and US foreign policy', in Cox, M. and Stokes, D., US Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press,
2012, p. 130-142, p. 136
A Comparative study of EU and US approaches to Human Rights in External Relations
35
answered with pre-emptive strikes.121 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were expressions of the new US
policy. The Obama administration has focused on ending the deployment of large scale US troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the maintenance of the Guantanamo detention camp, the
usage of armed drones and specialized commandos, such as the which killed Osama Bin-Laden in 2011,
are expressions of the ongoing US extra-ordinary measures in its fight against terrorism. Moreover,
the US has shown that it is still concerned with human security in the European neighbourhood, using
force in the context of a NATO-Libya operation, ‘Operation Unified Protector’.
3.7 Comparative conclusions and the future of EU-US cooperation
While arguably the EU has a become more successful in making human rights a part of its foreign policy,
several remaining challenges can be pointed out: human rights implementation is still seen as
problematic with varying results, depending on the policy area of concern. Moreover, despite efforts to
prioritize human rights, in particular in the context of the Strategic Framework/Action Plan, human
rights awareness within EU foreign policy still needs to be raised.
Comparing the EU with the US, the sharpest difference between the two is that the US can use is
willing to use unilateral action if needed to protect human rights abuses in third countries. As Risse and
Börzel have observed elsewhere, the EU prefers ‘soft security’ in its foreign policy including compliance
with its policies by incentives, capacity-building and learning.’122 By contrast, the US is militarily
equipped and more willing to take action, while the EU has shown continuous efforts to build
capacities in the field, be it with regard to civilian or military missions in the context of CSDP. The EU’s
focus on civilian missions is not a downside, rather a complementary tool, for example in the field of
rule of law missions which trigger a direct impact on human rights. At the same time, the two actors do
have many similarities with a view to the promotion of human rights and the use of instruments,
be it diplomatic action, human rights dialogues or sanctions. The US and the EU should use their
similarities to look to greater synergies. The EU’s enlargement policy is a good example of the
transformative impact the EU can have on accession countries, including the improvement of
human rights regimes. At the same time, the human rights situation within the ENP currently
suffers from many setbacks, in particular with respect to Europe’s Northern African Neighbours. More
comprehensive and closer coordination within the EU, and between the EU and the US, seems called
for. Similar collaborative action to protect human rights in other countries in a phase of transition (e.g.
Myanmar) or countries which are showing serious backsliding in terms of human rights and democratic
governance (e.g. South Sudan, Burundi), seems necessary. It is in this context that both the US and the
EU need to use more of their diplomatic toolbox. The US and the EU will have to invest in soft power;
the power of enticement to persuade other actors to follow their examples and a policy of
universal human rights. In this context, the EU and the US face challenges as they have to ensure the
coherence of their actions, both internally and externally. If diplomatic efforts, such as human rights
dialogues and the work of special representatives and envoys is supposed to be effective, then human
rights need to be implemented internally as much as they are preached externally.
121 Ibid. p. 138.
122 Risse, T. and Börzel, T., ‘Venus Approaching Mars’, in: Magen, A., Risse, T. and McFaul, M. (eds.), Promoting Democracy and
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4. TRADE POLICY
4.1 Main actors
EU Trade Actors and competences Both the EU and the US dispense ‘exclusive’ or ‘principal’
competence to carry out their trade-related policies on the respective Union and federal level. In the EU,
the competence to initiate legislation has lain in the hands of the European Commission (EC) since the
Treaty of Rome.123 As the EU’s executive actor, the EC and its Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) in
particular, have the sole right to negotiate the trading partners on behalf of the EU, and to speak with
that same ‘unified voice’ at the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a result, the Common Commercial
Policy (CCP) is regarded to be ‘the oldest, most integrated and most powerful external policy domain of
the EU’,124 and DG Trade is considered to have achieved a ‘high degree of institutional autonomy’ and a
‘distinct organization esprit de corps’.125
As the EU increasingly wandered into the ‘new trade’ territory services and intellectual property
rights,126 the exclusiveness of its CCP competences had become contested after the ECJ adopted the
Opinion that the EU needed to conclude, in close cooperation with its Member States, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).127
After more than a decade of legal uncertainty with regard to the distribution of competences in these
matters, the Lisbon Treaty effectively extended the EU’s exclusive competence into the full range of
trade in goods, services, trade-related intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment (see
table 1).128 This development significantly enhanced the similarities between the scope of the EC and
the USTR (United States Trade Representative) competences in trade-related matters, with the latter
highlighting roughly the same ‘major areas of responsibility’129 as the former in its post-Lisbon setting.
With regard to trade policies, in other words, the EU has steadily been moving towards a division of
competences which is similar to the one found in the US. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
and the further consolidation of the EU’s exclusive competences in this regard, that trend has now
markedly come to fruition.
123 For a discussion on the historical origin and development of the EU’s exclusive competence in trade policy, see for
instance Gstöhl, S., ‘The European Union’s Trade Policy’, Ritsumeikan International Affairs, Vol. 11, 2013, p. 1-22.
124 Bossuyt, F., Drieghe, L. and Orbie, J., ‘Living Apart Together: EU Comprehensive Security from a Trade Perspective’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, 2013, p. 63.
125 Ibid.
126 Meunier, S. and Nicolaïdis, K., ‘The European Union as a trade power’, in Hill and Smith (eds.), International Relations and
the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 275-298.
127 Hilf, M., ‘The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the WTO – No Surprise, But Wise?’, European Journal of International Law, 6, 1995, p.
245-259.
128 Woolcock, S., European Union economic diplomacy: the role of the EU in external economic relations, Ashgate, Farnham,
2012.
129 USTR Mission Statement. Available online: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission, accessed on 28.8.2014.
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Table 1: Comparison between the EC ‘exclusive competence’ and USTR ‘principal responsibility’ to act in
trade-related matters, prior to and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty130
Trade Issues EU competence in
Trade pre-Lisbon
EU competence
in Trade post-Lisbon
USTR competence
in Trade
Bilateral, regional
and multilateral
trade agreements
Exclusive
competence
Exclusive competence USTR principal
responsibility
Trade in goods Exclusive
competence
Exclusive competence USTR principal
responsibility
Trade in services Shared competence
between the EU and
its Member States
Exclusive competence USTR principal
responsibility
Trade-related
intellectual
property rights
Shared competence
between the EU and
its Member States
Exclusive competence USTR principal
responsibility
Foreign Direct
Investment
Shared competence
between the EU and
its Member States
Exclusive competence USTR principal
responsibility
Source: Opinion 1/94, Treaty of Lisbon (EU) and Office of the US Trade Representative (US)
At the same time, the expansion of the EU’s CCP coverage has also brought about institutional changes,
with the introduction of small amendments to the Council’s decision-making procedures and the
introduction of full co-decision powers for the European Parliament in trade-related matters. Save for a
number of exceptions which have now been clarified in the Lisbon Treaty,131 the Council ‘shall act by a
qualified majority’ when negotiating and concluding international agreements,132 and has thus retained
its decision-making powers in trade policy – including the mandate to authorize the EC to engage in
trade negotiations.
The most drastic change, however, has come in the form of the newly empowered European Parliament
which has been, in a role increasingly similar to that of the US Congress, increasingly involved in the
conduct of trade affairs (see infra, table 2). Taking into account the observation that the European
Parliament has been adamant in linking trade relations to beyond-trade issues such as human rights,133
this means that the European Parliament is now well-equipped to ensure ‘good governance through
trade’ (see infra, section 4.2). Indeed, the Lisbon treaty enhanced the EP’s mandate in trade-related
affairs in three important ways.
First, the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ – read: co-decision – is now applicable for the adoption of ‘the
measures defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy’.134 This means that
130 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, ‘Trade Policy one year into the Lisbon Treaty’, 2010. Available online:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201012/20101207ATT07748/20101207ATT07748EN.pdf, accessed
on 28.8.2014.
131 Subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Article 207(4) TFEU.
132 Art. 207(4) TFEU.
133 Gstöhl, supra, n. 123.
134 Art. 207(2) TFEU.
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all essential EU trade legislation, such as on trade preferences and their potential human rights-related
aspects, should be adopted jointly by Parliament and Council. The EP, in other words, has hereby
gained an additional and important ‘power of co-legislation on human rights issues’.135 Recalling Art.
207 TFEU which stipulates that the CCP must now be pursued in the broader context of the EU’s human
rights principles as enshrined in Art. 21 TEU (see infra, section 5.2), the EP recently set a precedent in this
regard when it suspended the 1977 EEC-Syria cooperation on the grounds of human rights violations.136
Second, the EP must now grant its ‘hard power of consent’137 prior to the ratification of all EU trade
agreements.138 Not counting the conclusion of ‘agreements relate[d] exclusively to the common foreign
and security policy’139 or ‘agreements concerning monetary or foreign exchange regime matters’,140
where it does not play any role at all, the Parliament now has the ‘power to withhold consent to almost
all international agreements’.141 Soon after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP already
withheld its consent for the EU’s interim agreement on sharing banking data with the US via the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) in 2010, thereby strongly evoking
human rights-related concerns.142 Aimed at sharing securitized data under the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program (TFTP),143 the SWIFT agreement had raised a number of concerns regarding the
fundamental right to the protection of personal data as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights (ECFR).144 The EP also set an important precedent when it rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) on the basis of human rights-related concerns. Citing the possibility that the
agreement might ‘jeopardize citizens’ liberties’, ACTA rapporteur David Martin went on record as
stressing ‘the need to find alternative ways to protect intellectual property in the EU’.145 Third, whereas
prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament had been virtually absent from the negotiation of trade
agreements, it is now more prominently involved – a development which has been dubbed to be ‘a
degree of parliamentary scrutiny unparalleled in the field of international negotiations’.146 Indeed, the
European Commission is legally required to ‘report regularly […] on the progress of negotiations’147 to
the EP’s International Trade Committee (INTA), so that ‘the European Parliament shall be immediately
and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’.148
135 Bartels, L., ‘The European Parliament’s Role in relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment Agreements‘, European
Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, EXPO/B/DROI/2012-09, February 2014, p. 21.
136 EU Council, ‘Council Decision 2012/123/CFSP of 27 February 2012 amending Decision 2011/523/EU partially suspending
the application of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Syrian Arab Republic’,
L 54/18, 28.2.2012.
137 Richardson, L., ‘The Post-Lisbon Role of the European Parliament in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy: Implications for
Bilateral Trade Negotiations’, College of Europe, EU Diplomacy Paper No. 5, 2012, p. 5.
138 Art. 207(2) and (3) TFEU juncto art 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU.
139 Art. 218(6) TFEU.
140 Art. 219(3) TFEU.
141 Bartels, supra, n. 135, p. 21.
142 See, for instance, European Parliament, ‘SWIFT: European Parliament votes down agreement with the US’, Press Release,
IPR68674, 11.2.2010.
143 Bossong, R., ‘The Fight Against Terrorism: A Key Global Objective for the EU?’, in Boening, A. et al (eds.), Global Power
Europe – Vol. 2, Global Power Shift, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2013, p. 28.
144 Art. 8, ECFR.
145 See, for instance, European Parliament, ‘European Parliament rejects ACTA’, Press Release, IPR48247, 04.7.2012.
146 European Commission, ‘What did the Lisbon Treaty change?’, Factsheet, 14 June 2011. Available online:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/june/tradoc_147977.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
147 Art. 207(3) TFEU juncto art 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU.
148 Art. 218(10) TFEU.
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Table 2: Comparison between EU and US Parliamentary Involvement in Trade-related Matters, prior to and
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty149
Trade Issue EC-EP relations
in Trade (Nice)
EC-EP relations
in Trade (Lisbon)
USTR-Congress
relations
(1962 TEA)
USTR-Congress
relations
(1974 TA)
Trade policy
framework
Commission shall
submit proposals
to the Council for
implementing the
common
commercial policy
(Article 133 (2))
EP and Council shall
adopt the measures
defining the
framework for
implementing the
common
commercial policy
(Article 207(2))
Upon
recommendation
of Congress,
President selects
4 ‘congressional
delegates to
negotiations’150
Upon
recommendation
of congressional
committees,
Congress selects
10 ‘congressional
advisers for trade
policy and
negotiations’151
Negotiation of
Agreement
Commission shall
report to a special
committee
appointed by the
Council
(Article 133 (3))
Commission shall
report to EP’s INTA,
in addition to the
special
committee, on the
progress of
negotiations
(Article 207 (3))
Congress may
grant the
President TPA for
five years
President
required to
submit for
congressional
review a copy of
each concluded
agreement and a
presidential
statement
explaining
why the
agreement was
necessary
Congress may
grant the
President TPA for
five years
President
required to
submit for
congressional
review a copy of
each concluded
agreement and a
presidential
statement
explaining
why the
agreement was
necessary
Conclusion of
Agreement
No formal role EP Council must obtain
EP consent
(Article 218 (6)(a)(v))
USTR/President USTR/President
US Trade Actors and competences The US the Constitution assigns the authority to ‘regulate commerce
with foreign nations’ and to ‘lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises’152 to its legislative branch,
149 Supra, n. 130.
150 Public Law 87-794, 11.10.1962, SEC. 243, p. 878.
151 Trade Act of 1974, Sec. 161, p. 45.
152 Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution.
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Congress. Under Article II of the US Constitution, the President has the sole authority to negotiate and
conclude trade agreements. However, as part of the executive branch, the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) has, as indicated by its mission statement, the ‘principal responsibility for
administering U.S. trade agreements’.153 Legally, the President can act on behalf of Congress in certain
cases, by way of receiving ‘Trade Promotion Authority’ from Congress.154 The USTR also acts as the
President’s principal advisor on trade-related issues, and can thus be analysed on a par with DG Trade in
their respective mandates to develop and coordinate international trade and foreign direct investment
policies. In terms of intra-institutional coordination in practice, there are inter-agency working groups
through which the Labor Department, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the USTR come together and discuss potential labour rights-
related implications of US international trade policies.155 To this end, a Labor Advisory Committee was
set up under the joint auspices of the USTR and the Department of Labor. As stipulated by its founding
Charter, its objectives are:
‘[t]o advise, consult with, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Labor and the United States
Trade Representative jointly, on issues and general policy matters concerning labor and trade
negotiations, operation of any trade agreement once entered into, and other matters arising in
connection with the administration of the trade policy of the United States’.156
Should the occasion to negotiate and conclude an international trade agreement arise, the Labor
Advisory Committee is mandated to ‘provide reports on trade agreements to the President, the
Congress, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative at the conclusion of negotiations for
each trade agreement’.157 In addition to its role as an inter-agency coordination mechanism, the Labor
Advisory Committee also invites a wide range of civil society representatives to participate as
Committee Members. Currently composed of 23 members, its designated website lists representatives
from across the spectrum of public- and private sector actors. Unlike the situation in the EU where
relevant actors are poised to meet when the situation calls for it, the Committee meets on an
institutionalized regular basis. As one respondent pointed out, however, the relevant US actors do meet
more frequently in the case of ‘high-profile trade agreements, when much is at stake’, in order ‘to keep
the iron hot’ and to coordinate messages when dealing with external stakeholders.158 Ensuring system-
wide coordination, the conclusions of the Labor Advisory Committee Meetings subsequently feed into
the labour-rights related sections of the DRL’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
EU Trade Policies: from ‘elusive’ to ‘exclusive’ competences As ‘unparalleled’ as the EP’s scrutiny in
trade-related matters may be, it has not yet achieved a level of political leverage which is comparable to
the US, where both the legislative and executive actors play a defining role in the development and
execution of trade agreements.159 This divergence may be explained by an interplay of institutional and
153 Supra, n. 129.
154 For a comprehensive analysis, see Cooper, W., ‘Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy’,
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 13.1.2014, p. 1. TPA is defined as ‘the authority Congress grants to
the President to enter into certain reciprocal trade agreements, and to have their implementing bills considered under
expedited legislative procedures, provided the President observes certain statutory obligations’.
155 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 14.3.2014.
156 Charter of the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy. Available online:
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmental-affairs/advisory-committees/labor-advisory-committee-lac, accessed on
28.8.2014.
157 Charter of the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy. Available online:
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/intergovernmental-affairs/advisory-committees/labor-advisory-committee-lac, accessed on
28.8.2014.
158 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 14.3.2014.
159 Cooper, supra, n. 154, p. 2.
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historical factors. In the EU, the EP had little to no means of effectively scrutinizing trade and investment
policies, especially with regard to their human rights implications, before the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the EP’s INTA had only been created in 2004,160 while to date no unit within DG
Trade deals exclusively with parliamentary affairs.161 By the same token, the EP’s Subcommittee on
Human Rights was also only ‘reconstituted’ in 2004.162 Although the Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s Action
Plan on Human Rights have recently instigated more EC-EP collaboration in this regard, many
respondents noted that this collaboration still remains ‘ad hoc’ without any clear guidance as to how to
systematically ensure cooperation on a recurring basis. In certain instances, EU respondents even
indicated that they were in the mere process of developing a framework for inter-institutional
cooperation on human rights-related trade issues.163 Given the relative lack of institutional memory in
this regard, this finding should perhaps not come as a surprise.
In the US, by contrast, the USTR has been working closely with Congress ‘since its creation’ in the early
1960s.164 Whereas until then, US trade and investment policies were tucked away under the auspices of
the US State Department, this situation changed when Congress adopted the 1962 Trade Expansion
Act, which established a Special Representative for Trade ‘who shall hold office at the pleasure of the
President’.165 Ensuring system-wide collaboration, the Act called for the establishment of an
‘interagency trade organization’ under the chairmanship of the USTR, and composed of the ‘heads of
such departments and of such other officers as the President shall designate’166 with a mandate to
formulate recommendations to the President on trade and investment policies. In order to ensure
parliamentary scrutiny, finally, the Act also established the practice of ‘congressional delegates to
negotiations […] who shall be accredited as members of the United States delegation to such
negotiation’.167 Reiterating former President [John F.] Kennedy’s remarks upon signing the Act,
expressing his ‘strong appreciation to the members of the Congress who were so greatly involved in the
passage of this bill’,168 the USTR Office notes that it indeed ‘reflected Congressional interest in achieving
a better balance between competing domestic and international interests in formulating and
implementing U.S. trade policy’.169 One such manifestation of that balance was the requirement of an
annual Congressional authorization in order to grant ‘most favored nation trade status for countries
with nonmarket economies’.170 In the decades that followed, Congress continued to enhance the USTR’s
responsibilities, including by adopting the 1974 Trade Act which instilled the USTR’s accountability vis-
160 Woolcock, S., ‘Trade Policy: A Further Shift Towards Brussels’, in Helen Wallace, Mark Pollack and Alasdair Young (eds.),
Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 389.
161 Within the Directorate on ‘Resources, Information and Policy Coordination’, there is a unit responsible for general ‘Policy
Coordination and Inter-Institutional Relations’, to which the relations with the European Parliament also pertain. See DG
Trade’s organogram. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/contacts/people/, accessed on
28.8.2014.
162 EP’s DROI Subcommittee homepage. Available online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/droi/home.html,
accessed on 28.8.2014.
163 Interview with EU officials, Brussels, 18.3.2014.
164 Supra, n. 129.
165 Public Law 87-794, 11.10.1962, SEC. 241, p. 878.
166 Public Law 87-794, 11.10.1962, SEC. 242, p. 878.
167 Public Law 87-794, 11.10.1962, SEC. 243, p. 878.
168 See President John F. Kennedy’s remarks upon signing the Trade Expansion Act. Available online:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8946, accessed on 28.8.2014.
169 USTR History on designated homepage. Available online: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/history, accessed on 28.8.2014.
170 Brimmer, E., ‘The United States, the European Union, and International Human Rights Issues’, Center for Transatlantic
Relations, Washington D.C., 2002, p. 3.
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à-vis both the President and Congress,171 established an Office dealing solely with ‘Congressional Affairs’
within the USTR,172 and thus consolidated its ‘pivotal role’ in US trade and investment policies.173
4.2 Objectives and policy context: trade and human rights
The Inter-linkages between Trade and Human Rights In the last two decades, human rights provisions
have increasingly been integrated into a growing number of unilateral, bilateral and regional trade
policy instruments and tools. The bulk of this expansion is due to the heightened speed at which both
the EU and the US, as the world’s most powerful trade actors, have been concluding ‘new generation
trade agreements’ in a rapidly changing international context.174 Indeed, as one scholar observed,
‘commerce, on the face of it, has never looked so principled’.175 In light of the contentious debate
surrounding the ‘shot-gun wedding’176 of trade and human rights, however, this recent development
has been rather remarkable. Although the International Labour Organization (ILO) had already declared
in its Constitution that the ‘the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle
in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries’,177 the 1996
Ministerial meeting of the WTO in Singapore declared the protection of such conditions to pertain to
the ILO’s competence. In the resulting ‘Singapore Consensus’, the signatories ‘reject[ed] the use of
labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree[d] that the comparative advantage of countries,
particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way [be] put into question’.178 As a result, WTO
agreements are ‘virtually silent’179 on the human rights-related aspects of trade agreements.180
The Treaty of Lisbon brought forth an expansion of the EU’s CCP to not only encompass a broader
portfolio of international trade and foreign direct investment policies, but also to link the EU’s
commercial agenda to the projection of what it considers to be foundational values. Placed within the
remit of ‘external action by the Union’,181 the EU’s CCP policies are now poised to be guided by the
human rights provisions as laid down in Article 21(1) TEU,182 thereby reflecting an overall spirit of
‘consistency’183 and ‘good governance through trade’ . The United States, by contrast, seems to be more
succinct in its objectives of pursuing international trade policies. Although the pivotal 1974 Trade Act
also pronounces ‘to promote the development of an open, non-discriminatory, and fair world economic
171 Trade Act of 1974. Available online: http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/TRADE74.PDF, accessed on 28.8.2014.
172 USTR Relations with Congress. Available online: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/congressional-affairs, accessed on
28.8.2014.
173 Supra, n. 169.
174 Carbone, M. and Orbie, J., ‘Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: the European Union and the trade-development
nexus‘, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 20(1), 2014, p. 1-9.
175 Hafner-Burton, E., Forced to be Good. Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2009, p.
4.
176 Aaronson, S. and Chauffour, J.P., ‘The Wedding of Trade and Human Rights: Marriage of Convenience or Permanent
Match?’, WTO Publications, Geneva, 2011.
177 ILO Preamble to the Constitution. Available online:
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO, accessed on 28.8.2014.
178 Singapore WTO Ministerial 1996, ‘Ministerial Declaration Wt/Min(96)/Dec’, 18.12.1996. This statement was later reaffirmed
in the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration.
179 Brown, D., Deardorff, A. and Stern, R., ‘Labor Standards and Human Rights: Implications for International Trade and
Investment’, University of Michigan, IPC Working Paper Series No. 119, 2011, p. 1.
180 The only reference made to such standards in the WTO context is enshrined in Article XX(e) GATT 1947, which allows
WTO members to prohibit trade ‘relating to the products of prison labour’.
181 Part Five, External Action by the Union, Articles 205 – 214 TFEU.
182 Art. 205 TFEU.
183 Art. 21(3) TEU.
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system’184 it explicitly links this mission to labour rights-related provisions by evoking the need to
‘provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor […] and to assist industries,
firms, workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows’.185 In doing so, it thus
pays considerably less attention than the EU to the comprehensive human rights principles as
enshrined in Article 21(1) TEU. Indeed, paving the way for today’s US trade and investment policies, the
1962 Trade Expansion Act had already proclaimed to ‘promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and
security of the United States through international trade agreements and through adjustment
assistance to domestic industry, agriculture, and labor’.186
Echoing the fear for instilling protectionist measures in disguise, some have questioned the very
rationale for integrating human rights into trade policies,187 or have even posited that these areas
‘diverge at the theoretical level’.188 Still others have pondered whether the sticks-and-carrot approach of
tying material benefits to the compliance with certain standards might, in fact, provide one of the few
reliable and effective ways to enforce human rights protection worldwide.189 In the midst of this debate,
the EU and the US focus has increasingly shifted from concluding multilateral agreements within the
WTO to pursuing bilateral trade routes with strategic partners instead. Faced with the frustrations
surrounding the everlasting Doha Round stalemate190 and the perceived regulatory deficit of human
rights governance,191 it perhaps comes as no surprise that both actors have increasingly opted for a
bilateral ‘Plan B’.192
Promoting the Trade-Human Rights Nexus Given the above mentioned and operating at the frontline
of the trade-human rights nexus which falls outside the scope of the WTO, both the EU and the US use a
combination of two broad avenues to pursue their trade agenda: unilateral (non-reciprocal) policies and
bilateral (reciprocal) trade agreements. In practice, the EU and the US have been granting preferential
tariff cuts to developing countries in exchange for the implementation of human rights standards under
their unilateral Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP), and have also been including human rights
clauses in their bilateral trade agreements – albeit to a lesser extent. Following the slightly divergent
approach towards their respective trade objectives, the EU defines its guiding human rights principles
as constituting broader and more transversal rights, while the US mainly focuses on the integration of
labour standards in particular.193
184 Preamble, Trade Act of 1974, Public Law 93–618, as amended.
185 Sec. 2, Trade Act of 1974, Public Law 93–618, as amended, p. 7.
186 Public Law 87-794, 11.10.1962, Preamble, p. 872.
187 Schneider, F., ‘Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences: Legitimacy, Legality and
Reform’, Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien, Vol. 3, 2012, p. 301-328.
188 Ibrahim, A., ‘International Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished Debate’, German Law Journal, Vol. 14(1), 2013, p. 322.
189 Hafner-Burton, E., ‘Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression’,
International Organization, Vol. 59(3), 2005, p. 593-629.
190 Hartman, S., ‘The WTO, the Doha Round Impasse, PTAs, and FTAs/RTAs’, International Trade Journal, Vol. 27(5), 2013, p.
411.
191 Pogge, T., World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity, Cambridge, 2008, p. 25.
192 Keukeleire and Delreux, supra, n. 59, p. 199.
193 Kerremans, B. and Martins Gistelinck, M., ‘Interest Aggregation, Political Parties, Labour Standards and Trade: Differences
in the US and EU Approaches to the Inclusion of Labour Standards in International Trade Agreements’, European Foreign
Affairs Review, Vol. 14, 2009, p. 683-701. See also Aaronson, S. and Zimmerman, J., Trade imbalance: the struggle to weigh
human rights concerns in trade policymaking, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
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4.3 Main instruments
4.3.1 Unilateral/non-reciprocal trade instruments
Human Right Provisions As the oldest trade instrument to employ normative conditionalities through
commercial incentives, the GSP was established at the 1968 United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in New Delhi. According to Resolution 21 (ii), ‘[…] the objectives of the
generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of the developing
countries, including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries,
should be: (a) to increase their export earnings; (b) to promote their industrialization; and (c) to
accelerate their rates of economic growth’.194 The so-called ‘Enabling Clause’,195 adopted in 1979 as part
of the GATT Tokyo Round, granted permanent validity to the GSP.196 The EU and the US were amongst
the first global actors to establish their GSP schemes in 1971 and 1974 respectively,197 and to gradually
integrate human rights provisions in their respective policies. While the EU claims its scheme to be ‘the
flagship EU trade policy instrument supporting sustainable development and good governance in
developing countries’,198 the US variants have also been hailed for being ‘the chief policy vehicle in US
law to promote [human rights] principles’.199
The US Generalized System of Preferences The US was the first actor to effectively integrate this
conditionality in its GSP scheme. Backed by a strong Congress controlled by Democrats, President
Reagan signed the GSP Renewal Act of 1984200 and thereby made GSP benefits conditional upon
whether the country was ‘taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights’.201 In addition,
the Act also foresaw procedural guidelines to file complaints against a country’s GSP status in the case
of labour rights violations, which could possibly lead to an investigation launched by the USTR and
ultimately result in the suspension of trade preferences.202 Perhaps most importantly, and following a
long period of political meandering in Congress,203 it also consolidated the applicable definition of such
rights, which would continue to be utilized in current GSP schemes and throughout the designated
‘labour chapters’ of present-day Free Trade Agreements (FTAs, infra). In the years that followed, the US
increasingly strengthened the labour provisions in its GSP scheme,204 ranging from the 1985 inclusion of
labour provisions in the legislation governing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)205 to
194 See designated UNCTAD information about GSP. Available online: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/About-
GSP.aspx, accessed on 28.8.2014.
195 See, for more background information, Wouters, J. and De Meester, B., The World Trade Organization. A Legal and
Institutional Analysis, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2007, p. 65-68, paras 88-92.
196 WTO Decision of 28.11.1979 (L/4903), ‘Differential and more favourable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of
developing countries’. Available online: http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm, accessed on
28.8.2014.
197 The UNCTAD Secretariat lists a total of 13 national schemes, including Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria (consolidated under the
EU), Canada, Estonia (consolidated under the EU), the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation,
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America.
198 European Commission, ‘Communication on Trade, Growth and Development. Tailoring trade and investment policy for
those countries most in need’, COM(2012) 22 final, Brussels, 27.1.2012, p. 13.
199 Compa, L., and Vogt, J.S., ‘Labor rights in the generalized system of preferences: a 20-year review’, Comparative Labour
Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 22, 2000, p. 199.
200 GSP Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3019.
201 19 U.S.C.A § 2462(b)(2)(G).
202 Regulations of the U.S. Trade Representative Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and Countries for the Generalized System
of Preferences Program, 15 C.F.R. § 2007 et seq., 2002.
203 Compa and Vogt, supra, n. 199, p. 203-204.
204 Ibid. p. 205-206.
205 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191 a(a)(1).
A Comparative study of EU and US approaches to Human Rights in External Relations
45
the 2000 establishment of the flagship African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Andean Trade
Preference Act (ATPA), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which were all effectively made
conditional upon the compliance with labour rights as defined in the original GSP Act.206 In terms of
implementation, the US GSP is governed by Title V of the 1974 Trade Act, under which the executive
branch has the sole competence to grant or withdraw GSP preferences by unilateral Presidential
proclamation.207 As in many other cases of US external action, however, there is also a certain ‘tension in
the twilight zone’,208 as the GSP scheme has to be periodically reauthorized and extended by US
Congress – most notably, by the Ways and Means committee in the House of Representatives –
reinforcing the leverage of the legislative branch over human rights provisions in the GSP. Most
recently, the GSP scheme was extended until 31 July 2013, in Section 1 of P.L. 112-40. This means that,
at the time of writing, US Congress is still in the process of considering a renewal of the GSP scheme.209
The EU Generalized System of Preferences The EU followed suit from 1991 onwards, when it first
included a provision of ‘positive conditionality’ in its GSP schemes with a number of Latin American
countries, in order to reward progress made on combating drug trafficking.210 The possibility of
withdrawing preferences in light of evidence of forced labour as defined in the Geneva Conventions
(1926 and 1956) and the ILO Conventions (No 29 and 105) was subsequently introduced in the first GSP
Regulation.211 Against the backdrop of the 1995 UN World Summit for Social Development in
Copenhagen, as well as the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights, the EU was
prompted to revise its scheme in 2001, which extended its legal basis ‘to correspond with all the eight
fundamental Conventions of the ILO’,212 for both the incentive and the withdrawal clause. Since the
reform of the EU’s GSP scheme following the WTO Appellate Body Report in the 2004 case EC Tariff
Preferences, the EU’s GSP has consisted of three distinct arrangements, which have been slightly
amended following the most recent 2014 reform.213 The Generalized Preferences Committee is
mandated to ‘examine any matter relating to the application of th[e] [GSP] Regulation, raised by the
Commission or at the request of a Member State’.214 Hitherto established by the 2008 GSP Regulation,215
the GSP Committee is composed of representatives of the Commission, EEAS, the EP’s INTA committee
and the individual Member States, and meets on a regular basis to discuss the economic, social and
206 19 U.S.C.A. § 3703(a)(1)(F).
207 Blanchard, E., and Hakobyan, S., ‘The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences in Principle and Practice’, Tuck
School of Business, Working Paper No. 2439798, 2013, p. 5.
208 Henkin, supra, n. 20, p. 888.
209 USTR designated homepage about the US GSP. Available online: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-
development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp, accessed on 28.8.2014.
210 Portela, C. and Orbie, J., ‘Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and foreign policy: coherence by
accident?’, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 20(1), 2014, p. 65.
211 Council Regulation (EC) No 3281/94 of 19.12.1994 applying a four-year scheme of generalized tariff preferences (1995 to
1998) in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries.
212 Portela and Orbie, supra, n. 210, p. 65.
213 ‘Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25.10.2012 applying a scheme of
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political impacts of the scheme.216 In practice, EU GSP preferences, from either the general or specialized
scheme, have been withdrawn on only three occasions.
Although no official information is publicly available to assess the current number of labour rights
reviews in the US, interview findings and previously conducted evaluations confirm the perception that
the US is, in fact, a more adamant enforcer of human rights provisions through trade than the EU. When
it comes to withdrawing GSP preferences, the maxim that ‘when all you have is a hammer, every
problem looks like a nail’217 still seems to hold for the US to a large extent. Indeed, in the US between
1984 and 2001 alone, more than 100 reviews of countries’ labour rights records were conducted, as a
result of which 13 countries were suspended from GSP benefits and 17 were temporarily extended
pending the results of continuing review.218 In view of the EU’s much more limited track record in
suspending GSP benefits, therefore, it perhaps comes as no surprise that one observer employed a
modified maxim to describe the role of EU sanctions in EU Foreign Policy: ‘when all you have are carrots,
every problem looks like a rabbit’.219
GSP: empty shell or springboard for human rights? The GSP tends to trigger some ‘strongly diverging
partisan views’. Whereas some regard it as a ‘springboard for the promotion of human rights’, others
have debunked the instrument for being ‘an empty shell’.220 The EU’s GSP has not remained devoid of
criticism with regard to its effective promotion of human rights throughout its schemes. Scholars from
across several disciplines have accused the EU of employing ‘double standards’,221 espousing a
‘dichotomy between norms and interests’,222 whereby the procedure behind the granting and
withdrawing of GSP preferences has been noted to be ‘lacking in transparency’.223 In addition, the EU
has also been questioned upon its reluctance to employ sanctions in the context of its GSP scheme,224
and this in spite of the observation that the EU has been imposing a panoply of sanctions with
increasing frequency in recent years.225 With regard to the US GSP scheme, criticism has been raised on
five fronts. First, it is noted that the reference to ‘internationally recognized worker rights’ does not
explicitly mention multilateral frameworks, including ILO Conventions, pertinent human rights treaties
or any other benchmarks of high international standing. As a result, some have argued that the US has
been undermining multilateral efforts to forge internationally consistent norms.226 Second, due to the
unilateral nature of the GSP, some have raised the point that third country partners cannot negotiate its
terms,227 and therefore view the scheme as an example of ‘aggressive unilateralism’ or even ‘global
bullying by the United States’,228 Third, the US decision-making process has been faulted with assigning
216 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 12.5.2014.
217 Lehne, S., ‘The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, p. 1.
218 Compa and Vogt, supra, n. 199, p. 208-209. See also Brown, Deardorff and Stern, supra, n. 179, p. 4.
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220 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 12.5.2014.
221 Fierro, E., The European Union’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, Martinus Nijhoff, The
Hague/London/New York, 2003, p. 378.
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too much power to the USTR which may decide ‘whether to accept the case (a prosecutor’s role), to
hear the case (a judge’s role), to weigh the evidence (a jury’s role), and to apply the sanction (an
executioner’s role)’.229 Fourth, the US has been deemed hypocritical in requiring labour standards
without itself having ratified a number of important treaties: for instance, the US is not a party to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Finally, in spite of the seemingly long
list of complaints filed against GSP beneficiaries’ human rights records, it has been argued that the
‘merits of a petition have little bearing on the outcome of a case’. Instead, ‘geopolitics and foreign policy
are the chief considerations in applying the GSP labor rights clause, not the merits of a country’s
compliance or non-compliance with the law’.230
4.3.2 Bilateral trade agreements
FTAs and the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ principle and the integration of human rights FTAs constitute
reciprocal trade benefits between two or more concluding parties. These ‘Preferential Trade
Agreements’ (PTAs) or ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ (RTAs) are often – but not always - concluded
between a developed and a developing country (or group of countries), where the developed country
grants preferential market access to the developing country in the form of low tariffs or high import
quota. Under international trade law, PTAs thus constitute a deviation from the ‘Most Favoured Nation’
(MFN) principle, which foresees that, in a bid to liberalize trade relations around the world, any country
must receive the same trade benefits as those of the most favoured nation with which the country
granting such preferential treatment is engaged. Whereas human rights standards used to be merely
linked to unilateral measures such as the GSP without placing an obligation on the EU or the US to
uphold human rights,231 they have now been expanded into the delicate realm of bi- and multilateral
PTAs – thereby creating reciprocal obligations for the contracting parties under international law to
protect human rights.
In the EU, human rights have formed an ‘essential element’ or ‘suspension clause’ in all framework
agreements since 1995. This means that the EU may suspend or even terminate bilateral agreements in
the case of serious human rights violations (see also link with the suspension mechanisms under the
Cotonou Agreement, infra).232 In the years leading up to the human rights momentum brought forth by
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU pronounced a number of commitments to ‘deliberately put ‘sustainable
development’ and ‘social solidarity’ at the heart of EU trade policy discourse’.233 Ranging from the 2004
Communication on the ‘Social Dimension of Globalization’ and the 2006 ‘Global Europe’ Strategy, to the
2009 Council Guidelines on the use of such provisions in trade agreements, the major breakthrough
eventually came with the adoption of the 2012 Human Rights Action Plan in which the EU pledged to
‘make trade work in a way that helps human rights’.
Similar to the EU, the integration of labour standards in US FTAs is also found to have taken off from the
mid-1990s onwards, with the adoption of the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation
(NAALC) as an annex to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).234 As has been noted
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above, this development followed the precedent set by the 1984 GSP Renewal Act.235 Signed between
the Canadian, Mexican and US governments, the 1994 NAALC constitutes the first labour agreement to
have been negotiated as part of a PTA. According to the designated Secretariat of the Commission for
Labor Cooperation, mandated to oversee its effective implementation, NAALC is unique in that it
‘provides a mechanism for member countries to ensure the effective enforcement of existing and future
domestic labor standards and laws […], to improve working conditions and living standards, and to
protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights’.236
Comparing EU and US human rights conditionalities in FTAs The table in the annex to this study maps
and compares the different countries with which the EU and the US have already concluded FTAs. For
the sake of maintaining a certain level of comparability in the myriad of FTAs which are currently being
negotiated by both actors, the table takes as a point of departure those countries where an FTA is in
place with either the EU, the US or both, in order to subsequently highlight the prominence of human
rights considerations contained therein. Drawing on this table, it once again emerges that the EU is a
more reluctant enforcer of human rights provisions through FTAs than the US. As noted by the ILO in a
recent assessment, in the EU’s case the enforcement of human rights provisions tends to be rather
weak. Even in those cases where complaint mechanisms are available, they have seldom been put into
motion. Reflecting the US conditional approach, it is interesting to note that in the four cases in which a
complaint mechanism has been used, the ILO comes to the conclusion that these always involved the
US.237 Still, it adds, ‘no complaint has given rise to a decision of a dispute settlement body or even led to
sanctions’.238
EU missing FTA targets vs. US consolidated FTA models First, as evidenced by the comparative analysis
in the table in the Annex, the EU seems to be employing a number of moving targets when integrating
human rights provisions in its FTAs. Contrary to the US FTA model framework, in which every country is
subject to almost identical provisions in every bilateral trade agreement, the EU FTA model integrates a
so-called ‘Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter’ which substantially differs from one trade
agreement to the next. Although the same themes recur in the Preamble to an EU trade agreement, in
which references are made to the ‘commitment to the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights’, as well as to the ‘objective of sustainable development, including […]
respect for labour rights’, the EU does not uphold the same level of consistency as the US, which
prescribes an entire chapter on ‘Labor’ and the adhering ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, in which each article spells out the precise scope of each labour right and standard upon
which the US FTA has been made conditional. Indeed, as has been remarked elsewhere, ‘contrary to the
US’s agreements, the standards used [in EU agreements] to evaluate the respect of the labour rights by
the contracting parties seem to be stemming from international rather than national labour law, as the
standards adopted by the ILO are the main point of reference’.239 It follows, therefore, that the US FTA
model pinpoints labour rights conditionalities in a more concrete manner than the EU FTA model,
where labour standards are not merely limited to the ILO Declaration, but also refer to much broader
notions of human rights promotion in general.
EU carrots vs. US sticks The differences in FTA models are partly a result of the differences in the
institutional and political context within which the EU and the US are respectively embedded. Indeed, in
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the US, backed by a relatively strong Congress, the ‘political process’240 is said to play a fundamental role
in stipulating the conditions for the ratification of trade agreements, which has resulted in the
requirement to make FTAs conditional upon the compliance with labour standards, prior to their
approval by Congress, since 2006.241 According to several US respondents, this policy development
mirrors a growing sense in both public opinion and an adamant Congress that the domestic
implications of economic globalization should not be ignored. Given the recent political climate in the
US and the disposition of Congress to effectively influence US trade agreements, it perhaps comes as no
surprise that in six out of seven trade agreements which have been concluded since the 2006
requirement, the ILO found that ‘pre-ratification conditionality has contributed to significant reforms of
domestic labour legislation and practice’.242 A telling example in this regard was the contentious US-
Oman FTA which, prior to its conclusion, had been subject to a significant amount of Congressional
pressure because of serious labour rights concerns.243 Citing the outcome as a tremendous contribution
to labour rights protection on the ground, one respondent confirmed that, because of Congress’
commitment, ‘President Bush had to address the union issue before signing the FTA, and Oman actually
changed its labour laws’.244 In a similar vein, there had been a heated debate surrounding the US-
Bahrein FTA, especially given the context of the Arab Spring when, as one respondent noted, ‘the US
really wanted to be vocal on human rights but realized it had lost a lot of credibility in the region’. When
the AFL-CIO subsequently filed a complaint, ‘US diplomats were happy that they could play the labor
rights card and use the FTA leverage as a means to be vocal on human rights issues in the region’. 245 In
view of its rather forceful foreign policy credentials, however, it seems that the US only employs trade
instruments when the first option of traditional foreign policy is not immediately at hand. The EU,
meanwhile, is faced with a traditional foreign policy which is still, euphemistically speaking, at a
‘complicated crossroads’.246
4.4 Recommendations
Recommendations on integrating human rights into EU trade policies
 Consistently apply human rights conditionality in trade by employing the same standard
clauses in all EU international agreements The EU may learn from the rather straightforward US
approach in consistently employing the same language, which has resulted in more narrowly
defined and thus more credible human rights-related trade policies.
 Ensure transparent decision-making by presenting annual EC reports on the trade-human
rights nexus to the EP and the Council Coherence and transparency in unilateral measures such
as GSP remain important signallers of credibility in external action. In response to the prevailing
criticism that the decision-making process behind the EU’s human rights-related trade policies
remain incoherent and opaque, the EC should present annual reports on the trade-human rights
nexus to the EP and the Council and seek synergies with the EP’s Annual Report on human rights
in the world.
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 Ensure accountability of human rights-related trade policies by establishing an agency tasked
with monitoring the EU’s conditionality policies If there is not the necessary political will to add
this task to the existing mission of the FRA of monitoring ‘internal’ fundamental rights issues
within the EU, an external human rights agency could be established to maintain an oversight of
human rights in all of the EU’s external relations, including clauses in all international agreements.
Recommendations on EU inter-institutional cooperation in EU trade policies
 Encourage the EEAS to take up its role as the ‘guardian of consistency’, in order to
systematically mainstream human rights into trade policies and to ensure COM-EEAS-EP
coordination in matters relating to the trade-human rights nexus This may be done by
expanding the established good practice of having institutionalized GSP Committee meetings
during which the Commission, EEAS and EP aim to formulate a common stance on GSP policies.
By the same token, a similar process may be envisaged to discuss EU international agreements on
a recurring basis.
 Encourage MEPs to take their role as human rights actors in trade-related affairs to heart The
EP should take up its empowered role as a human rights watchdog and effectively ensure that
‘trade works in a way that helps human rights’. In collaborating with the EEAS as the ‘guardian of
consistency’ (supra), a permanent representation of the HR/VP in parliamentary settings may be
considered to this end.
 Foster institutional memory in devising human rights-sensitive trade policies In light of the
myriad of human rights considerations relating to EU international agreements, there is a clear
need to consolidate all relevant human rights information surrounding these agreements in an
up-to-date database, which can be shared between the EU Institutions and the Member States.
Recommendations on EU-US Cooperation in international trade policies
 Forge a stronger partnership on human rights-related trade policies A stronger transatlantic
partnership may generate a higher degree of economic and political clout to arrive at a new
consensus on including non-trade issues in multilateral trade agreements. The EU and the US
may pull their collective weight to ease the current tensions surrounding the increasing scramble
for bilateral agreements and the declared moratorium on multilateral trade fora.
 Establish a platform for EP-Congress inter-parliamentary cooperation on human rights-
related aspects of foreign policy The EP and US Congress may reinvigorate a stronger
transatlantic partnership on human rights-related trade policies by establishing a platform for
inter-parliamentary cooperation across the Atlantic.
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5. DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Human rights and development are considered to be intimately connected, with a common emphasis
on issues of poverty, inequality, discrimination and injustice. Since the mid-1980s, and particularly since
the adoption of the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development by the UN General Assembly, the
mutual synergies between human rights and development have increasingly been addressed by
scholars, activists, and policy-makers. The past two decades have brought forth an increasingly
integrated framework within which human rights and development practitioners have been striving
towards one common working language. The concept of mainstreaming human rights in the area
of development cooperation247 has been taken up by a growing number of committed actors in the
development community. Development assistance in its various forms is often seen as a key tool for
advancing and addressing human rights in partner countries. Such efforts are strongly linked to US
and EU efforts in ‘democracy promotion’, which are further discussed in the case study under section
6.2.
5.1 Main actors
USAID and the US State Department Since its creation by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961,
USAID’s status as an independent development agency, and its relationship with the State Department,
has been a point of dispute. Several political initiatives have been undertaken to fully integrate USAID
into the USSD.248 Since 1995 the Secretary of State is the coordinator of all US economic aid programs.
249 The USAID administrator operates under the direct policy authority and foreign guidance of the
Secretary of State250. Despite several reforms, it has been noted that in practice ‘USAID’s relationship
with the USSD, both in Washington and in the field, has rested less on organizational lines of authority
than on informal personal relationships […].’251 Depending on the account/fund allocated by Congress,
either USAID or the USSD has direct control over the planning of development assistance. Similarly, in
the area of democracy assistance and human rights promotion, both USAID and the USSD develop
policies and each has their own budget to administer (see infra, section 6.2.3). Observers note that a
‘gradual erosion’ of USAID’s de facto autonomy in planning development policy has occurred,252 a
process catalysed by the creation of a ‘Foreign Assistance Bureau’ within the USSD charged with
aligning USAID’s budget and activities with foreign policy objectives.253 In addition, funding for
development assistance has been increasingly directed through new mechanisms, such as the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), or presidential initiatives. Reforming the fragmented
landscape of US foreign assistance has remained on the political agenda, with some calling for a
complete integration of all foreign assistance activities in the USSD, while others have called to upgrade
247 For this section we adopt the term ‘development assistance’ as comprising assistance for long-term economic
development and poverty alleviation, as well as ‘political aid’ for human rights promotion and democracy assistance, but
excluding military assistance and humanitarian aid, as well as the regulations and policies of development banks and
overseas investment funds or organizations.
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USAID’s status to ‘cabinet’ level.254 The Obama administration has sought to redefine the
relationship between USAID and USSD through the reform process under the Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) which seeks to ‘rebuild’ USAID as a ‘preeminent global
development institution’.255 The QDDR is part of a new emphasis on development policy as ‘a central
pillar’ of national security policy, on equal footing with diplomacy and defence.256
US Congress The US Congress directly allocates funding for US bilateral and multilateral development
assistance through the annual State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. Several
congressional authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees exert control over what
countries and what sectors receive more or less development funding.257 Moreover, by setting funding
levels and earmarking funding, Congress identifies certain priority countries and priority human rights
issues it wants to see addressed.258 In the adoption of new bills, such as the ADVANCE Democracy Act of
2007, Congress can authorize additional funding for assistance dedicated to human rights
promotion and democracy support.259 It is also able to set human rights conditions for certain
countries through adding specific provisions in budget appropriations. While such conditions are more
systematically attached to the provision of military assistance rather than economic assistance,260 the
recent 2014 allocations Act provides a salient example of how Congress can scrutinize USAID’s
activities. It prohibits funding for activities that may ‘directly or indirectly’ involve forced eviction in
certain regions of Ethiopia where USAID has been active.261 These prohibitions illustrate the broad
powers of Congress to scrutinize and influence US development policy, from the allocation of funding
to broad sectors or countries, down to the level of implementation of programmes.
DG DEVCO and the EEAS The establishment of a new DG ‘Development and Cooperation –EuropeAid’
(DG DEVCO)262 and the creation of the EEAS have significantly changed the decision making process
and management of EU development assistance, in particular since development programming is the
only specific policy area included in the EEAS’s mandate.263 Summarizing the new structure, the EEAS
and DG DEVCO are co-programming development cooperation, while DG DEVCO remains in charge of
the implementation of development policy.264 A set of Working Arrangements elaborates how the
Commission and the EEAS give shape to the EU’s development assistance policy; they ‘will perform their
respective tasks throughout the programming and implementation cycle in full transparency, informing
and consulting each other […]’.265 The working arrangement set out a division of work in the
allocation of development funding for 2014-2020, whereby the EEAS will lead in planning the
allocation of the European Development Fund (EDF), the  European Neighbourhood and Partnership
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Instrument (ENPI), and the Development Co-operation Instrument’s (DCI’s) geographic programming.266
The EEAS thus establishes the allocations for individual countries and regions - within the framework of
the regulations establishing the aforementioned financial instruments - in agreement with DG DEVCO.
The programming of thematic programmes under the DCI is undertaken by DG DEVCO in consultation
with the EEAS and other relevant EC services.267 An important exception here is the programming of
EIDHR, a thematic instrument specifically aimed at financing democracy and human rights promotion
(see section 6.2.3.), for which the strategic programming falls under the responsibility of the EEAS, with
DG DEVCO (or the FPI in case of electoral observation missions) to be consulted.268 In the drafting of
Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) or Regional
Indicative Programmes (RIPs) the EU Delegations - consisting of staff from DG DEVCO, the EEAS, and
other EC services - further coordinate. Such co-management between the EEAS and DG DEVCO is also
apparent in the new budget support policy, where both actors convene in the Budget Support Steering
Committee to decide what type of aid modality can be used in which countries (see infra, section 5.3.1).
European Parliament The European Parliament’s Development Cooperation Committee monitors the
EU’s annual budget for development assistance as part of the budgetary procedure consolidated by the
TFEU, which provides for joint powers of the EP and the Council to decide over all expenditure. In
proposing amendments to the budget under the titles for development cooperation, the EP is able to
influence decision-making. Moreover, the Multiannual Financial Framework and the regulations
establishing the EU’s financial instruments for development assistance also require the EP’s approval.
The financial instruments constituting EU development assistance, particularly the DCI, fall under the
scrutiny of the EP, but until recently its oversight over the Commission’s programming process was
constrained. Under the previous DCI Regulation (2007-2013), the programming of EU development
cooperation was consolidated through implementing acts, whereby the allocation of funding to
countries and sectors proposed by the Commission was reviewed and adopted by Commission
Committees consisting of Member States (i.e. the ”comitology” procedure).269 While Parliament could
scrutinize the draft implementing acts together with the Council, the Member States retained the
authority to approve these acts. The EP has claimed greater control and oversight over the
development programming process now that the Commission will adopt a list of elements framing
the areas of EU cooperation, in the form annexes, as delegated acts (instead of the hitherto co-decision
procedure). This empowers the EP to veto specific programming documents and allocations,
reinforcing its role in the decision-making process. In addition, a strategic dialogue between the
Commission and the EP has been introduced as a new element of procedure in the programming
process, thereby giving the latter more room to provide early input into the decision-making process.
After lengthy negotiations, this reform has been adopted in the new regulations establishing financial
266 Ibid. p. 17. The Regulation for the DCI includes six geographic programmes (i) Latin America (ii) South Asia (iii) North and
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these geographic programmes account for approximately 60% of the DCI Instrument’s total budget. See Regulation (EU) No
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instruments for development assistance.270 However, the EP’s ’power over the purse’ is limited when it
comes to the European Development Fund (EDF). Indeed, as the EU’s oldest and largest instrument for
financing development, the EDF consists of voluntary contributions from Member states and is thus not
part of the EU budget – in spite of financing the majority of the EU’s cooperation in ACP Countries.
While the EP’s consent was required in the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement which regulates the
EDF, the EP is unable to scrutinize the use of EDF funding directly.
5.2 Objectives and policy context
The majority of OECD donors, which together provide the bulk of the world’s Official Development
Assistance (ODA), see human rights and democracy as a constitutive element of development
cooperation. Whether development assistance should in the first instance promote economic growth
and poverty reduction, and address human rights and democracy only as a secondary objective,
remains a pertinent question for both the US and the EU. However, among the various objectives of
development cooperation, the pursuit of human rights and democracy has clearly proliferated in both
US and EU development policies.
US Development Policy and Human Rights As is the case in the broader domain of US foreign policy,
the emphasis of US development policy on human rights, rather than broader democracy promotion,
has fluctuated between administrations. Democracy promotion and support has been a constant
dimension of US development assistance and human rights have been a key aspect of USAID’s
‘democracy and governance’ agenda.271 However, disentangling how human rights substantially
influence or shape US development policy is less straightforward. Reference to respect for and the
advancement of human rights has been included in each of the USSD-USAID Joint Strategic Plans
since the first was launched in 2004, and the latest of such Plans adopts as a goal to ‘protect core US
interests by advancing democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society’.272A more explicit
emphasis on human rights, democracy and governance has emerged within USAID’s policy. The new
‘Strategy on Democracy Human Rights and Governance’ reaffirms that democracy, human rights and
governance constitute the foundation for the eradication of extreme poverty.273 This strategy sets
outs objectives relating to representative and inclusive political processes, accountability of institutions
and leaders to citizens, protection and promotion of universally recognized human rights, and
improving development outcomes through the integration of democracy, human rights and
governance. In this sense, one US official noted that issues of transparent and accountable governance
have come to the fore, and USAID has thereby adopted priorities reflecting those of European
development agencies, in particular the human rights policy elaborated by the Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA).274
EU Development Policy and Human Rights As early as 1991, the Commission underlined the
relationship between development policy and the ‘promotion and defense of human rights and
support for the democratic process in all developing countries’.275 Since then, human rights and
democracy have gradually come to the foreground of EU development policy. In 2006 the
‘European Consensus on Development Cooperation’ - a joint statement by the Council, the Member
270 Regulation (EU) No. 233/2014, supra, n. 262, Article 17(1).
271 USAID Center for Democracy and Governance, Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework, Report, 1998.
272 US Department of State and USAID, Strategic Plan FY 2014-2017, Report, 2014, p. 30.
273 USAID, ‘Strategy on Democracy Human Rights and Governance’, June 2013, p. 5.
274 Interview with US official, Washington, D.C., 13 March 2014.
275 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Human
Rights, Democracy and Development Cooperation Policy’, SEC(91)61 final, Brussels, 25.3.1991, p. 2.
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States, the European Parliament and the Commission - stated that progress in the protection of human
rights, good governance and democratization is fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable
development.276 In 2011, the Commission’s communication ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development
Policy: an Agenda for Change’ underlined that a focus on the EU’s partners’ commitments to human
rights, democracy and the rule of law should become a prominent feature of EU development
policy.277 Further defining this agenda, the Commission and the HR/VP set out a joint strategy entitled
‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a More Effective
Approach’.278 Of particular importance for development policy is the communication’s objective to
increase the EU’s ‘impact on the ground’ through ‘tailor-made approaches’.279 Building on these
communications, the Strategic Framework/ Action Plan adopted by the Council signalled further
engagement as it stated that a human rights-based approach’ (HRBA) to EU development
cooperation should be elaborated to ensure ‘the EU strengthens its efforts to assist partner countries in
implementing their international human rights obligations’.280 One of the key actions the Commission
has since realized is the adoption of a toolbox for implementing a ‘Rights-Based Approach,
Encompassing all Human Rights’ into its cooperation activities.281 Endorsing this new approach, the
Council notes that ‘several Member States are already developing or applying similar approaches for
the integration of human rights principles and standards in their development cooperation’.282 While
the implementation and impact of this comprehensive approach remain to be assessed, the strong
integration of human rights into EU development cooperation has been hailed as one of the most
significant achievements of the Strategic Framework and Action Plan.283
5.3 Policy approaches for human rights in development cooperation
5.3.1 Human rights as a condition for providing development assistance
Both the US and the EU have policy and legal frameworks in place for conditioning the provision of
development assistance on the human rights situation in a partner country. Human rights are often part
of a larger set of ‘democratic’ or ‘good governance’ conditions, which can relate to various aspects
such as anti-corruption policy and macro-economic performance. Conditions related to human rights
and democratic governance affect the allocation of assistance in several ways; the ‘eligibility’ of
countries to receive aid, the amount of aid allocated to a country, and the type of aid that is provided.
Human Rights and Aid Conditionality in the EU The EU’s legal and policy framework for taking into
account human rights when providing development assistance has evolved strongly since 1958, when
the European Economic Community started to engage in economic, financial and technical cooperation
with third countries. Since 1977, when all financial support to Uganda was suspended following large-
276 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’,
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Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an
Agenda for Change’, COM(2011) 637 final, Brussels, 13.10.2011, p. 5.
278 COM(2011) 886 final, supra, n. 44.
279 Ibid. p. 7.
280 OJ 11855/12, supra, n. 81, at 2.
281 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Toolbox. A Rights-Based Approach, Encompassing all
Human Rights for EU Development Cooperation’, SWD(2014) 152 final, Brussels, 30.4.2014.
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scale massacres the EU has sought to explicitly incorporate human rights as an essential element
in all its partnership agreements with third countries. In particular in its agreements with ACP
countries, the EU has elaborated a strong conditionality framework with human rights and democracy
at its centre.284
The use of human rights as a condition for cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries was first
institutionalized in the Lomé IV Agreement and the legal framework and instruments for applying
human rights-based conditionality were further developed in the revision of the Lomé Agreements and
in the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000.285 The Cotonou Agreement affirms respect for human rights,
adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of the ACP–EU
partnership. In case of a breach of any of these essential elements, a three step process is initiated, as
described under Article 96 of the Agreement.286 First, an ‘exhaustive political dialogue’ must be
undertaken between the concerned parties. If these efforts are not satisfactory, a consultation
procedure is launched in which the EU negotiates with the ACP country accompanied by friendly
countries, regional organizations and members of the ACP Secretariat. These enhanced dialogues are at
the centre of the Cotonou partnership; only if consultations are refused or when no agreement can be
found on a ‘roadmap’ acceptable to all parties, the adoption of ‘appropriate measures’ can be
considered, with suspension of the Agreement - and subsequent freezing of official aid - as a last resort.
Given the legally binding nature of Cotonou’s human rights clause, and the relative frequency with
which it has been invoked, the agreement still remains a strong tool to enforce human rights protection
in third countries. Indeed since 2000 alone, consultations and political dialogue under Article 96 have
been initiated on several occasions, primarily as a response to a military coup d’état. This was the case in
Fiji (2000 and 2007), Central African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2003), Mauritania (2005 and 2008),
Guinea (2009), and Madagascar (2009). In reaction to flawed elections, political dialogue was initiated in
Haiti (2000), Côte d’Ivoire (2001), Togo (2004), Guinea (2004), and in Niger (2009). With Liberia (2001)
and Zimbabwe (2001), dialogues were initiated on several human rights issues including lack of
freedom of expression.287 In general, the Article 96 consultations are initiated in response to a
confluence of political, security and human rights concerns, and individual instances of human rights
violations usually do not lead to the activation of the consultation procedure.288 In these dialogues on
human rights, there is a strong focus on political rights and less attention on social and economic
rights.289 Despite that the systematic inclusion of a ‘human rights clause’ in cooperation agreements
has become standard practice, the evocation of the ‘human rights clause’ to suspend or freeze EU
cooperation has mainly been applied in the context of the EU-ACP partnership under the Lomé IV and
Cotonou Agreements.
284 The Cotonou Agreement regulates ACP-EU cooperation and provides the framework under which assistance for the
European Development Fund (EDF) is used. The EDF, while managed and implemented by DEVCO and the EEAS, is not part
of the EU’s regular budget. For the first time, the programming, allocation and implementation of the EDF funding has been
aligned with the other instruments for development cooperation under the EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 2014-
2020.
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In addition to the use of human rights clauses to suspend agreements, the EU has further elaborated a
conditionality policy to determine how development funding is provided, e.g. what aid modality can be
used in which countries. This relates to the key issue of whether or not to provide assistance as
budget support to a partner government, and under what conditions this budget support should be
suspended. After consultations with Member States and other stakeholders, the Commission adopted
the ‘Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries’,290 which was endorsed by the Council
shortly after.291 This policy foresees a ‘tailor-made’ approach and proposes three types of budget
support ‘contracts’ to be allocated; ’Good Governance and Development Contracts’or general budget
support, ‘Sector Reform Contracts’, and ‘State Building Contracts’. One EU official indicated that the
number of countries receiving General Budget support will decrease significantly, indicating stricter
selectivity in terms of political and civil rights.292 Response to deteriorations should be ‘progressive and
proportionate’ and in first instance relies on initiating an ‘enhanced dialogue’. Where budget support is
suspended funds may be reallocated through project aid via NGOs. Insiders note that suspending
budget support based on human rights violations can imply a prioritization of some rights over
others. The recent example of Uganda, whereby the violation of LGBT rights led some donors to halt
budget support for programmes concerning maternal health, was considered to be problematic by
some of the interviewees.293
In addition to integrating human rights as negative conditions, the Commission also conditions its
development funding on positive conditions by offering more assistance to partner governments
which formulate plans for improving governance in line with democratic principles, including rule of
law and human rights protection. In the ACP region, such incentives were provided under the
‘Governance Initiative’ of the EDF (2008-2013) which foresaw a ‘governance incentive tranche’ for
partner governments. A similar approach can be found in the ‘governance facility’ of the ENPI 2007-
2010. The possibility of using incentives to reward performance in the area of democratic governance is
also part of the new budget support policy. While some of these experiences with positive
conditionalities have been disappointing in terms of impact, this ‘more for more’ approach to
incentivizing reforms has become a pronounced characteristic of the EU’s development assistance
policy as well as its democracy promotion efforts.
Human Rights and Aid Conditionality in the US Unlike the EU, the US’s conditionality policy towards
partner countries is more guided by general legislation rather than bilateral agreements.294A number of
amendments made to the FAA place clear restrictions on providing aid to governments which violate
human rights. In particular, section 508 of the FAA prohibits the provision of assistance to ‘any country
whose duly elected head of government is deposed by decree or military coup’. In 1975, Congress
adopted the Harkin amendment to the FAA, prohibiting economic assistance for the government of a
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights. Exceptions can be made where ‘extraordinary circumstances’ - routinely cited by the executive to
continue the provision of assistance295 – and when assistance will directly help needy people.296 The
290 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third
Countries’, COM(2011) 638 final, Brussels, 13.10. 2011.
291 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions, ‘The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries’,
Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 14.5.2012.
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vagueness in these provisions opens up loopholes which both Congress and the President can
exploit to continue providing assistance, by refraining from labelling a situation a military coup or by
not recognizing a ‘consistent pattern’ of human rights violations in a certain country.297 Furthermore, a
presidential waiver can be used for exemption based on national security grounds. In addition to these
general provisions in the FAA, more specific amendments and new acts have been adopted which lay
down more specific prohibitions on the provision of assistance for certain types of cooperation (e.g. the
International Financial Institutions Act of 1983) or for specific countries (e.g. the Zimbabwe Democracy
and Economic Recovery act of 2004).298 In recent years, suspensions or partial restrictions on
development assistance have been applied to several countries particularly in Africa, such as
Madagascar299 and Uganda.300
Greater attention to human rights and democratic governance has also come to the foreground in
the implementation of development policy by USAID. In addition to its new DRG strategy, USAID aims
to channel more assistance through partnerships with host country governments, and local NGOS and
private actors (instead of using US-based NGOs and contractors). Moving towards government-to-
government partnerships and using arrangements resembling the EU’s ‘budget support’ policy, USAID
identifies three types of country contexts which determine its approach to programming: authoritarian
regimes, hybrid regimes, and developing democracies.301 In this regard, USAID undertakes an
‘enhanced democracy, human rights and governance review’ (DRG review) to determine ‘whether a
government-to-government investment could empower a government at the expense of its people’.302
Countries which fall below an established democracy threshold will require an enhanced review in
addition to a standard appraisal.303 However, countries can be exempt from an enhanced review in
order to ‘avoid impairment of foreign assistance objectives’.304 The US also applies different ways of
positive conditionalities to incentivize the human rights performance of partner governments. The
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), established by Congress as a separate entity independent
from the State Department and USAID, illustrates this approach. The MCC provides extra development
funding in a select number of developing countries that demonstrate a commitment to political,
economic, and social reforms.305 It applies a set of indicators to determine a country’s eligibility for a
‘contract’ or ‘compact’, whereby the ‘civil liberties’ and ‘political rights’ indicators are considered
essential.306 The MCC currently operates in 30 countries around the world.307
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5.3.2 Human rights as a cross-cutting aspect in development planning
Policies introducing human rights as a cross-cutting aspect at the ‘micro-level’ of planning and
managing development programmes have been adopted by several donors. Often, such policies
identify specific groups which rights are neglected, unrecognized or violated, and aim to develop anti-
discriminatory measures. Such mainstreaming policies can thus address gender equality and
women’s rights, children’s rights, rights of persons with a disability, rights of indigenous people,
and LGBT rights. They reflect an ‘inward focus’, requiring US and EU development planning to engage
with these issues systematically. In the EU, policies for mainstreaming women’s rights and children’s
rights have been particularly well established through internal ‘action plans’.308 Separate toolkits have
been issued to guide development practitioners at ‘field level’ in operationalizing such
mainstreaming.309 Similarly, USAID has elaborated policies for systematically integrating ‘gender
equality and female empowerment’ in programming.310
In addition to policies focusing on specific issues of group discrimination, there is also a growing effort
being made by DG DEVCO and USAID to systematically integrate ‘democratic governance’ and a
‘human rights-based approach’ in their planning and implementation of projects and programmes.
DG DEVCO’s recent adoption of an ‘RBA tool-box’ for ‘integrating human rights principles into EU
operational activities’ at both field and HQ level, is illustrative.311 This toolbox provides a ‘qualitative
methodology to advance the analysis, design and implementation of development programme and
projects to better reach target - groups and to strengthen their access to basic services in all sectors of
intervention’.312 A similar ‘transversal’ approach has also been put forward in USAID’s Policy Framework
for 2011-2015, which notes that initiatives on democracy, human rights, and governance will be
integrated into other sectors, such as health programmes. Following this, the development of a cross-
cutting policy for democratic governance and human rights is one of the priorities included in USAID’s
Strategy for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance.313 USAID’s Center for Democracy, Human
Rights and Governance will thereby be responsible for the integration of ‘democracy, human rights and
governance principles and practices’ throughout USAID’s portfolio of interventions, ensuring that ‘work
in social and economic sectors also supports related political reform’.314 What substantive implications
these new approaches will have on how EU and US development assistance is provided remains an
open question as their implementation is still in an early phase.
5.4 EU-US coordination on human rights in development cooperation
Coordination in the field of development assistance between the EU and the US occurs through various
channels. The call for a ‘New Transatlantic Agenda for Development’ by former EU Commissioner for
Development, Mr. Louis Michel,315 was followed through when a reinvigorated ’EU-US Development
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Dialogue’ was launched in 2009.316 In this framework, a US-EU High Level Consultative Group
Meeting takes place annually, and exchanges among USAID and DG DEVCO staff at headquarters, and
in-country coordination are also understood to be part of this dialogue.317 The USSD (Bureau for
European Affairs) and the EEAS (US and Canada Division) are also part of the high-level dialogue and
related exchanges.318 In addition to this platform, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee
(OECD-DAC) offers a forum of exchange which brings together OECD donors.319 The particular question
of human rights and democratic governance has been at the centre of the OECD-DAC’s
Governance network, wherein both the USAID and the Commission engage and contribute to
broadening policy expertise among the donor community. Lastly, the EU and US delegations at regional
and country level further coordinate the planning and implementation of development assistance
programmes. Such coordination - a priority for donors since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness -
takes place within larger donor coordination groups at national level or sector level. Moreover, regular
informal consultations between USAID and DG DEVCO staff are also likely to be an important factor in
country- or sector-level coordination.
To what extent the intensified interaction under the EU-US Development Dialogue touches upon the
issue of mainstreaming human rights and democracy in development assistance is unclear. One expert
of USAID’s DRG Center remarked that ‘there are no effective or institutionalized working relations with
the EU’.320 It was noted that more institutionalized interaction with the EU as well as Member States
through annual meetings on ‘transatlantic approaches towards human rights’ would be helpful. Several
interviewees engaged in US development and democracy assistance noted that they tended to
coordinate in first instance with individual EU Members States and their development agencies, or with
organizations based within Member States.321 Given that human rights and democratic governance
have gradually gained importance in US and EU development policy, more systematic avenues of
coordination and collaboration could enhance coordination at several policy levels.
5.5 Conclusions
Human rights, and the broader question of democratization, have become intertwined in the
development assistance frameworks of both the EU and the US. First of all, both actors see
development assistance as a tool to discourage human rights violations through suspending
development aid. At the same time, conditionality policies are not applied consistently by the EU or
the US. Within the EU, the use of negative conditionalities has remained largely concentrated on its
cooperation with ACP countries under the Cotonou framework, whereby the EU has strategically used
its provision of development assistance as leverage to demand dialogues and action following human
rights violations and deteriorations in democratic governance. The US has similarly frozen or
withdrawn its development assistance on various occasions, although this is not part of a structured
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317 Gaus A., and Hoxtell, W., ‘The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future’, Global Public Policy Institute,
Working Paper, July 2013.
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dialogue or procedure. In addition to applying negative conditionalities, both the EU and the US have
elaborated new mechanisms for incentivizing democratic governance and human rights
performance through positive conditionalities. This ‘more for more’ principle has been emphasized in
the EU’s development partnerships as a more constructive approach than negative conditions.
Similarly, in decisions on what type of aid modality to deploy in a given country – most importantly the
question of how much assistance should be provided as budget support to a partner government
– the human rights and democratic governance dimension has been more explicitly integrated in
recent policy frameworks in both the EU and the US. A second strategy for integrating human rights in
development cooperation is using aid for democracy assistance or human rights promotion. The EU
and the US are the largest donors in this area, and have significantly scaled up their spending on
democracy assistance over the last decades (see section 6.2). Thirdly, the understanding that human
rights, and in particular the rights of vulnerable groups, permeate all areas and sectors of development
assistance, has become a priority in the management of development projects and programmes.
Against this increasing proliferation of human rights strategies, guidelines, and toolboxes, which
suggest greater coherence in how human rights are addressed in EU and US development policy, the
question of consistent implementation remains pertinent.
5.6 Recommendations
Recommendations on integrating human rights in EU development cooperation
 Consistency in integrating human rights as a strong and substantive pre-condition for
entering into a cooperation partnership with the EU The EU should ensure greater
consistency in how the existing legal and policy frameworks for human rights conditionality are
applied to all partner countries and across regions, including the clarification of criteria for the
application of the human rights clauses included in the EU’s partnership agreements with third
countries.
 Harmonize EU-wide application of conditionalities for the provision of different types of aid
The EU should foster greater coherence between EU institutions and Members States in applying
different types of aid modalities. In particular, harmonizing the provision of budget support has
already been emphasized in the Commission’s new budget support policy and has been
endorsed by the Council.
 Rolling out a substantive ‘rights-based approach encompassing all human rights’ The
adoption of a ‘rights-based approach encompassing all human rights’ can be considered one of
the more innovative steps taken by the Commission to integrate human rights in its
development cooperation programmes. The implementation of the RBA toolbox by the
Commission will have to be supported with adequate resources and closely scrutinized in the
coming years.
Recommendations on EU inter-institutional cooperation in EU Development Policies
 Reaching a common understanding on the interrelation between poverty reduction and
human rights protection, and a consensus on when the absence of the latter prohibits the
pursuit of the former. Both the EEAS and the Commission rely on each other in the programming
of EU development cooperation. Their internal capacity and collaboration could be enhanced to
come to an ‘organizational culture’ which addresses human rights more consistently. A
mechanism such as the new Budget Support Steering Committee provides an avenue to discuss
frictions concerning development-human rights nexus, but this only relates to a specific aspect of
EU assistance. At the country level, EU delegations will need to be capacitated adequately to play
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the crucial role of coordinating and harmonizing EU-wide development strategies, carrying out
joint assessments, and coordinating a clear EU response when human rights violations occur.
 Strengthen the capacity of the EP in scrutinizing EU development cooperation Given its new
capacity to exercise oversight and its ‘strategic dialogue’ with the Commission, MEPs now have a
crucial role to play in safeguarding the integration of human rights throughout EU development
cooperation. In meaningfully fulfilling this role, the EP and its members will require extensive
know-how, based on input from various stakeholders and independent researchers, detailing
how EU development policies, the implementation of EU country strategies, or even specific EU-
funded programmes/projects, affect the human rights situation within developing countries.
Recommendations on EU and US development policy
 Aligning conditions: greater leverage through EU-US coordination While it is widely understood
that the effectiveness of applying conditions increases when donors act in concert,322for various
reasons the EU, US and other donors often struggle to harmonize their conditionality policies and
find a common response strategy when human rights violations occur in a partner country. More
strategic dialogue on the use of conditionalities between the EU and the US could enhance the
‘signalling’ and ‘leverage’ function of development assistance. A ‘common approach’ to what
types of assistance should be suspended immediately, and what forms of aid should be
suspended only as a last resort, would be instrumental in developing a joint strategy which takes
into account the potential impact of aid suspensions on the population. Similarly, the various
mechanisms the EU and the US have in place to incentivize reforms in the broad area of
governance could benefit from greater harmonization and a stronger common emphasis on
human rights. Realizing that external leverage and incentives are not sufficient in fostering
meaningful reforms, such efforts should be in sync with support for ‘bottom-up’ processes as part
of the EU’s and US’s democracy assistance (see infra, section 6.2.4).
 A mutually-enforcing learning process on human rights mainstreaming and an HRBA The
notion that human rights principles and the rights of vulnerable groups should be mainstreamed
in all development planning, including at the micro-level of managing and implementing
projects and programmes, has led to several policy initiatives by USAID and DG DEVCO. Both
could further engage in a mutual learning process, also including other donors agencies, which
are committed to working with ‘human rights-based approaches’ to development.
322 See Crawford, G., ‘Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency’, Democratization, Vol.
4(3), 2007, p. 69-108. See also Stokke, O. (ed.), Aid and political conditionality, Routledge Research EADI Studies in
Development, Routledge, Oxford, 1995.
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6. CASE STUDIES
In this section, the study presents case studies to compare more in depth the differences and similarities
between EU and US approaches in the integration of human rights policies into external action, thereby
focusing on the use of Special Representatives and Special Envoys (section 6.1), the promotion of
democracy in third countries (section 6.2), as well as EU and US engagement with the HRC (section 6.3)
and the ICC (section 6.4).
6.1 EU Special Representatives and US Special Envoys
6.1.1 Historical development
In their respective development as foreign policy actors, both the EU and the US employ ‘Special
Representatives’ (EU) or ‘Special Envoys’ (US).323 Both the EU and the US have historically relied on this
specific diplomatic instrument given that ‘being equipped with diplomatic representatives and having
them recognized by other entities can be regarded as a sign of statehood, or at least actorness’.324This
investment in actorness, in turn, has strengthened the credibility of the EU as a global player on the
international scene.325
In the US, the custom of having a Special Envoy has been noted to exist since the early years of its
inception.326 In a similar fashion, the EU’s Special Representatives (EUSRs) had already been brought
into existence by a provision in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, thereby rendering them one of the longest-
standing EU foreign policy instruments on the ground, and predating even the main CFSP bodies and
operations. In both the EU and the US case, the Special Representatives and the Special Envoys have
been noted to have ‘filled a vacuum at the outset’,327 as neither actor had any mandate in place to
ensure their permanent representation in a foreign country when the practice of employing envoys was
established. In light of the EU’s particularly intricate road towards a coherent external action, therefore,
some have even dubbed EUSRs to be ‘a forerunner of Europe’s efforts to forge a common foreign
policy’.328 Indeed, the first EUSRs had already been deployed before the post of CFSP High
Representative was even created in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, with the appointment of Aldo Ajello
for the ‘Great Lakes’329 and Miguel Angel Moratinos for the ‘Middle East Peace Process’.330 From this
moment onwards, the number of EUSRs grew exponentially. Subsequently, their relevance for EU
323 For conceptual clarity, this study will use the US terms of ‘special envoys’, ‘special representatives’, ‘special advisors’ and
‘special coordinator’ interchangeably, as their differing titles ‘offer no clear indication of the scope or nature of their duties’.
See Naland, J., ‘U.S. Special Envoys: A Flexible Tool’, United States Institute of Peace, Peacebrief No. 102, 2011, p. 2.
324 Adebahr, C., Learning and Change in European Foreign Policy: The case of the EU Special Representatives, Nomos Publishers,
Berlin, 2009, p. 15.
325 ‘Actorness’ was originally coined as the ability to function autonomously and independently from other actors in the
international community. For a first discussion, see Sjöstedt, G., The External Role of the European Community, Saxon House,
Farmborough, 1977. For a recent overview of the ensuing conceptual debate, see Ozoguz-Bolgi, S., ‘Is the EU Becoming a
Global Power After the Treaty of Lisbon?’, in Boening, A., Kremer, J.F. and van Loon, A. (eds.), Global Power Europe (Vol. 1).
Theoretical and Institutional Approaches to the EU’s External Relations, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2013, p. 3-18.
326 Fullilove, M., ‘All the Presidents’ Men. The Role of Special Envoys in U.S. Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84(2), 2005, p.
14.
327 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 74.
328 Gardner, A., ‘Future of special envoys out of Ashton’s hands’, European Voice, 12.2.2014.
329 EU Council, ‘Joint action of 25 March 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European
Union, in relation to the nomination of a Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region’, 96/250/CFSP, OJ L 087, 4.4.1996.
330 EU Council, ‘Joint action of 25 November 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on
European Union in relation to the nomination of an EU special envoy for the Middle East peace process’, 96/676/CFSP, OJ L
315, 4.12.1996.
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foreign policy was formally recognized by their inclusion in the Amsterdam Treaty under former Article
18(5) TEU, which stipulated that ‘the Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special
representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues’ (see below).
Reflecting a mounting international consensus on the need for ‘a type of actor that is indispensable for
successful diplomacy under today’s complex conditions’,331 both the EU and the US thus increasingly
started to rely on their envoys in foreign policy. From the mid-1990s onwards the number EUSRs
increased, from two in 1996 to an accumulated total of 47 in 2014. In the US ‘personal envoys sprouted
like mushrooms’ under the Clinton administration.332 After a marked decline in the use of special envoys
under the Bush administration, during which Secretary of State Colin Powell was said to have
‘purposefully eliminate[d] most of such positions’,333 the Obama administration once again vastly
expanded the practice, reaching the current total of 24 special envoys (see infra, table 3).334
6.1.2 Institutional setting
EUSRs as ‘Free Electrons’? Faced with an exponential growth in the use of special envoys and
representatives by a myriad of international actors, the EU adopted its designated ‘Guidelines on the
appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special Representatives’ (hereinafter ‘the Guidelines’) in
2007.335 Further to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the altered institutional set-up it
brought forth, with notable implications for the conduct of the EU’s CFSP policies in particular, these
guidelines recently underwent a thorough revision as part of the ongoing review of the organization
and functioning of the EEAS.336 In its conclusions of 17 December 2013 on this review, the Council
recently pledged its ‘continuing commitment to the role of EU Special Representatives as a valuable
instrument of EU foreign policy and stressed the need to enhance overall efficiency and
accountability, as well as to ensure coordination and coherence with all other EU actors, emphasising
the importance of close cooperation with the EEAS’.337 Indeed the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) recently
approved the revised Guidelines on the appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special
Representatives. Purportedly, it did so with a particular view to ‘the appointment of EUSRs and the
definition of their mandates, in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty’.338 Moreover, the ‘reporting and
evaluation mechanism of EUSRs was also elaborated in greater detail’.339 At the time of writing,
however, these new guidelines were unfortunately not publicly available for further analysis. The
following sections will therefore rely on the changes brought about in EU primary law.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty essentially reinforced the hybrid nature of the EU Special
Representative to the extent that ‘the confusion over how EUSRs fit into post-Lisbon structures –
331 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 79.
332 Fullilove, supra, n. 326, p. 16.
333 Naland, supra, n. 323, p. 1.
334 Ibid. p. 2.
335 EU Council, ‘Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special Representatives – revised guidelines:
approval’, 11328/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 24.7.2007, para. 2(1).
336 See Blockmans, S. and Hillion, C. (eds.), ‘EEAS 2.0. Recommendations for the amendment of Council Decision 2010/427/EU
establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service’. Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS), Special Report No. 78, November 2013. See also Wouters, J., De Baere, G., Van Vooren, B., Raube, K., Odermatt, J.,
Ramopoulos, T., Van Den Sanden, T. and Tanghe, Y., ‘The Organisation and Functioning of the European external Action
Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the
Union, EXPO/B/AFET/2012/07, February 2013.
337 EU Council, ‘Council Conclusions on the EEAS Review’, General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 17.12.2013, para. 4.
338 EU Council, ‘Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special Representatives – Approval’, 7681/14.
Brussels, 13.3.2014, para. 4.
339 Ibid.
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coupled with the establishment of a permanent foreign policy body [the EEAS] – led to initial scepticism
about the continued need for an ad hoc instrument in the form of the EUSRs’.340
Figure 3: Institutional setting of the EUSRs341
Indeed, by organizationally adhering to the EEAS yet being funded by the Council’s CFSP budget, all the
while pertaining to the Commission’s administrative management of Foreign Policy Instruments, EUSRs
represent a rare breed of ‘free electrons’342 in the institutional set-up of the EU’s foreign policy (see
figure 3). It is precisely because of their ambiguous position in relying on the Council for operational
guidance, while turning to the HR/VP for operation guidance, that EUSRs have been noted to remain an
‘intergovernmental instrument’343 in the EU’s external action. Pursuant to Article 33 TEU, they are
appointed, extended and dismissed by a Decision of the FAC.344 Since the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty, this appointment no longer requires unanimity rule but is now subject to a qualified
majority rule – a notable exception in the realm of CFSP policy-making. In practice, however, it is the
Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) with which the EUSRs are noted to entertain
‘privileged’ relations, as it ‘remains their primary point of contact within the Council’.345
Increased EEAS Clout Although EUSRs have been noted to ‘remain a de facto Council instrument’,346 the
HR/VP has gained a ‘previously unknown clout over the EUSRs’347 since the entry into force of the Lisbon
340 Mateja, P., ‘Double-hatting in EU External Engagements. EU Special Representatives and the Question of Coherence Post-
Lisbon’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comments Vol. 46(4), 2012, p. 3.
341 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 343, p. 484.
342 Tolksdorf, D., ‘The role of EU Special Representatives in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system: A renaissance?’, Institute for
European Studies, Policy brief No. 2012/02, June 2012, p. 2.
343 Tolksdorf, D., ‘EU Special Representatives: An Intergovernmental Tool in the Post-Lisbon Foreign Policy System?’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18(4), 2013, p. 471.
344 Art. 33 TEU states that ‘The Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special
representative shall carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative’.
345 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 343, p. 477.
346 Ibid. p. 478.
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Treaty. While prior to Lisbon it was the Council who could appoint a EUSR whenever it deemed it
necessary to do so, it is now the HR/VP who, pursuant to Article 33 TEU, ‘has the sole right of initiative
for the establishment of EUSRs and also proposes the person to occupy the post’.348 Subsequently, the
HR/VP is also able to obstruct the nomination of a post. Others have noted an increased tendency
for Member States to retain intergovernmental control over the appointment and mandates of EUSRs in
order to exert their influence over EU foreign policy, resulting in more explicit turf battles between the
HR/VP and the Council.349 As past experiences have shown, however, still others have pointed out that
‘the HR/VP is unlikely to refrain from proposing the deployment of a new EUSR when a group of
Member States pushes for it’.350 In addition, as EUSRs are also required to report on their activities by
submitting annual implementation reports to the Council, the HR/VP and the Commission, their
purported role as ‘free electrons’ should also be taken with a grain of salt. After all, as acknowledged
elsewhere, they ‘have to maintain close contacts with all of these institutions and to coordinate their
activities with them in order to fulfil their mandates properly’.351
Harmonious Relations with the Empowered EP Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP
has gained slightly more powers in the realm of the CFSP. In the past, some members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) had expressed criticism over EUSRs’ lack of democratic accountability in their
work. In an attempt to alleviate these concerns, the EP now has the competence to review and to adopt
the EEAS budget, thereby holding the HR/VP politically accountable. By the same token, all EUSRs are
now also expected to (informally) present themselves in AFET prior to the start of their mandate,
thereby pledging to take the positions of Parliament into account during the course of their mandate.
Pursuant to Article 36 TEU, the EP’s views ‘on the main aspects and basic choices’ of the CFSP must be
‘duly taken in consideration’ by the HR/VP, while EUSRs ‘may be involved in briefing the European
Parliament’. Opinions differ as to whether the EP’s role actually matters in these CFSP deliberations, and
Parliament purportedly has taken issue with ‘a perceived lack of clear guidelines for creating new
EUSR posts, with a ‘proliferation’ of envoys that threaten to weaken the role of Commission [now EU]
delegations, and with the growing costs of existing missions and offices’.352 Others have, however,
noted more frequent participation of EUSRs in parliamentary hearings in recent years, and have
preliminarily concluded that ‘the relationship between the EP and the EUSRs has improved’.353 Indeed,
the EP had already called for the appointment of an EUSR for Human Rights on two earlier occasions,
thereby stressing that ‘the appointment of EU Special Representatives on human rights, notably for
human rights defenders, for IHL and international justice and for women's rights and children's rights,
could help to give EU external action in this field greater coherence and visibility’.354 In a later attempt,
the EU had also requested that the EUSR’s mandate, upon establishment, ‘should have cross-sectoral
skills enabling the implementation of a cohesion policy aimed at integrating human rights in all EU
policies’, whilst warning ‘against any attempt to isolate human rights policy from the overall external
policy strategies through the creation of such a Special Representative’.355 The subsequent
347 Adebahr, C., ‘Working inside out: what role for Special Envoys in the European External Action Service?’, European Policy
Centre, Policy Brief, January 2011, p. 2.
348 Mateja, supra, n. 340, p. 2.
349 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 343, p. 471.
350 Ibid. p. 479.
351 Ibid. p. 477.
352 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 128 (addition between brackets by the authors of this study).
353 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 342, p. 3.
354 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2009 and
the European Union's policy on the matter’, 2010/2202(INI), para 6.
355 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 18 April 2012 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World and the European
Union's policy on the matter, including implications for the EU's strategic human rights policy’, 2011/2185(INI), para. 23.
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appointment of the EUSR for Human Rights in the framework of the EU’s Action Plan on Human
Rights was thus enthusiastically endorsed by the EP.356 At the level of inter-parliamentary cooperation
(IPC), moreover, the IPC Conference on CFSP/CSDP held in September 2013 hailed the work of the EUSR
by stating that he had ‘enhanced the effectiveness and visibility of the EU's human rights policy'.357
Some weeks later, the EUSR was invited to shed light on its mandate during the Inter-Parliamentary
Committee Meeting on EU Human Rights Policy.358
In its latest Annual Report on Human Rights, finally, the EP has continued to hold the role of the EUSR
for Human Rights in high esteem, as it devoted an entire sub-section to his achievements thus far by
stipulating that it:
‘[r]ecognises the importance of the mandate given to the first [EUSR] for Human Rights; encourages the
EUSR to enhance the visibility, mainstreaming, coherence, consistency and effectiveness of EU human
rights policy, in particular on women’s rights, and to strike the right balance between silent and public
diplomacy in carrying out his mandate; repeats its recommendation that the EUSR provide Parliament
with a regular report on his activities and clarification of his thematic and geographic priorities, and
ensure that concerns raised by Parliament are followed up’359
‘[c]ommends the EUSR on the openness of the dialogue which he has conducted with Parliament and
civil society, thus establishing an important practice that should be continued and consolidated to
ensure due transparency and accountability; welcomes the EUSR‘s cooperation with regional bodies
and in multilateral fora and encourages him to further expand such activities’360
‘[w]elcomes the fact that cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights was included in the mandate of
the geographic EUSR for the Sahel, and urges the Council and the VP/HR to adopt this practice too,
with regard to the mandates of future geographic EUSRs’361
The Colloquial US Envoy In the US, a less intricate yet more politicized picture emerges.362 Depending
on the initial act of appointment itself, US Special Envoys report directly to the President, the Secretary
of State or, in the case of congressionally-mandated positions, to the House of Representatives. In
addition, Special Envoys may also be appointed as ‘domestic policy czars’363 or personal advisors to the
President, whose mandates often relate to ‘particular high-profile domestic issues’.364 Because of this
looser institutional set-up, the US President is said to have much more leeway in pursuing partisan
interests through external representation than the EU’s executive actors, as he has ‘unparalleled
freedom in determining both the individual and the job in question’ to such an extent that ‘he is even
free to bypass the State Department […] and its network of accredited ambassadors who are, by
default, already his personal representatives’.365 In addition, EUSRs do not personally represent the EU
institutions in the same way that the US Special Envoy embodies US foreign policy. Unsurprisingly,
the US Special Envoy is thus noted to have a more informal, personal and trust-based relationship with
356 European Parliament, ‘Recommendation to the Council of 13 June 2012 on the EU Special Representative for Human
Rights’, 2012/2088(INI).
357 Conclusions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common
Security and Defence Policy, para. 9.
358 Agenda of the AFET/DROI Inter-Parliamentary Committee Meeting, 'The implementation of the EU Strategic Framework
and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy', 25.9.2013. See also Wouters, J. et al, supra, n. 5, p. 10.
359 2013/2152(INI), supra, n. 57, para. 17.
360 Ibid. para. 18.
361 Ibid. para. 19.
362 It should be noted for the sake of methodological completeness that no equivalent US ‘Guidelines’ are available
concerning the mandate of US Special Envoys.
363 Naland, supra, n. 323, p. 1.
364 Ibid.
365 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 75.
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the executive than the EUSRs does. Indeed, ‘the issue of personal trust should be less prevalent for the
EU as the envoy is not anyone’s alter ego’.366 Because of the EU’s formalized and often cumbersome
selection procedure, the predominantly partisan considerations characteristic of the appointment of US
Special Envoys are deemed to be much less relevant. Indeed, the appointment of EUSRs has been noted
to be rather akin to the ‘usual horse-trading between [M]ember [S]tates’,367 thereby carefully
balancing sometimes diverging national and ideological interests.
6.1.3 Functions and tasks
As has succinctly been formulated elsewhere, ‘the business of special envoys – diverse as they are in
individual cases – is, in principle (and maybe not surprisingly) alike across institutions: they engage in all
forms of multilateral diplomacy, usually aimed at diffusing international crises, and they have
considerable room for manoeuvre’.368 Such is also the case in the EU and the US, where both the Special
Representatives and the Special Envoys are seen as the ‘eyes and ears’369 of foreign policy-making. There
are several advantages that come with giving a face to the represented actor in question. First, it
significantly enhances the visibility of an actor on the ground, thereby strengthening its actorness.370
Second, envoys may provide their respective headquarters with information about developments on
the ground, while strengthening ties with local policy-makers and civil society actors. As has been noted
elsewhere, this task is of particular importance in the EU, where smaller Member States who do not have
diplomatic missions in countries where EUSRs operate have been noted to rely on the EUSR as a much
appreciated complementary source of information in the development of their own foreign policy.371
Third, the availability of first-hand information enables a clear and coherent strategy for policy
formulation in a particular country. Fourth, that coherent strategy may lead to the dissemination of one
single message on the ground, thereby enhancing the credibility of the actor as a foreign policy player.
Finally, an envoy also allows for stronger coordination of potentially conflicting activities on the ground.
This is particularly the case in those countries where both the EU and individual Member States are all
implementing their respective activities.
As highlighted in the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, ‘[t]he EU has a
unique network of 139 in-country EU Delegations, diplomatic expertise in the EEAS including through
EU Representatives, and operational engagement through CSDP missions and operations. By bringing
all these together, with the European Commission and the 28 Member States, to work in a joined-up
and strategic manner, the EU can better define and defend its fundamental interests and values
[…].372 In a further step, as the comprehensive approach elucidates, stronger internal coordination also
enable better cooperation with other international actors. In the US, a similar picture of the necessity to
coordinate emerges, as ‘in addition to the State Department as primary competitor of the special
envoys, there is a whole government bureaucracy with different ministries involved in turf battles.
These are mirrored by a web of ministerial agencies and delegations abroad that, even for an allegedly
unitary actor such as the United States, add to a chorus of different foreign policy voices’.373 The need for
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid.
368 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 76.
369 Grevi, G., ‘Pioneering foreign policy. The EU Special Representatives’, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 106,
October 2007, p. 11.
370 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 15.
371 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 343, p. 475.
372 JOIN(2013) 30 final, supra, n. 51, p. 3.
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internal coordination prior to the external implementation of activities on the ground, therefore, is also
a common characteristic of both EU Special Representatives and US Special Envoys.
Reflecting the Lisbon Treaty’s renewed emphasis on ensuring policy coherence, the EU has in recent
years resorted to ‘double hatting’374 for its foreign policy actors, ‘in the expectation that it will ensure co-
ordination in the absence – or in lieu – of legal-institutional reform’.375 Indeed, mirroring the EU’s
incessant ‘quest for coherence’,376 its recent comprehensive approach exuded the conviction that ‘[t]he
EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU
institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and
vision’.377 The fate of double-hatting for the sake of policy coherence has increasingly been bestowed
upon EUSRs as well, who in certain countries now act as both the special envoy and the Head of the EU
Delegation on the ground (see table 3).378 This recent development has not been inevitable and was in
fact long deemed to be unthinkable, given that, as one observer remarked, prior to the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty, ‘Delegations were representing the Commission and its longer-term interests,
while the EUSRs were exclusively focusing on security policy and crisis management’.379 What makes the
practice of double-hatting EUSRs even more peculiar, moreover, is that it also implies that EUSRs are
physically located in their mandate area when taking up their double capacity. This practice stands in
stark contrast with US Special Envoys, who have remained based in Washington, D.C. As recently
observed by one analyst, however, double-hatting is not a panacea for the EU’s quest for coherence.
Indeed, ‘it would be unrealistic to expect double-hats to resolve deep-seated disagreements on
particular countries or regions of operation’, just as much as it would be ‘impossible for double-hats to
resolve the tensions that arise in contexts that involve both inter- governmental and communitarian
decision-making’.380
6.1.4 Geographical and thematic priorities
Echoing the aforementioned differences between the rather formalized nature of the EU Special
Representative and the more informal proceedings pertaining to the appointment of the US Special
Envoy, differences equally emerge in terms of the duration of an envoy’s mandate, the scope of
its mission and the level of operational engagement. As it has been noted elsewhere, the mandates
of US Special Envoys may even be ‘as short as only a few weeks to solve a particular issue (‘trouble-
shooters’)’,381 whereby the scope of the mission would be rather focused and highly specialized. By
contrast, following the EU’s more generic guidelines which stipulate that, ‘[a]s a general rule, the tenure
of office of an EUSR shall not exceed four years,’382 the mandates tend to be much broader and geared
towards a more long-term, structural engagement with the third country in question. As can be seen in
table 3 below, these differences also tangibly manifest themselves in the number and geographic
374 Mateja, supra, n. 340, p. 4.
375 Portela, C. and Raube, K., ‘The EU Polity and Foreign Policy Coherence’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol.
8(1), 2011, p. 9.
376 Smith, M., ‘The Quest for Coherence: institutional dilemmas of external action from Maastricht to Amsterdam’, in Stone
Sweet, A., Sandholtz, W. and Fligstein, N. (eds), The Institutionalization of Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 79.
377 JOIN(2013) 30 final, supra, n. 51, p. 3.
378 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 342.
379 Mateja, supra, n. 340, p. 2.
380 Ibid, p. 4.
381 Adebahr, supra, n. 324, p. 76.
382 EU Council (2007), ‘Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special Representatives – revised
guidelines: approval’, 11328/1/07 REV 1. Brussels, 24.7.2007, para. 2(1).
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and/or thematic nature of the mandates.383 Whereas the EU currently disposes of 9 Special
Representatives, the US significantly outnumbers the EU by having 23 Special Envoys active on the
global scene.
The lower EU number might be explained by the post-Lisbon expectation that EUSRs would gradually
be removed or integrated into the EEAS’ structure.384 Indeed, recent developments seem to have
brought the number of EUSRs down from twelve to nine, thereby affecting the EU’s diplomatic
presence in Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Sudans.385 What is perhaps even
more interesting, is that the EU tends to favour geographic mandates over thematic ones (8:1 ratio),
while the US seems to have a preference for specifically targeted and thematic mandates (10:13
ratio).The EU’s preference for geographic mandates might be explained by the fact that its Member
States have specific and sometimes diverging national interests to uphold in third countries –
particularly in former colonies.386 Indeed, ‘[g]iven that mandate areas are themselves a politically
sensitive issue in which the Council has to strike a balance between the Member States’ diverging
interests in regions outside of the EU, both the choice and deployment of EUSRs is no easy task’.387
From a thematic perspective, however, it is interesting to note that the EU has opted for an explicit,
transversal Special Representative on Human Rights whose mandate is 'based on the policy objectives
of the Union regarding human rights as set out in the Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, as well as the EU Strategic Framework [and] Action Plan on Human Rights and
Democracy'.388 Following the adoption of the 2012 EU Action Plan, the High Representative proposed
the position of an EUSR for Human Rights, based on Article 33 TEU – a mandate which has recently
been prolonged until 28 February 2015. In line with the new Guidelines, ‘the Council may decide that
the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security
Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy (HR)’.389
Hinting at the effort of mainstreaming human rights into EU external action, the mandate of Special
Representative Stavros Lambrinidis further outlines the tasks with regard to human rights
mainstreaming in EU external action:
‘In order to achieve the policy objectives, the mandate of the EUSR shall be to: (a) contribute to the
implementation of the Union’s human rights policy, in particular the EU Strategic Framework on
Human Rights and Democracy and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, including by
formulating recommendations in this regard; (b) contribute to the implementation of Union
guidelines, toolkits and action plans on human rights and international humanitarian law; (c) enhance
dialogue with governments in third countries and international and regional organisations on human
rights as well as with civil society organisations and other relevant actors in order to ensure the
effectiveness and the visibility of the Union’s human rights policy; (d) contribute to better coherence
and consistency of the Union policies and actions in the area of protection and promotion of human
383 Given that the designated EEAS website has not yet been brought in line with the latest developments, the authors
would like to thank the EEAS and the EC for their much appreciated collaboration in providing an up-to-date overview of the
9 EUSR mandates which are currently in place.
384 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 343.
385 Gardner, supra, n. 328.
386 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 343, p. 477.
387 Tolksdorf, supra, n. 342, p. 2.
388 EU Council, ‘Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP of 25.7.2012 appointing the European Union Special Representative for
Human Rights’, OJ L 200/21, art. 2.
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rights notably by providing input to the formulation of relevant policies of the Union’ (Article 3 of the
mandate of Special Representative on Human Rights)’.390
The US, by contrast, does not seem to approach human rights from a cross-cutting perspective, but
rather focuses on sub-thematic priorities within the broader realm of human rights, including mandates
on holocaust issues, anti-Semitism, international disability rights, and international labour affairs.
Table 3: Comparison between EU Special Representatives and US Special Envoys
EUROPEAN UNION (9) UNITED STATES (23)
Mandate Name Council Decision Mandate Name
GEOGRAPHICAL MANDATES: AFRICA
1.African Union,
double-hatted EUSR
and HoD
Gary Quince
2012/390/CFSP African Union No US Equivalent
2.Horn of Africa AlexanderRondos 2013/527/CFSP Horn of Africa No Current Appointment
Great Lakes No Current Appointment 1.Great Lakes and DRCongo Russell Feingold
Sudan No Current Appointment 2.Sudan and South Sudan Donald E. Booth
3.Sahel
 Michel
Dominique
Reveyrand-de
Menthon
2013/133/CFSP Sahel No US Equivalent
GEOGRAPHICAL MANDATES: AMERICAS
Haiti No EU Equivalent 3.Haiti Thomas C. Adams
GEOGRAPHICAL MANDATES: ASIA
North Korea No EU Equivalent
4.North Korean Human
Rights Issues
5.North Korea Policy
6.Six-party talks on North
Korea’s nuclear
programme
Dr. Robert R. King
Glyn Davies
Sung Kim
GEOGRAPHICAL MANDATES: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
4.Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
double-hatted EUSR
and HoD
Peter
Sørensen 2012/330/CFSP Bosnia and Herzegovina No Current Appointment
5.Kosovo,
double-hatted EUSR
and HoD
Samuel
Žbogar 2012/39/CFSP Kosovo No Current Appointment
Macedonia (FYROM) No Current Appointment Macedonia (FYROM) No Current Appointment
390 Council Decision 2012/440/CFSP, supra, n. 388.
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EUROPEAN UNION (9) UNITED STATES (23)
Mandate Name Council Decision Mandate Name
South East Europe No Current Appointment South East Europe No US Equivalent
GEOGRAPHICAL MANDATES: CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asia No Current appointment Central Asia No US Equivalent
Moldova No Current Appointment Moldova No US Equivalent
6.South Caucasus
and Georgia
Vacant391
2012/326/CFSP South Caucasus andGeorgia No US Equivalent
GEOGRAPHICAL MANDATES: MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
7.Afghanistan,
double-hatted EUSR
and HoD
Franz-Michael
Skjold Mellbin 2013/393/CFSP
7.Afghanistan and
Pakistan James F. Dobbins
Middle East Peace
Process No Current Appointment
8.Middle East Peace
9.Middle East Transitions
David Hale
Vacant
Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation No EU Equivalent
10.Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation Rashad Hussain
8.Southern
Mediterranean
Region
Bernardino
León 2012/327/CFSP
Southern Mediterranean
Region No US Equivalent
THEMATIC MANDATES
9.Human Rights StavrosLambrinidis 2012/440/CFSP Human Rights No US Equivalent
Climate Change No EU Equivalent 11.Climate Change Todd Stern
Holocaust issues No EU Equivalent
12.Holocaust issues
13.Monitoring and
combating anti-Semitism
Douglas Davidson and
Stuart E. Eizenstat
Ira N. Forman
International Energy
Affairs No EU Equivalent
14.International Energy
Affairs Carlos Pascual
Guantanamo closure No EU Equivalent 15.Guantanamo closure Clifford M. Sloan
Commercial and
business affairs No EU Equivalent
16.Commercial and
business affairs Lorraine Hariton
Faith Based and
Community
Initiatives
Muslim Communities
No EU Equivalent 17.Faith Based and
Community Initiatives
18.Muslim Communities
Shaun Casey
Farah Pandith
391 EEAS ‘EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia Philippe Lefort steps down’, Press Release, Brussels, 31
January 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140131_en_03.pdf accessed 01/08/2014.
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EUROPEAN UNION (9) UNITED STATES (23)
Mandate Name Council Decision Mandate Name
No EU Equivalent
International
Disability Rights No EU Equivalent
19.International
Disability Rights Judith E. Heumann
International Labor
Affairs No EU Equivalent
20.International Labor
Affairs Vacant
Nuclear non-
proliferation
No EU Equivalent 21.Nuclear non-
proliferation
Robert J. Einhorn
Biological and
- toxin weapons
convention
(BWC) issues
No EU Equivalent 22.Biological and
- toxin weapons
convention
(BWC) issues
Susan Burk
Proliferation and
Arms Control No EU Equivalent
23.Proliferation and Arms
Control Laura Kennedy
6.1.5 Recommendations
Recommendations on EU inter-institutional cooperation
 Clarify appointment, financing and mandate of EU Special Representatives Dubbed to be ‘free
electrons’ in the institutional set-up of EU foreign policy, confusion prevails as to how they
precisely fit into the post-Lisbon structures. Although the conclusion of the EEAS review has been
accompanied by a revision of the guidelines on the appointment, mandate and financing of EU
Special Representative, more clarity should nevertheless be provided on the cooperation
between the EU Special Representative, the EU Institutions and the Member States.
 Strengthen cooperation between EUSRs and EP Alleviating concerns about the EUSR’s lack of
democratic accountability in carrying out its mandate, the EP now has the power to review and
adopt the EEAS budget, thereby holding the HR/VP politically accountable. In doing so, the EUSR
on Human Rights might clarify the EU’s geographic and thematic priorities, thereby taking
concerns raised by the EP into account and seeking synergies to feed into the EP’s Annual Report
on Human Rights in the World.
Recommendations on integrating human rights into EUSR mandates
 Strive for a balanced practice of ‘double-hatting’ whilst seeking synergies between geographic
EUSRs and the EUSR for Human Rights The coherence and effectiveness of diplomatic
representation cannot be ensured by automatically merging all geographic mandates of the
EUSR and the Head of Delegation into one double-hatted reference point, as it would be both
unrealistic and practically impossible to impose such an encompassing mandate on one
individual. Rather, the practice of double-hatting should be pursued in a balanced manner,
whereby the decision to double-hat mandates in particular instances should be taken on a case-
by-case basis. Regardless of whether they carry out a ‘single-hatted’ or a ‘double-hatted’
mandate, moreover, every mandate of geographic EUSRs should also include the requirement to
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cooperate with the EUSR for Human Rights in order to ensure a systematic integration of human
rights into all diplomatic output.
 Ensure long-term and structural mandate for the EUSR for Human Rights Echoing the post-
Lisbon confusion about the appointment, role and financing of EUSRs, the future of too many
mandates of EUSRs has remained uncertain. For example, faced with the uncertainty of having his
mandate renewed by a Council decision on an annual basis, the EUSR for Human Rights is bound
to lose credibility vis-à-vis external interlocutors. The EUSR should be given a longer term of
mandate, one which ideally corresponds to the duration of the mandate the HR/VP.
6.2 Democracy Promotion
The EU and the US face similar challenges when it comes to democracy promotion, especially
regarding the strategic choices the two actors have to make in a rapidly evolving world. In this regard, it
has been argued that one of the fundamental choices in international relations is that between
‘democracy’ promotion (political rights, free and fair elections, plural party systems, etc.) and ‘stability’
(sponsoring stable autocratic regimes) on the other hand. Whereas the former foresees the support for
democratization through civil society support and institutional reform, in the latter case, political
reforms are avoided as they often imply unpredictable political outcomes.
Nevertheless, the promotion of democratic norms and values is firmly embedded in both the EU
and US external action, as these are seen as the foundations of wealthy and peaceful societies. The
democratisation of European and American societies (establishment of political participation rights), the
establishment of national and international human rights regimes and functioning rule of law systems
have been a major concern not only after the Second World War, but also in the wake of the revolutions
of Central-Eastern European states in the late 1980s and 1990s. The political transformation of these
states is until today a major narrative which feeds into the efforts of transforming other political systems
in and outside Europe. Another theoretical foundation for the external promotion of democracy has
been the ‘democratic peace theory’, which argues that consolidated democracies do not go to war.
Starting with the EU itself, the peace theory is often challenged by pointing out to military action used
by Member States (in and outside the EU) and the US. However, the key argument remains that not any
military action, but military action of a democracy against other democracies can be ruled out according
to the democratic peace theory. As such, the EU itself can be seen as a model of ‘civilising’ the
actions that democratic Member States use against each other. Third, democratization is often
closely linked to modernization theory and the idea that democracy is a milestone of political system
transformation, as it generally contributes to the implementation and advocacy of human rights and
market capitalism. Given these strong underlying rationales, both the EU and the US have consistently
reiterated their commitment to democracy promotion. This is reflected in EU policy by the 2009 Council
of the EU’s ‘Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations’ and the Strategic
Framework /Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. In the US, the ‘ADVANCE Democracy Act’
adopted by the US Congress in 2007 can be highlighted. Under the Obama administration the notion of
‘democracy promotion’ was not emphasized to signal a break with the rhetoric from the Bush era, but it
has none the less remained a key dimension of US foreign policy.392
This case study provides a snapshot of EU and US democracy promotion, with a focus on democracy
assistance efforts in third countries. First, it provides an overview of the different concepts behind
392 Bibbins Sedaca, N., Bouchet, N., ‘Holding Steady? Us Democracy Promotion In A Changing World‘, Programme Paper,
Chatham House Americas Programme, February 2014.
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democracy promotion (section 6.2.1), and the different approaches to democracy promotion (section
6.2.2). Secondly it focuses on EU and US democracy assistance (section 6.2.3), identifying different types
of assistance, actors and implementing organizations, and geographic priorities. Third, how the EU and
the US support ‘grassroots’ democratic reformers by adopting a ‘bottom-up’ strategy is discussed in
more detail (section 6.2.4). The case study concludes with identifying certain challenges and
opportunities for EU-US cooperation (section 6.2.5.) and tentative recommendations for EU action and
policy-making (section 6.2.6.).
6.2.1 The concept of democracy promotion
Various forms of democracy have emerged throughout history, and today the debate on the diversity
and adaptability of the democratic model is as salient as ever with new transitions taking place in North
Africa and the Middle East. Hence, in looking at democracy promotion by the EU and the US, a key
question is what model of democracy they intend to promote. Arguably, what characterizes Western
democracy promotion actors is that they “promote what they know and admire most, which is almost
always their own country’s particular approach to democracy”.393 Hence, both the US and the EU are
widely regarded to promote a liberal democratic model. This appears more explicitly in the case of the
US,394 and its democracy promotion seems to export some of its party political models (see infra,
section 6.2.3). Despite certain nuances, at the core of the EU’s democracy promotion a similar model of
liberal democracy can be recognized – although as a supranational structure the EU does not represent
a typical liberal democracy.395 Accordingly, the ‘liberal democratic discourse provides an almost
universal backdrop to debates on democracy promotion’.396 The standard substance of liberal
democracy is understood as entailing ‘free and fair elections and constitutional guarantees of
individual political, civil, and associational rights’ although broader interpretations also include equal
voting rights for citizens, universal suffrage, freedom of conscience, information, and expression, etc.397
Despite a strong convergence around a core of liberal democratic principles, neither the EU nor the
US advance one clear-cut definition of democracy promotion to steer their efforts, which are
undertaken by a multitude of actors. Hence observers note several nuances and variations on the
substance of democracy promotion both within and between the EU and the US. In addition to a
‘political’ form, Carothers distinguishes a ‘developmental’ form of democracy promotion which ‘looks
past political procedures to substantive outcomes such as equality, welfare, and justice’, and puts
economic and social rights on equal footing with political and civil rights.398 Arguably, this
understanding of democracy is more common to the EU, reflecting the idea that the ‘European social
model’ has lead the EU to promote a more social-democratic model whereas this is absent in US
democracy promotion.399
Based on conceptual work by several authors, Wetzel and Orbie develop a conceptual framework
wherein this ‘social democratic’ dimension is integrated as part of the ‘external conditions’ of a
393 T. Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy’, Democratization, Vol. 4 (3), 1997, p. 121–122.
394 Kurki, M., ‘Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy
Promotion’, International Studies Review, Vol. 12, 2010, p. 362–386.
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid. at p. 365.
397 Wetzel, A. and Orbie, J., ‘Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 16, 2011, p. 565–588, p. 572.
398 Carothers, T., ‘Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, 2009, p. 8.
399 Ibid.
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democratic system.400 They identify four possible democracy promotion agendas; a ‘full agenda’
covering all the essential political and institutional elements which constitute the architecture of a
democratic model,401 a ‘narrow agenda’ whereby the focus is often concentrated only on the electoral
process, a ‘broad’ agenda which not only focuses on political structures but also on ‘external conditions’
such as the effectiveness of the state, the presence of an active civil society and a minimum level of
socio-economic equality, and lastly a ‘shallow’ model which only focuses on the external conditions but
not on the political architecture of a democracy. In discussing democracy promotion strategies, the EU
and the US are criticized for leaning too much towards a ‘narrow agenda’ with a singular emphasis on
elections.402
The EU has also been criticized for having a ‘shallow agenda’, reflecting its ‘developmental’ approach to
democracy promotion whereby a gradual investment in ‘state effectiveness’ and ‘poverty reduction’ is
prioritized over the core political elements of a liberal democratic model.403 EU officials have advocated
this approach as ‘giving people a voice’ through social development, rather than attempting to
‘replicat[e] institutional patterns’.404 The US on the other hand is said to be more forceful and less
pragmatic in transferring its model of democracy, adopting a principled position on core civil and
political liberties. The ‘replication’ of US political culture is also apparent in how a share of its democracy
assistance is channelled through organizations reflecting party ideologies (see infra, section 6.2.3). In
the EU, the newly established EED seeks to distance it from this approach, emphasizing that it does not
promote ‘any single model’.405 In characterizing this ‘transatlantic’ divide, some commentators argue
that the EU is from Venus, more ‘understanding’ of alternative pathways to democratization, whereas
the US is from Mars – forceful and principled in pushing its proper democratic model.406 Rather than
characterizing the substance of their democracy promotion, the analogy is used to describe the
different approach and ‘posture’ of the EU and the US.
Despite such metaphors, it is clear that within the EU and the US themselves competing visions on
democratization exist.407 Rather than a clear-cut US or EU template, democracy promotion is given
substance depending on the actors involved and the country-specific context in which it is undertaken.
This adaptability has been highlighted as the EU and the US aim to move away from a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ strategy.408 The brief analysis above indicates the absence of a single monolithic ‘democracy
agenda’. Given this adaptability, the next section clarifies the different strategies, instruments and tools
which are used to put the democracy promotion agenda into practice.
400 Wetzel and Orbie, supra, n. 397.
401 The political architecture of a liberal democracy is composed of five regimes: ”a democratic electoral regime, political
rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the
hands of democratically elected representatives”, see: Wetzel and Orbie, supra, n. 397., p. 573.
402 Ibid, p. 570-571.
403 Carothers, supra, n. 393, p. 8.
404 As cited in Richard Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy’, Working Document, No. 167,
Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2001, p. 10.
405 Interview Jerzy Pomianowski, Executive Director of the EED, Euractiv Website, 15 April 2014. Available at
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/jerzy-pomianowski-france-could-do-more-human-rights-301565 (accessed
26/05/2014).
406 Risse and Börzel, supra, n. 122.
407 See Melia, T., ‘The Democracy Bureaucracy’, The American Interest 1, no. 4, 2006.; Spence, M., ‘Policy Coherence and
Incoherence: The Domestic Politics of American Democracy Promotion’, Paper presented at the Workshop on Democracy
Promotion Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University October 4-5, 2004.
408 In the EU, the EC’s Agenda for Change calls for a tailor-made approach, (see EC COM(2011) 637final, 13 October 2011). In
the US, the process of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review has similarly called for tailored responses and
enhanced cooperation with local actors.
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6.2.2 Strategies for democracy promotion
Both the EU and the US have a various means at their disposal to promote democracy, several of which
are described in the chapters on foreign policy (section 3), trade policy (section 4), and development
cooperation policy (section 5). The controversial ‘modality’ of democracy promotion, which is not
discussed in this report, is military intervention or democratization by force. At the opposite
spectrum of action is the ‘intrinsic’ external influence which the EU and the US project on the world
stage as ‘models’ or ‘examples’,409 inspiring democratic movements or reformers. Because this ‘diffusion’
of democratic values does not require direct activity - although the EU and the US amplify their meta-
influence through various means - it is also not addressed as a separate policy in this report. The
majority of the EU’s and the US’s instruments and tools for promoting democracy are located between
this passive role as ‘model’ and the use of military force. They can include sanctions and embargos,
various forms of positive and negative conditionality related to trade and development assistance, and
a range of diplomatic efforts.410.
In looking at how the EU and the US deploy their ‘toolbox’ in relation to a third country, there are
several ways to categorize the various tools and instruments into broader strategies for democracy
promotion.411 In the context of this case study we adopt a distinction between the promotion of top-
down democratic reforms, and efforts towards bottom-up democratic reform. The category of top-
down efforts relates in first instance to all actions which aim to provide incentives or disincentives to
governments. Often described as the ‘sticks and carrots’ approach and operationalized by different
types of conditionality policies in tandem with diplomatic and political dialogues with partner
governments, it relies on the use of external leverage to incentivize reforms.412 It also can cover
substantial amounts of democracy assistance funding for programmes in collaboration with
governments or public institutions. The ‘bottom-up’ approach to democracy promotion covers all
forms of support for non-state actors as the ‘grassroots’ of democracy, and relies on creating
transnational linkages.413 This can include support for political parties, but primarily covers a diverse
category of civil society actors, including human rights defenders. The distinction between top-down
and bottom-up approaches is particularly useful in comparing US and EU strategies. While it is
acknowledged that the EU and the US combine top-down and bottom-up democracy promotion,
several authors argue that the EU invests more in a ‘top-down’ state centric approach, whereas the US is
said to be more committed to ‘bottom up’ support.414 This would reflect a more careful and less
antagonizing approach adopted by the EU, while the US is more confrontational towards governments
and less concerned with the potential of worsening diplomatic relations. The remainder of this case
study will focus primarily on democracy assistance, that is, the use of development funding to assist
processes of democratic reform in other countries. The following sub-sections elaborate and
409 E. Baracani, ‘U.S. and EU Strategies for Promoting Democracy,’ in Federiga, M. and Angelescu, I. (eds.), The Foreign Policy of
the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p. 307.
410 Ibid, p. 308.
411 See for example, Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas, 2nd ed.,
Oxford University Press Oxford, 2001; Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F., ‘EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood:
from leverage to governance?’, Democratization, Vol. 18 (4), 2011, p. 885-909.
412 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, supra, n. 411, p. 892.
413 Ibid, p. 890-891.
414 See Risse, T., ‘Conclusions: Towards Transatlantic Democracy Promotion?’ in Magen, A., Risse, T. and McFaul, M.A. (eds.),
Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law. American and European Strategies, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2009, p. 244-271;
Kopstein, J., ‘The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29(2), 2006, p. 85-98;
Babayan, N., and Viviani, A., ‘Shocking” Adjustments? EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion’, Transworld Working
Papers, No. 18, 2013.
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substantiate how the EU and the US carry out democracy assistance. Section 6.2.4 further looks more
specifically into the implementation of ‘bottom up’ democracy assistance.
6.2.3 EU and US democracy assistance
Both the EU and US invest a significant share of their official development assistance (ODA) budget in
projects and programmes on ‘human rights and democracy’. This type of democracy/human rights
assistance is part of a broader trend whereby development assistance is increasingly seen as a tool for
shaping institutions and governance, in addition to its traditional focus on economic growth and
poverty reduction. This subsection summarizes the main types, actors and characteristics of EU and US
democracy assistance.
Democracy and Human Rights Assistance as an increasing share of ODA The amount of official
development assistance (ODA) which the EU and the US allocate for the broad category of good
governance-, democracy assistance- and human rights-projects and programmes has increased
significantly over the past decade (see figure 4).
Figure 4: : ODA commitments to ‘Government and Civil Society’ from the US and EU Institutions, 2000-
2012, Total Amounts in USD million dollars and percentage as compared to total sector spending415
Despite this increasing investment in ‘governance’, this thematic sector of development assistance
remains relatively small compared to other sectors such as education or health. Its share of total
spending in all sectors has fluctuated over the last decade in both the EU and the US. In 2012, it
accounted for 16% of the US’s sector ODA, and 11% of sector ODA managed by EU Institutions.
Types of Democracy Assistance The EU and the US fund a broad variety of activities which can be
regarded as democracy assistance, covering support for different branches of government, political or
civil society organizations, or individual citizens. This includes support for electoral processes and voter
education campaigns, grants for individual human rights organizations or defenders, funding for public
415 Data extracted on 20.5.2014 15:33 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat. The OECD’s Creditor Reporting System code ‘151: I.5.a.
Government & Civil Society-general, Total’ was used. The total amounts omit funding under CRS code ‘152: I.5.b. Conflict,
Peace & Security’, which can also cover certain forms of democracy assistance. The percentage trendlines are based on the
share of the government-civil society sector (151:1.5.a) against total sector allocated ODA spending (1000: Total All Sectors)
reported through the OECD’s CRS.
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or semi-public accountability institutions, support for parliamentary institutions, etc. Numerous
Washington- and Brussels- based institutions and agencies are engaged in democracy assistance and
they reach out to a broad range of actors at the national and supranational level. The latter can
include financial support for regional and international bodies who address human rights such as the
UNOHCHR and the ICC. In looking into more detail of what this broad category of ‘governance’ and
democracy assistance covers, certain divergences can be found between the EU and the US as
illustrated by figures 5 and 6 (infra). The OECD data suggest a much stronger emphasis of US
democracy assistance to legal and judicial development, but a much smaller share dedicated to human
rights organizations and actors. While initiatives on ‘Rule of Law’ and ‘Access to Justice’ are important in
EU and US democracy assistance, this seems to indicate a difference in how the role of human rights
actors is prioritized. In looking at other large sub-sectors, both the EU and the US dedicated roughly one
third of their ‘governance’ budget to programmes which aim to improve effective governance and
state-building (i.e. the sub-categories of public sector policy and administrative management, public
finance management, decentralisation and support to sub-national governments, anti-corruption
organisations and institutions). While it can be argued that an effective state is essential for the
protection of human rights, such programmes often do not focus directly on improving human rights
protection or democratic governance as such.
Figure 5: US commitments for sub-sectors of ‘Government-Society’, 2012, as % of total sector
Those assistance programmes which directly and explicitly have democratic accountability and
participation as a primary goal fall under the sub-sectors of ‘Democratic participation and civil society’,
‘Elections’, ’Legislatures and political parties’, ‘Media and free flow of information’, ‘Human rights’, and
‘Women's equality organisations and institutions’. In order to contrast this type of assistance with
programmes which aim to state efficiency or the development of judiciary, the broad label of ‘bottom-
up’ is applied. The following section (see infra, 6.2.4) provides a more detailed analysis of this type of
democracy assistance.
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Figure 6: EU commitments for sub-sectors of ‘Government-Society’, 2012, as % of total sector
EU Instruments and Implementing Actors In the EU, DG DEVCO and the EEAS dispose of several
financial instruments to fund a broad range of activities in the field of democracy assistance. A key
development in this regard was the creation of EIDHR in 1994, and its subsequent adoption as a specific
thematic financial instrument in 1999.416 It followed a push by the European Parliament for a more
coherent and sustained EU effort at democracy promotion.417 EIDHR main objective is to provide
support to human rights defenders and civil society organizations, and is able to do so without the
consent of a partner government allowing it to operate in repressive states. While support for human
rights defenders and CSOs is at the core of EIDHR’s mandate, a significant share of its budget is also
used for supporting other actors, including the European Electoral Monitoring missions and institutions
such as the UNOHCHR and the ICC. In addition, funding for democracy assistance is available to the
EEAS and the Commission under several geographic financial instruments; at least 15% of the funding
under the DCI’s geographic programmes for 2014-2020 will be invested in ‘human rights, democracy
and good governance’.418 Similarly, the ENPI and the EDF also foresee funding for democracy assistance
in the European Neighbourhood and ACP-countries respectively. Besides DG DEVCO, other DGs also
engage in democracy and human rights initiatives in coordination with the EEAS. The Service for
Foreign Policy Instruments provides support through the Instrument for Stability (IfS), financing for
example ‘rule of law’ reform programmes. In pre-accession countries, DG Enlargement further engages
in human rights promotion and democracy assistance, as the ‘promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms’ is part of the specific objectives of the Instrument for Pre-accession
Assistance (IPA).419
A notable development is the emergence of a new actor with the creation of the European Endowment
for Democracy (EED) in 2012 under the auspices of the Polish presidency of the Council. Based on the
US’s National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (see infra), the EED is a private grant making institution
with a mandate to ‘’foster and encourage ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ within the EU
416 The current regulation for EIDHR is the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 235/2014 establishing a
financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide (2014) OJ L77/85.
417 REGULATION (EU) No 235/2014.
418 Regulation (EU) No. 233/2014, supra, n. 266.
419 Article 2, 1 (a) (ii), REGULATION (EU)231/2014.
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neighbourhood.420 Its board is composed of representatives of EU Member States, MEPs, and NGO
representatives.421 It receives a significant share of its funding from the European Commission to cover
its operating budget, but relies primarily on contributions from Member States. Because it foresees less
procedural requirements than other funding mechanisms, the EED’s added value would lie in its flexible
approach for providing grants to pro-democracy actors and human rights defenders, as is further
discussed below.
US Instruments and Implementing Actors In the US context, several actors dispose of significant
resources to carry out democracy assistance. The US Congress allocates its ‘democracy fund’ between
USAID and the USSD’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL Bureau). The most recent
Appropriations Act of 2014422reflects a gradual evolution whereby the USSD’s budget for democracy
assistance has increased significantly and USAID has lost its status as the main provider of US
democracy assistance. Complementing its ‘traditional’ reporting activities, the USSD’s DRL Bureau uses
several funding mechanisms. It primarily grants contracts for programmes to US-based non-profit
organizations to strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil society
mainly in fragile democracies and authoritarian states. The DRL Bureau also has an emergency ‘Human
Rights Defenders’ Fund’ for quickly assisting individuals at risk and contributes to a similar mechanism,
the ‘The Embattled NGOs Assistance Fund’ together with several other donor states. Additionally, large
programmes such as the Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative also cover significant funding for
democratic reform and civil society support. Despite a ‘stagnation’ under the GW Bush administration,
democracy assistance and human rights have again been adopted as a visible priority for USAID with
the establishment of its Center of Excellence for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance in 2012,
and its renewed strategy discussed above.423
In addition, a large share of funding for democracy assistance is allocated to the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED), a private, non-profit foundation which operates largely independent from USAID
and USSD. Established under the Reagan administration by the National Endowment for Democracy Act
of 1983, the NED has since evolved into one of the key ‘branches’ of US democracy assistance. The NED
is based on the German ‘Stiftungsmodell’424 and receives its funding via Congress for international
projects in the field of human rights and democracy. The great majority of its budget is directed to its
four core institutions: the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI),
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the Solidarity Centre. The NED’s core institutes
reflect party political and ideological components of the US’ democratic model. They carry out a variety
of democracy assistance programmes and initiatives relying on a network of partner organisations and
disposing of field-based offices in a large number of countries. The creation and expansion of the NED
is considered a milestone in US democracy assistance.425 Its focus on supporting civil society and
NGOs provides it with a distinct mandate, different from the democracy assistance efforts undertaken
by USAID or the USSD. Although wholly dependent on government funding, the independence of the
NED is presented as one its defining features. Its board members are not selected by the President, and
420 Council Of The European Union, Declaration on the Establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy, 20.12.2011,
Brussels.
421 Škoba, L., ‘European Endowment for Democracy: hopes and expectations’, Briefing, Library of the European Parliament,
30/04/2013.
422 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, 113th Congress (2013-2014,) H. R. 3547—475.
423 Under GW Bush administration, senior leadership of USAID did not prioritize democracy assistance. See T. Carothers,
‘Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance- The Challenge of USAID’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.
424 Magen, A., and McFaul, M.A., ‘Introduction: American and European Strategies to Promote Democracy’, in: Magen, A.,
Risse, T. and McFaul, M. (eds.), Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies, London: Palgrave,
2009, p. 1-33.
425 Interview with US official, Washington D.C., 13 March 2014.
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those who are appointed to serve in the Executive Branch have to relinquish their board membership.
The ‘added value’ of the NED in supporting ‘grassroots’ or ‘bottom-up’ democratic processes is
discussed below (see infra, section 6.2.4).
Apart from the NED, USAID and the USSD, other governmental institutions can be engaged in programs
that cover democracy and human rights promotion, including the Department of Defense, the MCC,
and the Department of Justice.426 Given the variety of actors involved in democracy promotion, the
coordination of democracy assistance has become a salient question within both the US and the
EU. In the US, a rapidly increasing budget for democracy assistance combined with a greater spread of
this funding over different actors has led some authors to identify a sprawling ‘democracy
bureaucracy’.427 Concerns regarding coordination were highlighted in the US Senate, where it was
noted that USAID and the USSD did not have a ‘common definition’ of what a ‘democracy program’ is.428
The multiplicity of actors and programmes presents a challenge for internal oversight, and the need for
adequate coordination between USAID, State Department, NED, and other actors has been
emphasized.429 In the EU, the recent creation of the EED, and even more so the many Member-State-
based donors and organizations engaged in democracy assistance, reflect a similar degree of high
fragmentation.
Geographic Priorities in EU and US Democracy Assistance Due to the multitude of actors and funding
instruments engaged in democracy assistance, little systematic data is readily available on where US
and EU assistance is concentrated. Table 4 presents a snapshot comparison of the top 15 recipient
countries of EU and US democracy assistance based on studies commissioned by the Commission (EU)
and undertaken by the Government Accountability Office (US). While it should be highlighted that
these studies adopt different timeframes and different methodologies for measuring democracy
assistance, they do indicate interesting geographic overlaps and differences between EU and US efforts.
Apart from Iraq and Afghanistan, countries such as Sudan, Indonesia, Ukraine, Colombia, Russia and the
West Bank and Gaza Strip are among the overlapping top recipients.
426 Carothers, supra, n. 423.
427 Melia, supra, n. 407.
428 Senate Report 109-096 of June 30, 2005 on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and related programs
Appropriations Bill FY 2006.
429 Government Accountability Office, ‘Democracy Assistance: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International
Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities’, Report to Congressional Committees, 2009.
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Table 4: Comparing recipients of EU and US democracy and human rights assistance430
Top 15 Recipients of EU Human Rights and
Democracy Assistance431, 2001-2010
Top 15 Recipients of US Human Rights and Democracy
Assistance (‘Governing Justly and Democratically’)432,
2006-2008
1. Afghanistan (x)
2. Sudan (x)
3. West Bank and Gaza Strip (x)
4. Indonesia (x)
5. Somalia
6. Iraq (x)
7. DR Congo
8. Russia (x)
9. Colombia (x)
10. Georgia
11. India
12. Bangladesh
13. Ukraine (x)
14. South Africa
15. Sri Lanka
1. Iraq (x)
2. Afghanistan (x)
3. Sudan (x)
4. Egypt
5. Mexico
6. Colombia (x)
7. Russia (x)
8. Kosovo
9. Pakistan
10. Liberia
11. Indonesia (x)
12. West Bank and Gaza Strip (x)
13. Ukraine (x)
14. Cuba
15. Haiti
In looking at specific EU and US actors, some clear geographic priorities can be identified. The USSD’s
DRL Bureau for invests about half of its budget in Iraq, with the remainder of its programming budget
spread over several regions.433 A quick scan of current USAID projects for democracy and human rights
430 Note: Countries appearing in both lists are marked (x)
431 The numbers included here are based on an extensive evaluation of the Commission’s support to human rights and
fundamental freedoms, carried out by a consortium of research institutions. The measurement of financial support covers
assistance managed by the Directorates-General for Development and Co-operation/EuropeAid (DEVCO), Enlargement
(ELARG) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), provided to third countries (excluding OECD members and
candidate countries) and ‘filtered’ to identify human rights-related interventions. The three funding instruments which
dispensed most human rights-related funding are FED (26 %), DCI-ALA (18 %) and EIDHR (17 %), with a notable trend
whereby geographic instruments now dispense more HR-related funds than the thematic funding instruments. See
Consortium PARTICIP-ADE–DIE–DRN-ECDPM-ODI, Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including solidarity with victims of repression), Volume 3: Inventory of Human
Rights Interventions (2011).
432 This table lists funding under the ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’ objective as set out in the Foreign Assistance
Framework developed by the USSD and USAID in 2006. The strategic objective the ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’
has four program areas—’Rule of Law and Human Rights,’ ‘Good Governance,’ ‘Political Competition and Consensus-
Building,’ and ‘Civil Society. See Government Accountability Office, Democracy Assistance: U.S. Agencies Take Steps to
Coordinate International Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded Activities, Report to Congressional
Committees (2009).
433US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Website on Democracy, Human Rights and Law
Programs, available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/index.htm (accessed 12/05/2014).
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based on its website indicates a high concentration in Afghanistan (30 projects) and Egypt (25
projects).434 At the EU side, country’s with a high concentration of EIDHR projects between 2007 and
2010 were Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Russia, Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Nepal, Venezuela, and DR Congo.435
These observations seem to indicate that foreign policy priorities, such as the international efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, account for a large share of the EU’s and the US’s democracy assistance efforts.
6.2.4 Supporting bottom-up democratic reform
In their assistance strategies, both EU and US use a mix of tools. Depending on the broader context of
bilateral relations, democracy assistance will be used to support state institutions or the political society
of a country, or it will be used to strengthen civil society, assist human rights defenders, or support
opposition movements. In the case of USAID and DG DEVCO, this choice of engagement strategy runs
parallel to their implicit or explicit ‘categorization’ of countries reflected in their development strategies
(USAID), or budget support policy (DG DEVCO-EEAS), as described above (see supra, section 5.1).
Both the US and the EU see support for an active political and civil society as an essential component of
democracy promotion.436 However, democracy assistance covers a broad spectrum of activities,
whereby support for non-state actors is not necessarily prioritized. What can be labelled as ‘bottom-up’
democracy assistance represents a small yet significant share of the EU’s and the US’s overall
ODA budget for ‘governance’ assistance; 18% for the US and 35% for the EU in 2012 (see supra,
figures 5 and 6). This type of ‘bottom-up’ democracy assistance still covers a broad category of non-
state actors. It is funded through several financial instruments or budget accounts allocated by different
institutions/agencies, and often flows through various intermediaries which can be EU or US-based (e.g.
the EED or NED) or international organizations (e.g. UN agencies or international networks of CSOs). In
addition to direct and indirect (i.e. through intermediaries) support for non-state actors discussed in this
section, the EU and the US can also use their ‘top-down’ leverage to address certain constraints states
put on civil society actors, such as prohibitive laws, or specific cases.
Increasing budgets Despite the fact that ‘state-centric’ democracy assistance accounts for the majority
of ‘governance’ assistance, a strong upward trend in US and EU investment in bottom-up assistance can
be identified between 2000 and 2012 using OECD data as a rough indicator (see figure 7).
434 As presented on USAID Interactive Map, available at http://map.usaid.gov/ (accessed 12/05/2014).
435 See European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, ‘Compendium of Projects 2007-2010’, DG DEVCO Brochure,
2011.
436 See COM(2012) 492 final, The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society
in external relations, Brussels, 12.9.2012. For the US dimension, see the US-USAID Strategic Plan, supra, n. 272.
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Figure 7: EU and US financial commitments for bottom-up democracy promotion437, 2000-2012,
in USD millions
This data suggests that the EU has overtaken the US in investing ODA in electoral processes,
political parties, various types of CSOs, and other non-state actors such as media organizations.
Arguably, this nuances the view that the EU prioritizes state-centric democracy promotion. The rising
level of funding also reflects several policy changes within the EU which foresee a more systematic
engagement with civil-society actors, such as the scaling up of EIDHR funding, and the creation of other
funding mechanisms such as the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility (ENI), and the Civil Society
Organisations and Local Authorities Programme (DCI). At the same time, as figures 5 and 6 illustrate (see
supra, section 6.3.2) both the EU and the US invest considerably more in broader ‘governance
programmes’ often in cooperation with governments or national judiciaries, which do not necessarily
include a strong element of ‘bottom-up’ democratic participation. Furthermore, the quantitative data in
figure 7 does not reflect the ‘quality’ of bottom-up assistance. At least two important and interrelated
elements which determine the ‘nature’ of EU and US bottom-up support can be highlighted: the choice
of non-state partners in a given country, and the funding channels used for providing support to
democratic reformers.
Strategic choice of non-state partners Support for bottom-up democratization can cover a range of
actors, and various qualitative analysis suggest that both the EU and the US adapt their choice of non-
state partners in light of a strategic choice between ‘confrontational’ or ‘cooperative’ democracy
promotion.438 The data used to compose figure 7 also covers projects and programmes with public- or
semi-public institutions (e.g. election commissions, ministry of education) and with non-state actors
(labour unions, chambers of commerce, etc.), which - depending on the country context – are not
necessarily strong democratic reformers. It might also include funding for ‘semi-governmental’ NGOs,
closely linked to politicians in power.439
Some authors argue that the US is more dynamic and less-risk averse in supporting strong democratic
reformers, whereas the EU is said to prefer supporting a range of CSOs which are less concentrated on
437 Data extracted on 21.5.2014 10:10 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat. The category of ‘bottom-up support’ aggregates the
following reporting codes from OECD’s Creditor Reporting System; 15150- Democratic participation and civil society, 15151-
Elections, 15152- Legislatures and political parties, 15153- Media and free flow of information, 15160- Human rights, 15170-
Women's equality organisations and institutions. It should be noted that within these categories certain programmes can
also include significant financing for public- or semi-public institutions (e.g. election commissions).
438 L. Bush, ‘Confront or Conform? Rethinking U.S. Democracy Assistance’, Project on Middle East Democracy, Policy Brief,
March 2013.
439 Bicchi, F., ‘Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An Overview’, Mediterranean Politics, No.1, 2009, p. 61-78., p. 66.
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straightforward political engagement. With regards to its Eastern Neighbourhood, it has been noted
that past EU civil society support ‘largely focused on vulnerable groups’ rights promotion and sustainable
development’ rather than enhancing the political influence or participation of CSOs.440 Historical analysis
of how the EU and US supported democratization in Indonesia also indicate that, while Brussels also
provided some support for civil society, the US was more effective and strategic in its choice of
partners.441 In similar vein, during the political crises in Georgia preceding the ‘rose revolution’ of 2004,
US support for democratic reformers was more direct and decisive than the EU’s efforts.442 More
symbolic examples indicate a similar dynamic; in Angola the EU provided funding for a civil society
forum in 2009, but refrained from sending a high-ranking representative in order to avoid tension with
the Dos Santos Regime.443 Other case-studies illustrate that the US and the EU both prefer not to
invest in confrontational support and prefer to provide only limited assistance for selected non-
state actors.444 This dynamic was also apparent in both EU and US reactions towards the democratic
movements in Tunisia and Egypt, where the initial response towards the reform movements was
ambiguous.445 Rather than an intrinsically different approach from each side of the Atlantic, country
context and larger factors determine the level and intensity of support for bottom-up reform. However,
findings from several case-studies do seem to indicate a particular difference; the US has been much
more active in supporting democratic reformers before and during transitions phases, whereas the EU
often has a delayed response and starts investing in civil society actors after a democratic transition has
already taken place.446 This difference is often ascribed to the nature of the different EU and US actors
providing democracy assistance.
Funding democratic change: state actors and political foundations A variety of actors in both the US
and the EU are engaged in different types of democracy assistance. The complex and multi-layered
financing often makes it hard to determine what actors on the ground are receiving US or EU funding.
This subsection highlights a key difference which sets the US approach to democracy promotion apart
from the EU: the NED as a semi-governmental mechanism. While not necessarily illustrative for the full
range of democracy assistance the US provides, the role of the NED is often highlighted to enforce the
differences between EU and US democracy promotion.
With a small operational structure and specialized in providing grants to civil society actors, the NED’s
modus operandi is considered more dynamic than USAID or the USSD, which dispense large
budgets and are primarily engaged in managing larger multi-stakeholders programmes. The notion
that the US is more active and successful in supporting bottom-up democratization comes at least
partly from the NED’s ability to reach out to dissidents and strong reformers, notably its early support
for the Polish underground during the 1980’s. However, during its first two decades the NED’s came
under fire on various occasions, mainly due to fiscal conservatives in Congress.447 None the less, it has
since garnered wide bipartisan support and its funding has increased significantly, from 35 million USD
440 See N. Shapovalova, and R. Youngs, ‘EU democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood: a turn to civil society?’
FRIDE, WORKING PAPER 115, 2012.
441 See R. Kleinfeld, U.S. and EU Strategies to Promote Democracy in Indonesia, in Magen and Risse, op cit., p. 216-243.
442 T.A. Börzel, Y. Pamuk and A. Stahn, ‘Democracy or Stability? EU and US Engagement in the Southern Caucasus’, in Magen
and Risse, op cit.
443 T. A. Börzel and C. Hackenesch, ‘Small carrots, few sticks: EU good governance promotion in sub-Saharan Africa’,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26 (2013) 3, 536-555.
444 V. van Hüllen / Stahn A., ‘Comparing EU and US Democracy: Promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent
States’ in Magen and Risse (eds.), 2009.
445 AZIZ, S., ‘U.S. Foreign Aid and Morsi's Ouster’, Middle East Institute, July 31, 2013; Macqueen, B. ‘Democracy promotion
and Arab autocracies’ Global Change, Peace & Security, 2009 21, 165-178.
446 Risse, in Magen and Risse, op cit, p. 260.
447 Interview with US official, Washington, D.C., 12 March 2014.
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in 1993, to 135 million USD allocated in the 2014 Appropriations Act. For 2013, the Senate Committee
proposed to double NED’s budget to 236 million USD and foresee an ‘equivalent decrease in the overall
fiscal year 2013 budget request for democracy programs’.448 The Senate Committee motivated this by
underlining the ‘comparative advantages’ of the NED, given its ‘status as an NGO, unparalleled experience
in promoting freedom during the cold war, and continued ability to conduct programs in the most hostile
political environments.’449 The Committee stated that the NED is ‘a more appropriate and effective
mechanism to promote democracy and human rights abroad than either the Department of State or
USAID.’450
Experts agree that the NED’s ‘flexibility and capability to operate in political environments’ allows it to
engage certain actors which cannot be reached by other US democracy assistance initiatives.451 Both
USAID and the State Department rely heavily on a good working relationship with the local government
for the majority of their activities in a given country, which inevitably constrains their ability to reach out
to democratic reform movements.452 The NED’s modus operandi thus contrasts with USAID’s
‘bureaucratic’ nature and makes it less risk-averse. For this reason, insiders note that the NED’s role in
picking up ‘contentious cases’ is appreciated by US government agencies which have to take into
account bilateral relations.453At the same time, nuances should be made about the nature and impact of
NED-funded initiatives or the programmes carried out by its partner institutions such as the NDI and
IRI.454
The EU on the other hand, is generally not considered to have a strong track-record in supporting
democratic reform movements, whereby its prior policy towards Northern Africa and the reaction to
the Arab Spring movements often serves as a case in point. None the less, the EEAS and the Commission
manage several funding instruments through which democracy assistance can be provided to non-
state actors. Civil society actors receive EIDHR support through an EU-wide open-call for applications
(macro-programmes) or via country-based support schemes (micro-projects). Whereas the latter was
designed to reach out to local actors in partner countries, heavy procedural and administrational
requirements are often cited as the reason why EIDHR has not been able to reach out to emerging local
actors which dispose of little or no organizational capacity.455 EIDHR’s procedures requires its applicants
to be registered organizations. As repressive governments can easily deny groups from registering, and
are increasingly making it more difficult to do so,456 its ability to support democratic reformers has been
constrained. Characterizing EIDHR’s bureaucratic nature and its embedded role within the
Commission, one US interviewee mentioned that it was a ‘creature of the system’, and it has not been
flexible enough to meet ‘the needs of people on the ground engaged in democracy promotion’.457
Other interviewees in Washington affirmed that in the area of democracy promotion, not the EU itself
448 See U.S. Senate, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2013,” U.S. Senate
Report 112-172, 112th Congress, 2d Session, 24 May 2012, p. 34.
449 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
451 Michael A. Cohen and Maria Figueroa Küpçü, Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Promotion: a Comprehensive Plan For Reform,
the privatization of foreign policy initiative, New America Foundation, 2009.
452 Interview with US official, Washington, D.C., 13 March 2014.
453 Interview with US official, Washington, D.C., 13.3.2014.
454 See for example, Haring (2013), p. 5-6. In this context, a dramatic increase in the NED’s budget is cautioned by some
observes, as this would affect its ‘lean’ and ‘flexible’ organizational model for which it has been lauded. See Carothers (2009),
p. 46.
455 Bicchi, supra, n. 439.
456 Carothers, T., and Brechenmacher, S., ‘Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire’ Report, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2014.
457 Interview with US official, Brussels, 4 April 2014.
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but the various political foundations of EU Member States are considered to be the main actors and
strongest partners.458
The EU catching up? Given this understanding that the EU ‘lags behind’, the idea to establish a new
foundation for EU democracy promotion, independent of the Commission, has been on the agenda
since the revision of EIDHR in 2006.459 This has crystallized into the establishment of the EED, as a new
mechanism, similar to the US’s NED, for rapidly providing support to grassroots movements and
democratic reformers in the EU’s neighbourhood. The EED’s focus on flexible grant making and its
ability to provide core-funding for grassroots actors is seen as its main added-value to the existing EU
mechanisms.460 At the same time certain authors have argued that the emergence of the EED could
further fragment EU’s democracy assistance funding and ‘obstruct the emergence of a coherent
approach’, in particular given the financial instruments already in place, and the important role played
by the various political foundations of EU Member States.461 In this regard, the EP has underlined that
the EED’s activities should complement and not overlap with the EU’s existing funding instruments, and
that ‘close coordination and consultation’ with the EEAS, the Commission and Parliament should be
undertaken.462
6.2.5 EU-US cooperation: challenges and opportunities
This case study on democracy promotion has featured several similarities and differences between the
EU and the US. It identified that, despite the temptation of international actors to advocate stability over
reform, democratization remains a viable tool for both the EU and the US, as it (a) features the
promotion of values and principles, which have contributed much to their own creation; (b) fosters the
peaceful international cooperation according to the democratic peace theory; and (c) strengthens
transformations along the ideas of modernization theories. In this regard, both the US and the EU are
widely regarded to promote a liberal democratic model, while the EU, given the diversity of its own
Member States’ democratic systems, is less keen to advocate a specific model vis-à-vis its international
partners. Focusing on bottom-up democracy promotion, OECD data indicate a strong trend in US
and EU investment in bottom-up democracy promotion between 2000 and 2012, and suggests the EU
has overtaken the US in terms of total spending in recent years. In general, however, the EU’s
democracy promotion is seen as lagging behind from a US perspective, for example in terms of
flexibility and the choice of local partners.
Realizing its own deficiencies, the establishment of a new foundation for EU democracy promotion,
crystallized into the establishment of the EED, a more flexible mechanism for rapidly providing support
to grassroots movements and democratic reformers in the EU’s neighbourhood. The report showed
that the EED’s focus on flexible grant making as well as its ability to provide core-funding for grassroots
actors is meant to overcome previous shortcomings. The EP has underlined that the EED’s activities
should complement and not overlap with the EU’s existing funding instruments, and that ‘close
coordination and consultation’ with the EEAS, the Commission and Parliament should be undertaken. In
458 Interview with US official, Brussels, 4 April 2014.
459 Řiháčková, V., ‘Great Expectations: The launch of the European Endowment for Democracy should mark the beginning of
a new era of EU democracy assistance’, Policy Brief, Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS), 31 January 2013.
460 Kostanyan, H., and Nasieniak, M., ‘Moving the EU from a Laggard to a Leader in Democracy Assistance: The Potential Role
of the European Endowment for Democracy’ Policy Brief, Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2012.
461 Leininger, J., and Richter, S., ‘Flexible and Unbureaucratic Democracy Promotion by the EU? The European Endowment
for Democracy Between Wishful Thinking and Reality’, SWP Comments, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2012.
462 European Parliament recommendation of 29 March 2012 to the Council on the modalities for the possible establishment
of a European Endowment for Democracy (EED).
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other words, the EP advocates a coherent democracy promotion via the several available EU channels,
including EIDHR and EED. One of the greater obstacles to EU-US cooperation in the field will not only be
linked to an increased coherence of the EU’s democracy promotion, but also its engagement as a key
partner for the US. In this regard, the case study pointed interviewees to the observation that
Washington often sees in the area of democracy promotion not the EU itself but the various political
foundations of EU Member States as the main actors in the field.
6.2.6 Recommendations
Recommendations on the EU’s policy on Democracy Promotion
 Developing and exploring the full scope of human rights and democracy promotion
instruments Although the EU has progressively developed and expanded its tools to provide
democracy assistance, it is has been characterized as a more risk-averse actor than the US,
preferring stability and concentrating on gradual ‘state-centric’ governance reforms. With
creation of the EED as a new EU-wide ‘independent’ actor, EU democracy assistance might enter a
new era wherein support for grassroots processes is equally important. However, the landscape
of actors is already dense, and intense coordination will be necessary to harmonize the use of
EIDHR, the work of the EED, and the various democracy assistance actors based in the EU Member
States. Developing and fine-tuning a division of work at the country level will be necessary to
explore the potential synergies of combined EU democracy assistance efforts.
 Ensuring inter-linkages between state-centric governance reforms and civil society support
The EU’s success in democratization through incentivizing top-down reforms is only of limited
relevance outside its immediate neighbourhood. Providing partner governments with incentives
for reforms and the resources for specific reform programmes will continue to be an important
dimension of democracy promotion and assistance. However, in each country context the EU
delegation should identify the limits of externally induced top-down reform, and adjust the EU’s
approach to democracy promotion in this light. Coupling investments in government reforms
with investments for developing the capacity of grassroots civil society actors is recommended,
and is currently already undertaken in certain contexts. The choice of local partner organizations
is crucial in this regard.
Recommendations for EU-US collaboration on Democracy Promotion
 Coordinating democracy assistance and human rights promotion The EU and the US are the
largest providers of democracy assistance. The increasing number of actors and channels in both
the EU and the US also raises the issue of internal and external coordination. This should carry
implications for a stronger transatlantic effort. In interviews with US officials and US-based
organizations working on democracy assistance, the lack of knowledge of the EU as an actor in
the field was symptomatic for the lack of mutual engagement. More can be done to explore how
EU-based actors can engage more strategically with their US counterparts. At the level of state
actors, USAID and DG DEVCO should compare portfolios and engage in a learning exercise of
what democracy assistance can achieve. At the level of non-state actors, the EED and the NED, as
well as the various other organizations involved, could benefit from similar exchanges.
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6.3 Human Rights Council
6.3.1 Introduction
The HRC is a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), composed of 47 elected UN Member
States. It was established in 2006 to replace the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which had
become increasingly contested due to its alleged politicisation and ineffectiveness. Tasked with the
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the HRC should address human rights
violations and make recommendations thereon, it should contribute to the mainstreaming of human
rights throughout the work of the UN, promote human rights education, technical assistance and
capacity-building and serve as a platform for a comprehensive human rights dialogue.463 Like its
predecessor the HRC may appoint independent experts to serve as special rapporteurs on thematic or
country-specific matters (special procedures).464 In addition, the HRC has launched a universal periodic
review (UPR) which aims to examine in a cooperative manner the human rights record of each UN
Member State.465
The US was an early supporter of the reform of the CHR and actively participated in the negotiation
process. Its disappointment with the final draft, however, led it to issue a negative vote and to abstain
from running for membership in the newly established body. Instead, the US opted for observer status,
which allowed it to remain engaged in the work of the Council. In 2008 the US withdrew its mission
altogether, due to its dissatisfaction with the HRC, which it considered to be politicised and abused as a
forum for attacks against the US. The Obama administration decided to reengage with the HRC, opting
for a strategy of reform from within. The US subsequently was elected in a clean slate election as a
member to the HRC in 2009, and re-elected in 2012 in an open slate election.
The EU on the other hand was not one of the earliest supporters of a CHR reform, due to the lack of a
uniform position of its Member States towards the CHR and with regard to its potential successor.466
Nevertheless, it quickly warmed to the idea of a new UN human rights body and even turned into a
‘critical force’467 in the negotiations on the HRC. Since then the EU has been actively involved in the
Council as an observer. Other than in the UNGA the EU enjoys no enhanced participatory rights in
the HRC, which means that it continues to be represented through its Member States. The EU has
repeatedly endorsed the HRC as the main human rights body in the UN framework, underlining its
‘leading role […] in addressing urgent cases of human rights violations’468 and declaring its
commitment to ‘contribute vigorously to the effective functioning of the Council’.469 However, despite
463 UNGA Resolution 60/251, 15.3.2006, ‘Human Rights Council’, para 2-5.
464 HRC Resolution 5/1, 18.6.2007, ‘Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council’, annex II.
465 Ibid, annex I.
466 Macaj, G./Koops, J., ‘Inconvenient multilateralism: The challenges of the EU as a player in the United Nations Human
Rights Council’, in Wetzel, J.E. (ed.) The EU as a ‘Global Player’ in Human Rights?, Routledge, London/New York, 2011, p. 66-
81, p. 72.
467 Macaj/Koops, supra, n. 466, p. 73; Wouters, J./Meuwissen, K., ‘The European Union at the UN Human Rights Council.
Multilateral Human Rights Protection Coming of Age?’, European journal of Human Rights, 2014, p. 135-172, p. 137; Wouters,
J., Basu, S. and Bernaz N., ’The Role of the European Union in the Human Rights Council’, Study for the European Parliament,
Directorate-General External Policies of the Union, November 2008, p. 6-7.
468 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (11855/12),
25.6.2012.
469 Ibid.
A Comparative study of EU and US approaches to Human Rights in External Relations
91
this political prioritisation and the EU’s by now high degree of voting cohesion at the HRC, its overall
impact on the work of the Council remains limited.470
6.3.2 Positions on the mandate of the HRC
This part analyses the respective positions of the US and the EU on prominent HRC issues, in particular
concerning its institutional set-up and agenda, as shaped through the 2005/2006 negotiation process,
the 2007 institution-building package, and the 2009-2011 review. Going beyond a mere comparison of
EU and US approaches, we place the positions in the broader context of the negotiations and examine
the way in which both actors deal with the perceived shortcomings of the Council.
Establishment of the Human Rights Council The establishment of the HRC highlights the differing
positions of the US and the EU towards the creation of the new multilateral human rights body. The US
had been highly critical of the CHR, particularly with regard to the composition of its membership and
its ensuing lack of credibility. Controversy peaked when the US failed to be re-elected in 2001, while
countries with questionable human rights records, such as Pakistan, Sudan and Uganda, were
successful. The US therefore welcomed the initiative to replace the Commission with a new body. The
Bush administration even ranked the creation of the HRC as one of its key priorities in the
framework of a general UN reform.471 During the negotiations on the HRC, the US advocated stronger
membership criteria to bar the election of serious human rights violators, and requested a threshold of
a two-thirds majority in the UNGA.472 Amongst others, it was proposed that those countries that were
subjected to UNSC sanctions for gross abuses of human rights should be barred from sitting on the
Council.473 The US also supported a smaller sized,474 ‘action-oriented’ Council, mandated ‘to
address human rights emergencies and the most egregious human rights abuses, to provide
technical assistance, and to promote human rights as a global priority’.475 Other than the CHR, the HRC
should ‘meet through the year’476 in order to allow for rapid reaction to human rights violations. The EU
had similar visions for the new Council, and indeed cooperation between the EU and the US during
the negotiation process was close.477 The EU also envisaged a body that was smaller in size,478 to
admit only those UN Member States that were seriously committed to the promotion and protection of
human rights. As with the US, the EU favoured a voting requirement of a two thirds majority in the
UNGA.479 Candidate countries should ‘demonstrate their good faith by making voluntary commitments
about the action they will take, domestically and internationally, in support of human rights during their
470 Emerson, M. et al., ‘Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European
Diplomacy’, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations/European
Policy Centre/Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, 2011, p. 94.
471 United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, ‘U.S. Priorities for a Stronger, More Effective United Nations’,
08.9.2005, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/52982.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
472 UNGA, ‘General Assembly Establishes New Human Rights Council by Vote of 170 in Favour to 4 Against, With 3
Abstentions’, Press Release GA/10449, 15.3.2006, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ga10449.doc.htm
(accessed 27.8.2014).
473 Bolton, J., Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2007, p.
236.
474 Bolton, supra, n. 473, p. 234.
475 Supra, n. 471.
476 Ibid.
477 Bolton, supra, n. 473, p. 235.
478 European Community Statement by Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and
European Neighbourhood Policy, at the United Nations High Level Meeting (14-16.9.2005), New York, available at
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5030_en.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
479 Supra, n. 472.
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term of office’.480 The HRC should possibly have the rank of a principal organ of the UN, and it should
ideally be a standing body, but meet at least 4-6 times per year for an overall period of at least 12 weeks.
EU compromise and US non-compromise positions Both the EU and the US were disappointed with
the final outcome of the negotiation process.481 UNGA Resolution 60/251 contained only weak
language on the eligibility criteria for HRC Members, stating that ‘the contribution of candidates to the
promotion and protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments thereto’
‘shall [be] take[n] into account’. It also established merely a simple majority requirement for the election
of new Members. The HRC was not elevated to a principal UN organ, but created as a subsidiary body
of the UNGA, and its regular sessions were reduced to three per year, for a total duration of at least 10
weeks. Although the EU and the US were both thus unable to achieve important negotiation goals, the
respective reactions to the final draft were different. The EU expressed its disappointment, stating that
‘not everything that the EU had aimed for was reflected in the resolution’. Nevertheless it considered
the HRC to be ‘an improvement over the Commission on Human Rights’ that would ‘further strengthen
the United Nations human rights machinery’.482 The EU thus chose to support the resolution despite its
perceived shortcomings because it still saw a gradual improvement compared with the previous
institution. All EU Member States voted in favour of the Resolution 60/251. The US on the other hand
joined the small group of four countries that voted against the text.483 Expressing his goal for a ‘true
reform’ of the CHR, US Ambassador Bolton had previously quipped during the negotiations: ‘We want a
butterfly. We're not going to put lipstick on a caterpillar and declare it a success’.484 For the US, the
negative vote therefore represented the consequent reaction to the discrepancy between envisaged
goals and final outcome. These contrasting approaches are in line with the perception of one EU official
interviewed for this study concerning the different ‘styles’ of the EU and the US at the multilateral level:
‘The US is less afraid. They vote against what they don’t like. […] We try to integrate partners and find
compromises’.485 This prima facie stark juxtaposition between the EU and the US approach, however,
risks overlooking the nuances that accompanied the negative vote of the US. While rejecting Resolution
60/251, the US did not opt for a strategy of full-fledged opposition, but instead maintained full funding
for the newly established Council and actively participated in its work as an observer. Its vote was thus a
‘soft no’486 and its aim was similar to the EU’s approach: to remain engaged and to keep working
towards a stronger HRC.
Institution-building process The first year of the newly created Council was primarily devoted to
‘institution-building’, i.e. the development of workable procedures and rules based on the general
provisions of UNGA Resolution 60/251. Both EU and US delegations invested considerable diplomatic
efforts to ensure a strong HRC. In particular, both delegations aimed to maintain the capacity of the
Council to address country-specific situations. While many other states contended that this function
was now incorporated in the UPR, the EU and US argued that the consideration of country
480 Statement by the United Kingdom on Behalf of the European Union, Informal meeting of the General Assembly Plenary,
Follow-up to the World Summit, ‘The Human Rights Council: Status, Size, Composition & Membership of the Council’, New
York, 24.10.2005, PRES05-275EN, available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5178_en.htm (accessed
27.8.2014).
481 Wouters/Meuwissen, supra, n. 467, p. 138; Freedman, R., The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early
Assessment, Routledge, London/New York, 2013, p. 56.
482 Supra, n. 472.
483 The other three countries were Israel, the Marshall Islands and Palau.
484 Bolton, supra, n. 473, p. 234.
485 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
486 Maurer, P., ‘About the Negotiation Process in New York (from 2005 until 2006): Of Ants, Caterpillars and Butterflies’, in
Mueller, L. (ed.), The First 365 Days of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Baden, 2007, p. 35.
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situations through the HRC and the UPR were complementary tools with distinct functions. Against
voices that held that country resolutions were counterproductive as they merely named and shamed
selected countries, the Western states argued that they were an important tool to highlight grave
human rights violations. The EU and the US supported the maintenance of all existing CHR thematic
and country specific mandates of Special Rapporteurs, however, they could not prevent the termination
of the mandates on Cuba and Belarus. An especially thorny issue was the creation of item 7 on the
HRC’s permanent agenda, which deals with the ‘human rights situation in Palestine and other
occupied Arab territories’ and thus singles out Israel as the only country to which a separate agenda
item is explicitly devoted. The US consequently questioned the ‘Council’s institutional priorities, its
ability to make unbiased assessments of human rights situations and whether it will take seriously its
responsibility to protect and promote human rights around the world with particular attention to the
most serious violations of human rights’.487 Due to its particularly strong bilateral ties with Israel the US
is frequently the most vocal advocate of Israel at the international level. Though taking a more
moderate stance, the EU agreed that the ‘issue should not have been singled out in the agenda’.488
As in 2006, the EU and the US suffered a similar defeat in the negotiations. Both the explanation of the
US’s vote and the EU Presidency statement deplored the termination of the country-mandates for Cuba
and Belarus, and the creation of agenda item 7. Again, however, the US subsequently opted for a
negative vote on UNGA Resolution 62/219, while all EU Member States voted in favour.489 The US
stated that it was ‘compelled to vote ‘no’ on the institution-building package’, stating that the HRC had
‘fallen short of [the US’s] limited expectations’.490 The EU again made a conscious effort to highlight the
perceived – if modest – progress made, declaring that ‘[a]lthough not all of the EU’s objectives could be
achieved, the EU joined this agreement in the spirit of necessary compromise’.491
The HRC review process In line with the requirements of Resolution 60/251, the HRC underwent a
review of its status and its work and functioning between 2009 and 2011. The Western states aimed for
a strengthening of the Council, in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate to promote human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. The EU in particular advocated for a reinforcement of the UPR and the
special procedures, for a complete reform of the Advisory Committee and the complaint procedure, as
well as for the creation of an independent procedure to address urgent human rights situations. The US
equally supported the strengthening of the UPR and the special procedures. With regard to the latter,
the US advocated inter alia for increased support for the dissemination of their findings and for the
creation of public records on the degree of cooperation by states.492 A key negotiation goal of the US
was the establishment of procedures that barred gross human rights violators from being elected to the
Council. In particular the US advanced a proposal that sought to ensure open slate elections, and, when
this idea failed to gain support, the US advocated an interactive dialogue between candidate states,
487 United States Department of State, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
‘Explanation of Vote on the Human Rights Council Institution Building Package’, Remarks to the Third Committee of the
General Assembly, 16.11.2007, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/95294.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
488 Council of the European Union, ‘Human Rights Council – Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the
outcome of the Institution Building Process’, Doc. No. 11074/07, 21.6.2007.
489 The resolution was adopted with 150 votes in favour, seven votes against (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Palau, US), and one abstention (Nauru).
490 UNGA, 62nd session, 79th plenary meeting, Friday, 21 December 2007, 3 p.m. (resumed Saturday, 22 December 2007,
4.10 a.m.), Official Records, A/62/PV.79.
491 EU Presidency, ‘Human Rights Council – Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the outcome of the
Institution Building Process’, 21.6.2007, available at
http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP_Statements/June/0621Menschenrechtsrat1.html (accessed 27.8.2014).
492 Smith, K.E., ‘The European Union and the Review of the Human Rights Council’, EXPO/B/DROI/2010/06, February 2011, p.
42.
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Members and civil society, about the human rights records of the former.493 Furthermore, the US
strongly advocated for the abolishment of item 7 of the HRC agenda (‘Human rights situation in
Palestine and other occupied Arab territories’), a position that was supported by the EU. Both endorsed
merging agenda items 4 (‘Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention’), 7 and 10
(‘Technical assistance and capacity-building’).494 The objectives of the EU and the US ran contrary to the
positions of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and
the African Group, which prioritised state sovereignty and consequently opposed larger reforms, opting
instead for a heightened control of the Council through its Members. The final outcome of the Review
Process was again a disappointment for the EU and the US. HRC Resolution 26/21 was characterized by
‘vague compromise language’495 and did not include the main objectives of the Western states. The
independent procedure dealing with urgent cases completely dropped out of the final draft despite
considerable negotiating efforts of the West. Neither the strengthening of the UPR and the special
procedures, nor the restructuring of the Advisory Committee and the complaint procedure was
achieved. Item 7 was maintained on the HRC agenda, and the US proposals on the election of Council
Members were rejected. In a pattern similar to previous negotiation defeats at the HRC, the EU and the
US chose to express their discontent with the outcome of the Review Process in very different ways. The
US disassociated itself from the consensus on HRC Resolution 26/21 and voted against the subsequent
UNGA Resolution 65/281.496 The EU joined the consensus and voted in unison for the UNGA resolution.
While the US spoke of a ‘race to the bottom’, the EU saw no ‘significant improvement’ but expressed
its hope for future opportunities ‘to further discuss some of the good ideas that were raised during this
exercise’. Again, the US was more straightforward in its rhetoric, unconcerned to demonstrate its
disagreement through a negative vote.
Throughout the negotiations on the creation, the institution-building and the review of the young HRC,
the EU and the US mostly shared similar convictions on the role and structure of the institution. Both
actors have declared their support for a strong Council, which focuses on the gravest human rights
violations around the globe and enjoys the necessary powers to fulfil its mandate as the primary human
rights body worldwide. Yet, they both frequently failed to garner the necessary support for their
proposals or to block unwelcome proposals from third states. Faced with a dominance of OIC, NAM and
African Group states, the EU and the US had difficulties to avoid a weak Council architecture, a singular
focus on Israel, and the membership of states with records of human rights violations. Despite these
shared defeats in the negotiation processes, the EU and the US displayed different reactions. While the
EU always ensured to value the modest progress that had been achieved, the US’s rhetoric clearly
denounced the flaws of the outcome. Consequently the EU consistently joined the consensus and
voted in favour of the final resolutions, while the US disassociated itself from the consensus and opted
for a negative vote.
This highlights a significant difference in how the EU and the US perceive their roles at the multilateral
level. In light of its preeminent position at the global level the US is less ready to compromise on issues
which it assigns high importance. The US pushes for its positions as an adamant negotiator, preferring
to join the opposition to yielding on the subject matter. EU positions on the other hand already
represent a compromise of multiple different views and are therefore more susceptible to taking the
493 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Explanation of Vote by John F. Sammis, Deputy Representative to the Economic and
Social Council, in the General Assembly on the Human Rights Council Review’, 17.6.2011, available at
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/166477.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
494 Smith, supra, n. 492.
495 Wouters/Meuwissen, supra, n. 467, p. 150.
496 154 countries voted in favour, the US, Canada, Israel and Palau voted against.
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approaches of third countries into consideration. Knowing that EU unity is a frail good which might
break under pressure, the EU avoids intransigent stances and instead searches for compromises,
dialogue and exchange. Small progress is valued even if important goals have to be given up on and
engagement is preferred to opposition.
6.3.3 Priorities at the HRC
This part examines the respective country-specific and thematic priorities of the EU and the US at the
HRC, analyses where priorities overlap or differ and draws conclusions. Due to the limited scope of this
study, the analysis focuses on the priorities for the sessions held in 2013 and 2014.
Country-specific Priorities The EU has opted for a focus on a selected number of countries at the HRC.
Country-specific priorities included in 2013 and 2014 are: Syria, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), Iran, Sri Lanka, Myanmar/Burma, Belarus, the Central African Republic, as well as DR
Congo, Eritrea, Mali and Sudan.497 In the 22nd-26th sessions held in 2013/2014 the EU sponsored two
successful resolutions each on the DPRK (together with Japan) and on Myanmar/Burma, as well as two
successful resolutions on Belarus. EU Member States sponsored and co-sponsored successful
resolutions on Sri Lanka, Syria and Iran. The US sponsored five successful resolutions on Syria, two on
Iran and one on Sri Lanka. It co-sponsored resolutions on DR Congo, the Central African Republic and
Somalia as well as the EU-led resolutions on the DPRK and Myanmar/Burma. It is noteworthy that the US
is consistently the only Member of the HRC voting against the multitude of resolutions dealing with the
situation in Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and the Golan. In the past five regular
sessions and the 21st special session of the HRC on ‘the human rights situation in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’,498 12 resolutions on these issues were adopted. EU
Member States mostly voted in favour but abstained on the resolutions dealing with the Golan Heights
and on Resolution S-21/1. In the 22nd session a split vote occurred when the Czech Republic decided to
abstain while all other EU Member States voted in favour of Resolution 22/25.499
This brief overview of the past two years shows a significant overlap of country-specific priorities of
the EU and the US. In most cases, resolutions were either sponsored by the EU or the US and co-
sponsored by the latter or the Member States of the former. Except with regard to the resolutions on
Israel, voting cohesion is high. There are, however, two recent and notable divergences in country
priorities. Firstly, in the 25th session of the HRC, the US delivered on behalf of 42 states a Joint Statement
on the Situation in Ukraine, ranking it as one of the key US outcomes of the session. While EU Member
States had joined the statement, Ukraine is conspicuously absent from the EU’s list of priorities for 2014
at the UN human rights fora, formulated only a few weeks before.500 This corresponds to the frequently
made observation that the EU lacked a strategy on Ukraine.501 Secondly and similarly, the US issued
during the 25th session a series of national statements on the human rights situation in Venezuela,
497 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on EU priorities at the UN Human Rights Fora, Brussels, 10.2.2014;
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on EU priorities at the UN Human Rights Fora, Brussels, 18.2.2013.
498 The 21st special session was held on 23 July 2014.
499 HRC Resolution 22/25, 22.3.2013, ‘Follow-up to the report of the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict’.
500 See supra, n. 497.
501 See for example Tost, D., ‘Die allerletzte Chance der Ukraine‘, Euractiv, 27.9.2012, http://www.euractiv.de/ukraine-und-
eu/interview/die-allerletzte-chance-der-ukraine-006764 (accessed 27.8.2014); Rachman, G., ‘Why Europe can’t think
strategically’, Financial Times Blogs, 03.4.2014, http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/04/why-europe-cant-think-strategically
(accessed 27.8.2014); Schmitz, G.P., ‘EU-Russland-Gipfel zur Ukraine: Putin handelt, Europa zaudert’, Spiegel online,
28.1.2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/putin-in-bruessel-eu-russland-gipfel-zur-ukraine-a-945882.html (accessed
27.8.2014).
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which was one of the priority countries for the US in the session. Again, Latin American countries are
absent from the EU’s list of priorities, supporting the view that the EU has abandoned its formerly strong
role as a promoter and protector of human rights in Latin America, where its ‘voice is [now] rarely
heard’.502
Thematic Priorities Thematically, EU priorities for the 2013 and 2014 sessions included the rights of
women, children and indigenous people, freedom of association and assembly, LGBT rights, the
promotion of a rights based approach for the post-2015 agenda, as well as the fight against the death
penalty, torture and racism. In line with item 9(a) of the 2012 EU Action Plan on Human Rights and
Democracy (Action Plan), the EU has included economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights as a priority for
the 2014 sessions. The EU’s strained relationship with ESC rights had frequently given rise to criticism by
third countries.503 However, the practical implementation at the HRC is still lacking. Responding to item
23(b) of the Action Plan the EU has also put a special focus on the freedom of religion or belief,
sponsoring two resolutions in the 22nd and 25th session. The US has traditionally been a strong
advocate of the freedom of expression, co-sponsoring respective resolutions and championing the
maintenance of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for the promotion and protection of freedom of
opinion and expression.504 It has played an equally strong role with regard to the support of human
rights defenders, civil society and freedom of assembly, as expressed through its support for thematic
mandates and resolutions.505 Like the EU, the US also lists the rights of indigenous people as one of its
priorities and supported the extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.506
One of the main differences between the EU and US with regard to thematic priorities is the position
towards the death penalty. The EU describes itself as a ‘firm advocate of the abolition of the death
penalty’ and lists the expression of ‘strong and principled opposition to the death penalty’ as one of its
priorities for its participation in UN human rights fora.507 Another important divergence between the
EU and the US is the extent to which the freedom of expression is protected. The US had entered a
declaration to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or Covenant) in which it
declared that State Parties ‘should wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or
limitations’ on the rights recognised by the ICCPR even if they were permitted by the Covenant,
referring in particular to Article 19(3) which allows for restrictions on the right to freedom of expression,
502 Mónica del Carmen Serrano Carreto, ‘Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Viewpoints on Challenges to the EU
Normative Trinity’, FRAME International Advisory Board Panel Debate, 19 December 2013, Faculty of Law, KU Leuven,
available at http://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/events/2013/12_2013/frame-iab-panel-summary.pdf (accessed 27.8.2014).
503 Macaj/Koops, supra, n. 466, p. 74.
504 Cf. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Key U.S. Outcomes at the UN Human Rights Council 25th
Session’, 28.3.2014, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/224138.htm (accessed 27.8.2014); US
Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Key U.S. Outcomes at the UN Human Rights Council 23rd Session’,
19.6.2013, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210893.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
505 Cf. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Key U.S. Outcomes at the UN Human Rights Council 22nd
Session’, 25.3.2013, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206606.htm (accessed 27.8.2014); US
Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Key U.S. Outcomes at the UN Human Rights Council 24th Session’,
01.10.2013, available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/10/02/key-u-s-outcomes-at-the-un-human-rights-council-24th-
session/ (accessed 27.8.2014).
506 US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Key U.S. Outcomes at the UN Human Rights Council 24th Session’,
01.10.2013, available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/10/02/key-u-s-outcomes-at-the-un-human-rights-council-24th-
session/ (accessed 27.8.2014).
507 In the UNGA, the EU secured support for a resolution calling for a moratorium on the death penalty in 2007 (UNGA
Resolution 62/149, 18.12.2007, ‘Moratorium on the use of the death penalty’), reaffirmed in 2008 (UNGA Resolution 63/168,
18.12.2008, ‘Moratorium on the use of the death penalty’), 2010 (UNGA Resolution 65/206, 21.12.2010, ‘Moratorium on the
use of the death penalty’) and 2012 (UNGA Resolution 67/176, 20.12.2012, ‘Moratorium on the use of the death penalty’).
The US consistently voted against the resolutions.
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if necessitated by the respect of the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, or
public health and morals. While the US stated that it would ‘continue to adhere to the requirements and
constraints of its Constitution’ in this respect, the EU recognises certain limitations to the right of
expression. EU and US positions also differ with regard to children’s rights. The EU has been a strong
advocate of the rights of the child, frequently listing it as a priority for its participation in UNGA
sessions508 and the work of the HRC.509 This policy has received constitutional backing since the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which listed the protection of the rights of the child prominently as one
of the foreign policy objectives of the Union.510 The US has a more difficult relationship with the
international regime of children’s rights, being one of only three countries in the world which have not
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.511 Lastly, the EU and the US show different
approaches with regard to ESC rights, which the US does not recognize as human rights.512 While
the EU’s commitment to ESC rights is weaker than that to civil and political rights, it has listed them as a
priority for the 2014 sessions of UN human rights fora, based on item 9(a) of the Action Plan which
obliges the EU to ‘[c]ontribute to shaping the agenda on economic, social and cultural rights with
specific focus on the UN Human Rights Council’. This may indicate ‘a policy shift with an important
potential since it plays into the interests of the Council Member States appertaining to the South’,513
though the practical implementation is still lacking.
The brief analysis of the respective EU and US priorities at the HRC shows a significant amount of
overlap, both in terms of country-specific and thematic issues. This could be interpreted as evidence
that the EU and the US share similar convictions of which countries should be singled out as the
gravest human rights violators world-wide and thus be addressed through HRC resolutions. Critics
might, however, counter that both actors merely consider it politically expedient to address certain
states instead of others.514 In particular it could be argued that all country-specific priorities listed above
concern economically insignificant and/or poorly connected states, while those states that are of
strategic or economic importance for the EU and US do not feature on the respective lists of priorities,
despite sometimes equally dismal human rights records. The analysis also reveals similar goals with
regard to civil and political rights, but a broader scope of the EU concerning ESC rights. The different
positions towards the death penalty permeate EU-US bilateral relations and are equally present in
multilateral fora, in particular in the UNGA, but also in the HRC.
6.3.4 Enabling and hindering factors
Based on their respective political, diplomatic and economic power, the EU and the US should be well
placed to play leading roles in multilateral fora in general and in the HRC in particular. Both place
human rights at the core of their internal and external policies and have been instrumental in shaping
the international human rights framework as it stands today. Despite their numerical inferiority both
actors should be expected to have sufficient clout to successfully forge cross-regional coalitions and
secure majorities for their positions. Nevertheless, the above analysis has shown that neither the EU
nor the US could achieve major negotiation goals concerning the institutional set-up and working
agenda of the HRC. Numerous studies have highlighted the marginal impact of the EU at the HRC,
508 Cf. the lists of priorities available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/articleslist_s27_en.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
509 See supra, n. 497.
510 TEU art. 3(5).
511 See supra, section 3.3.
512 Whelan, D.J., Indivisible Human Rights: A History, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2010, p. 110.
513 Wouters/Meuwissen, supra, n. 467, p. 160.
514 Cf. Macaj/Koops, supra, n. 466, p. 79.
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focusing on the EU’s failures to build majorities for its initiatives, its tendency to pre-emptively water-
down its initiatives in order to aim for the lowest common denominator, or its inability to prevent
counterproductive developments.515 A frequently cited example is HRC Resolution 7/20, which
terminated the expert mandate for the DR Congo, and was adopted by consensus with the votes of the
EU, although it had previously intensively lobbied for a renewal.516
EU and US: Lack of credibility One of the major hindering factors of the EU and the US at the HRC lies in
a lack of credibility as self-declared human rights champions, due to a widespread reproach of a
lack of internal-external and external-external consistency. Concerning the former, the EU and the US
have been frequently criticised for not ‘practising what they preach’. The US’s human rights reputation
has significantly suffered under its ‘war on terror’, with contentious practices such as the use of drones
for targeted attacks, the detention of terrorist suspects in Guantanamo or in black sites around the
world, the controversial use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ such as waterboarding, and the
practice of extraordinary renditions.517 The EU has been criticised for participating or condoning these
practices; in particular, several EU Member States hosted black sites and participated in
extraordinary renditions.518 The EU and the US are equally under fire for their treatment of immigrants
and minorities and for issues of xenophobia and racism.519 Furthermore, ESC rights, which play an
especially important role for the global South, are not recognized by the US520 and enjoy only lukewarm
support from the EU.521 Both the EU and the US have been perceived as demonstrating a clear lack of
self-reflection and openness to criticism concerning their own records. In the same vein, both actors
have been criticised for a lack of external-external consistency, in particular based on the reproach
that country priorities are selected based on political expediency and not on the perceived gravity of
the human rights violations.522 In this context, the US is particularly under attack for its strong and
consistent support for Israel, which is considered to neglect the HRC’s values of impartiality and
objectivity. The EU has been criticised for its inconsistent stance on the issue of clean slate elections. It
had initially positioned itself as a strong advocate of open slate elections, urging all regional groups to
ensure elections in which the number of candidates exceeds the number of available seats. However, it
remained silent when the US decided to run for membership in 2009 and New Zealand withdrew its
candidacy, thus creating a clean slate election.523
515 See Smith, K.E., ‘The European Union at the Human Rights Council: speaking with one voice but having little influence’,
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516 HRC Resolution 7/20, Technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 27.3.2008; cf.
Basu, S., ‘The European Union in the Human Rights Council’, in Wouters, J., Bruyninckx, H., Basu, S., Schunz, S. (ed.), The
European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights and
Environmental Fora, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, p. 86-102, p. 91 et seq.
517 Hilde, T.C., ‘Beyond Guantanamo: Restoring U.S. Credibility on Human Rights’, Study commissioned by the Heinrich Böll
Foundation, 2009; Ralph, R., ‘With a friend like this...’, Human Rights Vol. 35, 2008, p. 21; Shattuck, J., ‘Restoring U.S. Credibility
on Human Rights’, Human Rights Vol. 35, 2008, p. 2; Nyer, A., ‘How not to promote democracy and human rights’, in Wilson,
R.A., Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 137-143, p. 141.
518 Smith, ‘The European Union at the Human Rights Council: speaking with one voice but having little influence’, supra, n.
515, p. 235 et seq.
519 Ibid; Freedman, supra, n. 481, p. 170-187. Note however, that the EU has cooperated with the Special Rapporteur on the
human rights of migrants whose 2013 report focused on the ‘management of the external borders of the European Union
and its impact on the human rights of migrants’ (HRC Resolution 23/46).
520 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 2.4.2014.
521 Macaj/Koops, supra, n. 466, p. 75 et seq.
522 Smith, K.E., ‘The European Union and the Politics of Legitimization at the United Nations’, European Foreign Affairs
Review Vol. 18, 2013, p. 63-80, p. 78; Macaj/Koops, supra, n. 466, p. 79.
523 Macaj/Koops, supra, n. 466, p. 79.
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US: the advantage of diplomatic flexibility In comparison with the EU, the US enjoys the advantage of
a higher degree of diplomatic flexibility. While the US disposes of a well-staffed foreign service and a
clear institutional hierarchy allowing for rapid decision-making, the EU – even after the reforms of the
Lisbon Treaty – spends a considerable part of its diplomatic resources on internal coordination in order
to ensure a uniform position and voting cohesion. It thus not only has less free capacities for outreach
and coalition building, but is also more inflexible regarding the negotiation process and concerning
reactions towards new developments. On the other hand, the EU has the advantage of being able to
draw on the connections and expertise of its Member States, which may prove crucial to build cross-
regional coalitions. Nevertheless, the US uses the full range of its policy and diplomatic instruments
more efficiently than the EU in order to attain its objectives in multilateral fora.
Different EU-US negotiation styles Interviewees have also highlighted the different negotiation styles
and approaches of the EU and the US towards the HRC, resulting primarily from the different
institutional architectures. The US is generally perceived to be a strong and straightforward negotiator
because of its pre-eminent position at the international level.524 This results in a more confrontational
strategy, as evidenced through the abovementioned readiness to issue negative votes if important
negotiation goals could not be achieved, or through its approach to demonstrate its discontent, e.g. by
leaving the room during sessions with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
OPT.525 Respondents have remarked that the EU would be unable to pursue a similar negotiating style
because of its internal structure. First, EU positions have to accommodate a multitude of opinions of
different EU Member States and are therefore usually less trenchant.526 Secondly, respondents
commented that the EU has to be more conciliatory because otherwise it would be ‘crushed’, given
that external actors ‘would pit the different Member States against each other’.527 The EU’s unity is frailer
than US unity, making the EU a softer and more unwieldy force and reducing its ‘actorness’ within the
HRC. The EU refrains from issuing negative votes, seeking to maintain a constructive engagement. It
remains in the room in order to use the time and present its position.528
Special nature of the EU While both actors thus suffer from a similar credibility problem at the HRC, the
EU’s unique nature as a supranational Union of many Member States entails different challenges in
terms of internal coordination and external representation. Its striving for internal cohesion not only
turns it into a slower and more inflexible negotiator, but also tends to soften its stances and often
prevents it taking clear positions on contentious issues. This does not mean, though, that the EU should
not invest more in effectively using all the policy instruments and tools at its disposal to attain its
objectives.
6.3.5 EU-US cooperation at the HRC
According to an EU official interviewed for this study, cooperation between the EU and the US is very
close, both in the capitals and on the spot in Geneva and New York.529 Exceptions include those issues
where EU and US positions differ significantly, e.g. the death penalty.530 In light of the foregoing
524 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 27.3.2014.
525 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
526 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014; EU Member States’ positions have differed in the past e.g. with regard to
the use of drones, the US ‘war on terror’, the Durban Review Conference on racism, the human rights scrutiny of China in the
HRC, and several issues concerning Israel, in particular the Goldstone Report and the Mavi Marmara incident.
527 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 27.3.2014.
528 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
529 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
530 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
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analysis of the different negotiating styles, one respondent commented that cooperation with the US
can help the EU to argue for harder positions and to deliver strong arguments.531 It was remarked that
‘sometimes the US is the essential partner to seal a deal’.532 Referring to the US perspective, one
respondent stated that the US frequently commented on the inflexibility of the EU as a negotiating
partner, remarking that it was ‘a heavy partner to deal with’.533 Nevertheless, the US’s engagement with
the EU was also perceived as ‘slightly contradictory’ by certain EU officials. Several respondents
commented that while the US wished to have a united and action-oriented EU at its side whenever EU
and US goals corresponded, the US would not hesitate to undermine EU unity whenever the EU
position was perceived as less favourable: ‘The US will try to break up EU union if they don’t like the EU
position. They will end up undermining the unity and the common position’.534 The US would then
resort to working with preferred partners among the EU Member States, or try to influence Member
States towards adopting the US position.535
EU respondents also commented that for the EU the cooperation with the US was a ‘double-edged
sword’.536 While on the one hand the US could prove indispensable to achieve certain negotiation
outcomes, to build coalitions and to advance harder positions, the weak human rights credibility of the
US, in particular due to its selectivity, ‘undermined’ the ‘joint moral credibility’.537 Therefore the EU
regularly tried to keep its dialogue with the US ‘behind the scenes’ and tried to avoid to ‘appear in
public together’.538
In general, the key for successful participation at the HRC was seen in cross-regional initiatives, rather
than in a strong EU-US bloc. This would entail a broadening of EU-US cooperation and dialogue to
include third partners. Respondents also perceived a trend towards ‘smaller core groups’, in which a few
EU partners participated, rather than the ‘overwhelming EU bloc’.539
6.3.6 Comparison and concluding remarks
A comparative analysis of the EU and the US engagement with the HRC shows that both actors have
similar visions concerning the institutional set-up and mandate of the Council, and that their priorities,
both concerning country situations and thematic human rights issues, overlap to a large extent. The
analysis also shows that both actors have experienced considerable difficulties in impacting upon the
shape and work of the Council, due to their numerical inferiority and lack of external credibility as
human rights champions. But this is where similarities end. Both actors differ in the approaches they use
to participate in the negotiations at the HRC, and in the way they react to negotiation defeats. While the
US is a strong and unyielding negotiator, due to its pre-eminent role at the international level, its
diplomatic capacities and fast decision-making, the EU avoids intransigent stances and instead searches
for compromises, dialogue and exchange, given that its positions are already the product of intense
internal negotiations between a multitude of actors with different views, and therefore more
susceptible to taking the approaches of third countries into consideration. EU-US cooperation at the
HRC is very close and can mobilise a high degree of political, diplomatic and economic clout in order to
531 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
532 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
533 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
534 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014, Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 2.4.2014.
535 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014, Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 2.4.2014.
536 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 27.3.2014.
537 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
538 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 27.3.2014.
539 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 8.4.2014.
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achieve a negotiation goal. Despite this strong EU-US collaboration, officials noted that the key for
future successful participation at the HRC lies less in a strong EU-US bloc, and more in cross-regional
initiatives in which fewer, flexible partners participate as smaller core groups.
6.3.7 Recommendations
Recommendations on the EU’s policy towards the HRC
 Ensure internal-external consistency in EU human rights policy The EU’s lack of credibility as a
champion of human rights is one of the major hindering factors of effective EU participation at
the HRC. In order to avoid the criticism that it does ‘not practice what it preaches’, the EU should
ensure consistency between its internal and external human rights policies. It should
demonstrate openness to criticism on the weaker aspects of its human rights record and engage
constructively on these issues in the multilateral arena.
 Ensure external-external consistency in EU human rights policy EU credibility at the HRC suffers
additionally from the widespread perception that it does not sufficiently speak out against
human rights violations committed by its allies viz. strategic partners and that it selects its
country priorities based on political expediency and not on the perceived gravity of the human
rights violations.
 Ensure a uniform EU position and voting cohesion while avoiding a monolithic approach Due
to its unique nature as a supranational Union of 28 Member States, the EU faces considerable
challenges in terms of internal coordination and external representation. The EU should avoid
turning into a monolithic bloc. This includes that the EU should make better use of the many
voices, the large networks and the expertise of its Member States. Avoiding the image of an
‘overwhelming EU bloc’ may prove crucial to building cross-regional coalitions.
 Ensure a more efficient use of the full range of policy and diplomatic instruments Like the US
the EU should make more efficient use of the entirety of instruments and tools at its disposal in
order to realize its priorities at the HRC. This includes the Union’s bilateral relations with third
states and its participation in other multilateral fora, spanning the whole range of EU external
action, including trade and development cooperation.
Recommendations for the EU-US relationship
 Forge a stronger transatlantic partnership on human rights The EU and the US share similar
visions concerning the institutional set-up and mandate of the HRC and their country-specific and
thematic priorities overlap to a large extent. A stronger partnership with regard to those matters
where EU and US policies converge can be beneficial and mobilize a high degree of political,
diplomatic and economic clout. Closer cooperation during negotiations, in particular the
assignment of roles or stances, can help the EU to deliver stronger arguments and to play a more
assertive role.
 Aim for cross-regional initiatives and avoid the perception of an ‘EU-US bloc’ Given that the EU
and the US together assume a minority position at the HRC, their success depends on their ability
to forge cross-regional partnerships. The EU should work jointly with the US to broaden their
cooperation and dialogue with third country partners.
 Ensure an open EU-US dialogue on contentious human rights issues and take a clear stance in
the HRC Despite significant similarities in their respective human rights policies, a few salient
contentious issues remain. The EU-US partnership on human rights should be strong enough to
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allow for an open dialogue on these practices (e.g. death penalty, ‘war on terror’ on the part of
the US, treatment of immigrants and minorities on the part of the EU).
6.4 International Criminal Court
6.4.1 Introduction
While both the EU and the US were initially staunch supporters of the concept of a permanent
international criminal court, a deep divide formed during the negotiations of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) at the 1998 Rome Conference.540 The US’s failure to achieve important
negotiation goals, in particular concerning the ICC’s competence to exercise territorial jurisdiction541
and its relationship with the UN Security Council (UNSC),542 transformed its initial support into a
negative vote on the final draft of the Statute.543 The rift was particularly deep during the Bush
administration, when the US Government not only refused cooperation with the ICC, but also took
hostile measures, aimed to isolate and undermine the Court. The relationship between the US and the
ICC has thawed under the Obama administration, but not enough to make the prospect of US
ratification of the Rome Statute appear realistic at present. While the US stance towards the ICC thus
shifted over the course of the past three administrations, the EU has consistently acted as a supporter
of the Court. Commentators have even praised the Union’s ICC policy as one of the most successful
examples of EU foreign policy to date.544 Nevertheless, its relationship with the ICC has not been entirely
without difficulties, in particular due to its internal structure and division of competences, under which
the Member States remain solely responsible for ratifying and implementing the provisions of the Rome
Statute.
6.4.2 Positions on the mandate of the ICC
The ICC served in the past as a prime example of opposing EU and US foreign policy objectives.
Established on 1 July 2002 after the entry into force of the 1998 Rome Statute,545 the ICC is an
international organisation independent from the UN framework. As the first permanent international
criminal tribunal, it exercises jurisdiction over the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole’,546 namely genocide,547 crimes against humanity548 and war
crimes.549 Additionally it will become competent to try perpetrators of the crime of aggression,550 once
540 The United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (‘Rome
Conference’) took place between 15.6. and 17.7.1998.
541 Birdsall, A., ‘The ‘Monster That We Need to Slay’? Global Governance, the United States, and the International Criminal
Court’, Global Governance Vol. 16, 2010, p. 451-469, p. 453 et seq.
542 Schabas, W.A., ‘United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security Council’, European
Journal of International Law Vol. 15, 2004, p. 701-720.
543 The Rome Statute was adopted with a majority of 120 to 7 and 21 abstentions. The vote was unrecorded, however the
US, China, Israel and India made their negative vote public; du Plessis, M., ‘Seeking an international International Criminal
Court – Some reflections on the United States opposition to the ICC’, South African Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 15, 2002,
p. 301-320, p. 305, n. 20.
544 Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J., The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008, p.
172-3.
545 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17.7.1998, entry into force 1.7.2002), 2187 UNTS 90
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Rome Statute’).
546 Rome Statute, Preamble.
547 Rome Statute art. 5(1)(a), 6.
548 Rome Statute art. 5(1)(b), 7.
549 Rome Statute art. 5(1)(c), 8.
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the ratification requirements are fulfilled.551 Today the ICC counts 122 State Parties. Neither the EU nor
the US is among them. The first is due to the fact that the Rome Statute does not contain a so-called
‘regional economic integration organization (REIO) clause’ which would allow for membership of
regional international organisations. The US on the other hand signed the Rome Statute but later
notified that it would not ratify under the Bush administration.
United States positions on the ICC under three administrations
The relationship between the US and the ICC has been subject to considerable policy shifts under the
three administrations in power since the preparatory works for the negotiation of the Court’s Statute
began. The fault lines can be situated particularly with the changes of government (2001 and 2009),
where significant turns in the political stance have occurred. However, it should not be overlooked that
even within the terms of office of the respective US Presidents, perceivable alterations in the position
towards the ICC have taken place.
Promoting international criminal justice The US has been a strong proponent of international criminal
justice ever since the first ad hoc military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo laid the groundwork for
international criminal law. Propelled by its convictions about the promotion of human rights and the
rule of law, the US not only actively supported these first international criminal tribunals, but also used
its influential position in the UNSC to lead the process towards the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.552 It was therefore only consistent that the Clinton
administration (1993-2001) would also support the plans for a permanent international criminal
tribunal. This was initially backed by strong Congressional support, as evidenced in two joint resolutions
(1993 and 1997) urging the US Delegation and the President to promote the establishment of an
international criminal tribunal which was deemed to ‘greatly strengthen the international rule of law’
and ‘thereby serve the interests of the United States and the world community’.553
Diminishing US support for the ICC The US delegation played a leading role at the Rome Conference on
the establishment of the ICC, which was held between 15 June and 17 July 1998. However, support
began to dwindle when it emerged that the US could not build a majority for its goal to include
stronger safeguards for the State Parties into the draft Statute. In particular the Court’s competence to
exercise territorial jurisdiction, the proprio motu powers of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP),
and the weak role of the UNSC were regarded as dangers to US national interests (see infra, table
5). Therefore, when the Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 with 120 votes in favour, the US
belonged to the group of seven states which issued a negative vote. This was in line with the strong
domestic opposition to the Rome Statute in the Republican-dominated US Senate,554 where Senators
550 Rome Statute, newly inserted art. 8bis, cf. art. 5(1)(d), (2).
551 The 2010 Review Conference in Kampala paved the way for the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, however
the amendments still await ratification or acceptance by thirty State Parties (Rome Statute art. 15bis(2), 15ter(2)). The
exercise of jurisdiction is furthermore conditioned upon an additional ‘activating’ decision of a two-thirds majority of State
Parties to be taken not before 2017 (Rome Statute art. 15bis(3), 15ter(3), 121). By August 2014 15 State Parties have ratified
the Kampala amendments, among them nine EU Member States (Luxembourg, Estonia, Germany, Cyprus, Slovenia, Belgium,
Croatia, Slovakia and Austria).
552 Birdsall, supra, n. 541, p. 453; Lim, D.H., ‘Beyond Kampala: The U.S.’ Role in Supporting the International Criminal Court’s
Mission’, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce Vol. 39, 2011-2012, p. 441-468, p. 447.
553 103d Congress, 1st Session, Joint Resolution Calling for the United States to support efforts of the United
Nations to conclude an international agreement to establish an international criminal court, S. J. Res. 32, section 2; 105th
Congress, 1st Session, Joint Resolution Calling on the President to continue to support and fully participate in negotiations
at the United Nations to conclude an international agreement to establish an international criminal court, H. J. Res. 89.
554 Lim, supra, n. 552, p. 448.
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welcomed the decision not to become a signatory of the Statute, and requested the administration to
take measures against the Court.555
Table 5: Overview of US Criticism of the ICC
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION556
Enables the ICC to prosecute nationals of non-Member States for crimes committed on the territory of a
State Party.
US position:  Amounts to universal jurisdiction and constitutes the Court’s ‘primary flaw’
 Threat for US nationals, particularly for US service-members who are deployed in missions
around the globe: could find themselves faced with an investigation before a tribunal to which
the US is not a party
 Limitation of US sovereignty: US would be bound by the rulings of an international organisation
without having consented to be bound
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNSC557
UNSC has only limited powers: Can temporarily postpone investigations or prosecutions of the ICC,
cannot halt them indefinitely.
US position:  Lack of UNSC control increases risk of politicised prosecutions
 US service-members are particularly vulnerable; threat to the ‘independence and flexibility of
US military forces’558
PROPRIO MOTU POWER OF THE OTP559
OTP has the authority to independently initiate investigations upon receipt of information on Statute
crimes. The continuation of the investigation beyond a preliminary examination requires authorisation
by the Pre-Trial Chamber, but there is no political control through the UNSC or the State Parties.
US position:  Concerns about politicised proceedings, not only against US service-members but also against
the political elite
 A ‘zealous’ OTP could have ‘enormous political impact’, simply by ‘launching massive criminal
investigations’
CRIME OF AGGRESSION560
ICC jurisdiction over and first definition of the crime of aggression.
US position:  Concern about the ‘lack of a generally accepted definition’ under customary international law561
 Definition would have the potential to ‘redefine or modify both the concept and conduct of
warfare’562
 Encroaches on the UNSC’s monopoly to determine the existence of aggression and to decide on
measures to take concerning acts of aggression
555 Senator Grams, for example, highlighted the importance to ‘ensure’ that the Rome Statute would not receive the
necessary number of ratifications for its entry into force. Failing that he advocated a ‘firm policy of total non-cooperation, no
funding, no acceptance of its jurisdiction, no acknowledgement of its rulings, and absolutely no referral of cases by the
Security Council’, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 23.7.1998.
556 Rome Statute art. 12(2)(a).
557 Rome Statute art. 16.
558 Birdsall, supra, n. 541, p. 454.
559 Rome Statute art. 15.
560 Rome Statute art. 8 bis.
561 Congressional Research Service, The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional
Concerns, Report RL30020, 6.1.1999, http://crs.wikileaks-press.org/RL30020.pdf (accessed 27.8.2014).
562 Congressional Research Service, The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional
Concerns, Report RL30020, 6.1.1999, http://crs.wikileaks-press.org/RL30020.pdf (accessed 27.8.2014).
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Nevertheless the US remained active in the subsequent work of the Preparatory Commission563 which
was tasked with the preparation of the practical arrangements for the Court. On 31 December 2000
President Clinton signed the Rome Statute, stating that the US wished both to reaffirm its support for
international justice and to remain engaged in shaping the nascent Court. However, he also underlined
the persisting concerns about ‘significant flaws in the Treaty’ referring in particular to the concept of
territorial jurisdiction.564
From cautious engagement to staunch opposition US policy towards the ICC shifted from cautious
engagement to staunch opposition under the Bush administration (2001-2009). Going beyond mere
passive non-membership, the US launched a series of active measures intended to isolate the Court
and to undermine its legitimacy. This corresponded to the ‘Policy of the three Noes’, formulated in 1998
by John Bolton who served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in
the Bush administration:
‘[N]o financial support, directly or indirectly; no collaboration; and no further negotiations with other
governments to improve the statute. This approach is likely to maximize the chances that the ICC will
wither and collapse, which should be our objective.’565
US opposition intensified after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and on 6 May 2002 the Bush
administration informed the UN Secretary-General that it did not intend to become a party to the
Statute. Participation in the work of the Preparatory Commission was discontinued and the US not only
threatened to veto UNSC resolutions on the extension of peacekeeping missions unless US forces were
granted complete immunity (which gave rise to UNSC Resolutions 1427 and 1487), but President Bush
also signed into law the American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA), intended to protect US
military personnel and government officials against criminal prosecution by international tribunals. In
addition the Bush administration launched its practice to conclude Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs
or so-called ‘Article 98 Agreements’) with third states to prevent detention, arrest or extradition of US
citizens to the ICC.566
Pragmatism rediscovered Policy shifted towards a more pragmatic stance during the second term of
the Bush administration. When it became apparent that the ICC could not be brushed aside as easily as
expected, concerns about the loss of influence on the evolution and workings of the Court rose.
Furthermore, some measures of active opposition, in particular the BIAs and the ASPA, were
increasingly regarded as harmful to US national interests. The US support for the ICC’s investigation in
the Darfur conflict is frequently cited as a salient example of the policy shift towards pragmatic US
engagement with the Court.567 Nevertheless, the Bush administration did not cease to conclude BIAs
even in the later years of its second term, and it remained non-involved in the discussion on the
definition of the crime of aggression in the run up to the 2010 Review Conference.568
Multilateralism and the promotion of the ICC A more substantial policy shift seemed to be on the
horizon under the Obama administration. In line with a stronger commitment to multilateralism, then
563 Established by Resolution F of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 17.7.1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/10.
564 Statement by President Clinton, 31 December 2000, available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/12/2000-12-31-statement-
by-president-on-signature-the-icc-treaty.html (accessed 27.8.2014).
565 Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 23.7.1998.
566 For more detail see below, section 6.4.3.
567 UNSC Resolution 1593, 31.3.2005; cf. Rome Statute art. 13(b). See below, section 6.4.3, for more detail.
568 Fairlie, M.A., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely
Marriage’, Berkeley Journal of International Law Vol. 29, 2011, p. 528-576, p. 540.
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Secretary of State Nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton declared support for the ICC and willingness to
promote the work of the Court during the Confirmation hearings in mid-January 2009.569 President
Obama had already stated in 2004 as a Senatorial Candidate that the US should ratify the Rome
Statute.570 Concrete plans to become a party or even a signatory of the Statute did however not emerge
and US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Rap declared in 2010 that there would be no US
ratification of the Rome Statute in the ‘foreseeable future’.571 The US policy was summed up in the 2010
National Security Strategy which stated:
‘Although the United States is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), and will always protect U.S. personnel, we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome
Statute on issues of concern and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S.
interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.’572
The US thus cooperates with the ICC on a ‘pragmatic, case-by-case’573 basis, within the confines of those
provisions of US law which restrict support for the ICC574 and in line with national interests and values.
This included firstly diplomatic engagement with the Court, both through the Assembly of State
Parties (ASP) – in which the US participated continuously since 2009 – and at the 2010 Review
Conference in Kampala. Furthermore, the US supported the UNSC’s 2011 referral of the situation in
Libya to the ICC, and it has repeatedly endorsed the work of the Court and encouraged cooperation
with it.575 While direct assistance to the ICC is still prohibited by US law, the US delegation has pledged
at the Review Conference to lend support to the Court’s investigation of the Lord’s Resistance Army as
well as to assist countries through rule-of-law and capacity building projects in order to enable
domestic criminal proceedings.576
The EU’s position on the ICC
The EU has since long been an advocate of international criminal justice, lending its financial and
political support among others to the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In line
with this commitment the EU was quick to endorse plans to establish a permanent international
criminal tribunal. It played a key role during the establishment of the Court, both in diplomatic and
financial terms.577 The EU Presidency participated in the Rome Conference, and has represented the EU
Member States on numerous occasions during the Conference and since then in the ASP. The
cooperation with the ICC has been lauded by commentators as one of the most successful examples of
EU foreign policy.578
569 Birdsall, supra, n. 541, p. 464.
570 AMICC, ‘Statements of U.S. Presidential Candidates on the International Criminal Court, 26.8.2008, available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/2008%20Candidates%20on%20ICC.pdf (accessed 28.4.2014).
571 Belczyk, J., ‘US war crimes ambassador says US unlikely to join ICC in 'foreseeable future'’, Jurist, 28.1.2010,
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/01/us-war-crimes-ambassador-says-us.php (accessed 27.8.2014).
572 The President of the United States, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 48.
573 Koh, H.H., ‘International Criminal Justice 5.0’, Remarks delivered as the Justice Address 2012 at the Vera Institute of
Justice, New York, 8.11.2012, and as a keynote lecture at Leiden University, Campus The Hague, 16.11.2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/200957.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
574 In particular ASPA (see below, section 6.4.3) and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 3427), Public Law No. 106-
113, §§ 705-706 which bars US financing of the ICC.
575 UNSC Resolution 1970, 26.2.2011.
576 ICC, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Pledges, Doc. No. RC/9, 15.7.2010.
577 Kemmerer, A., ‘Like Ancient Beacons: The European Union and the International Criminal Court – Reflections from afar on
a Chapter of European Foreign Policy’, German Law Journal Vol. 5, 2004, p. 1449-1467, p. 1458.
578 Supra, n. 544.
A Comparative study of EU and US approaches to Human Rights in External Relations
107
Full EU support of the ICC The EU ranks among the strongest supporters of the ICC. As Chris Patten,
then Commissioner for External Relations, stated before the EP in 2002:
‘The European Union fully supports the ICC. The Principles of the Rome Statute, as well as those
governing the functioning of the Court, are fully in line with the principles and objectives of the Union.
The consolidation of the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as the preservation of peace
and the strengthening of international security, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and
as provided for in Article 11 of the EU Treaty, are of fundamental importance to the Union.’579
On 20 June 2002 the Council adopted its Common Position 2001/443/CFSP in which it stresses the
fundamental importance of the Rome Statute and emphasises the determination of the EU and the
Member States to contribute to its full implementation. Multiple Council Decisions, EP Resolutions,
and statements by high-level officials of the EU have since reaffirmed the EU’s strong commitment to
the ICC. The Court is regarded as ‘an essential means of promoting respect for international
humanitarian law and human rights, thus contributing to freedom, security, justice and the rule of law
as well as contributing to the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening
of international security’.580 It is regarded as a Court of last resort, in which States have the primary
responsibility to bring perpetrators of Statute crime to justice. Therefore international criminal justice
would be ‘most successful if the national justice systems of each State function effectively’.581
Lack of formal status and quest for coherence While all EU Member States are Parties to the Rome
Statute, the EU itself does not hold a formal status at the ICC, due to the absence of a so-called REIO
clause in the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, the EU holds a special position within the ICC. In 2006 the EU
concluded an Article 87(6) ‘Agreement on cooperation and assistance’ with the ICC. It was the first
regional organisation to do so.582 On 31 March 2008 the ‘Security arrangements for the protection of
classified information exchanged between the EU and the ICC’ entered into force.583 The EU has
participated as an observer in the 2010 Review Conference and committed in its pledges among others
to promote the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute and to fight against impunity. Its external
track record of ICC promotion is strong. ICC policy is mainstreamed throughout EU external action and
formalised through the negotiation of so-called ‘ICC clauses’.584
To achieve coherence in its ICC policy, an intricate institutional structure has been established at the EU
level. Given that the EU acts alongside its Member States when it comes to cooperation with the ICC,
there is a need to coordinate a common position. In 2002, COJUR ICC, the ICC sub-format of the Public
International Law Working Party in the Council was established. It meets 4-5 times a year in Brussels,
and once in The Hague to prepare the annual ASP. In addition, a network of EU and national focal points
supports the coordination, consistency and preparation of EU activities. Focal points have been
579 Statement by Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, on the ICC, at the Plenary Session of the European
Parliament (Strasbourg), 25.9.2002, available at www.europa-euun.org/article.asp?id=1640 (accessed 27.8.2014).
580 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21.3.2011 on the International Criminal Court and repealing Common Position
2003/444/CFSP, O.J. L 76/56, 22.3.2011, art. 1(1). See further Wouters, J. and Basu, S., ‘The Creation of a Global Criminal
Justice System: the European Union and the International Criminal Court’, in Ryngaert, C. (ed.), The Effectiveness of
International Criminal Justice, Antwerp – Oxford, Intersentia, 2009, p. 117-142.
581 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the occasion of the
fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17.7.2013, available at
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_13776_en.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
582 Council Decision of 10.4.2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the International Criminal Court and
the European Union on cooperation and assistance, O.J. L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 49.
583 Council of the European Union, Security arrangements for the protection of classified information exchanged between
the EU and the ICC, Council Doc. No. 8349/1/08, 15.4.2008.
584 Bekou, O., Chadwick, M., ‘The EU commitment to international criminal justice – Achievements and possibilities’, in
Wetzel, J.E. (ed.), The EU as a ‘Global Player’ in Human Rights?, Routledge, London/New York, 2011, p. 82-96, p. 91.
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established by each EU Member State as well as by the General Secretariat of the Council. The EEAS and
the Commission are tasked with mainstreaming and coordinating ICC policy. The EP is to be kept
informed of the developments regarding the ICC and its views ‘should be taken into account, as
appropriate’.585
Uneasy vertical and horizontal EU coordination While EU engagement with the ICC is therefore
predominantly regarded as a success story, the past has also shown that that coordination between the
EU institutions and the EU Member States is not always easy. As will be explained in more detail
below,586 the EU has sometimes experienced difficulties to keep its ranks closed, due to diverging
opinions of its Member States. In particular, a number of Member States showed sympathy for the US
practice of concluding BIAs and were inclined to participate in bilateral negotiations. Other conflicts
have arisen from the division of powers within the EU. Ratification and implementation of the Rome
Statute fall exclusively within the competence of the EU Member States. The EU has little if any power to
enforce its policy of universal ratification internally. While it thus pressured and encouraged third
countries in its external relations towards accession and implementation of the Statute, internally
uniform ratification was only achieved as late as 2009, and several Member States still lag behind with
the implementation of the Statute’s provisions. Consequently a ‘double standard’ problem exists,
when the EU exerts pressure on third countries in order to promote the work of the ICC, whereas it is
powerless to enforce ratification and implementation among its own Member States. The constitutional
structure of the EU can also lead to the curious situation whereby a Member State, which has not
ratified the Rome Statute, nevertheless finds itself bound by EU law which gives effect to the Statute.
The EU’s leading role in the promotion of international criminal justice has therefore sometimes been
regarded as controversial, given the EU’s complete dependence on the Member States’ cooperation
and on their national criminal justice systems.
Conclusions: Sharing overarching policy goals despite EU-US difference The comparative analysis of
US and EU positions on the ICC shows that, despite their frequently diametrically opposed approaches
towards the Court, both actors share the same overarching policy goals. Both the EU and the US are
staunchly committed to the promotion of international criminal justice and to the fight against
impunity. Both have a strong record of support for earlier international criminal tribunals and both
have entered the Rome Conference with the same constructive ambitions. The EU and the US have not
ceased to adopt measures aimed at bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice, and they
have invested considerable political and diplomatic capital in the success of these initiatives. While both
actors thus agree on the goals, they disagree on the means to achieve them. The EU has endorsed
the ICC as an institution that has the potential to contribute successfully to the strengthening of
international criminal justice. In line with their strong commitment to multilateralism and based on their
own positive experiences with international integration, the EU Member States were ready to
delegate some of their sovereign powers to an international organisation and to thus cede a degree
of control. The US on the other hand considers the Court to be unfit to prevent impunity of the worst
crimes. The primary concern stems from the UNSC’s lack of control over the ICC’s docket, which bars
the US despite its permanent member status to retain an element of oversight over the work of the
Court. This in turn generates fears of politically motivated prosecutions, which would have doubly
detrimental effects by targeting the innocent and obstructing their valuable work, and by binding
resources which could otherwise have been used to prosecute the most serious crimes.
585 Council of the European Union, Action Plan to follow-up on the Decision on the International Criminal Court, 12.7.2011,
Council Doc. No. 12080/11.
586 Section 6.4.4.
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The US does not share the EU’s confidence, because its unique position as the world’s only remaining
superpower makes it particularly vulnerable. It has been argued that it is ‘precisely America’s great
power that makes it the primary target, and often the only target’.587 The US today ‘plays the role of
ultimate enforcer’,588 and its troops are deployed around the globe. This demonstration of strength
frequently causes resentment and can and does lead to politicised debates and decisions in multilateral
organisations. The EU as a comparatively weaker actor does thus not trigger the same amount of
controversy. It is not the ‘primary target’589 at the international scene. This may help to explain why the
US is considerably more reluctant to cede power to international institutions. It may explain why the US
was a staunch supporter of the ICC project as long as the draft Statute contained a high degree of UNSC
control and thus veto power for the US. It may also explain why the US raises objections in particular
concerning the principle of territorial jurisdiction, the independent power of the OTP and the ICC’s
potential jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The former two might open doors for abuse through
politicised prosecutions, the latter limits the power of the UNSC further by encroaching on its monopoly
to define and deal with aggression.
It may nevertheless not be overlooked that US policy has shifted towards a more favourable stance
on multilateralism under the Obama administration. While the ICC is still not being fully endorsed, a
multitude of different avenues have been employed to indirectly strengthen the institution and to
directly support international criminal justice in general.
6.4.3 Strategies, methods and tools with regard to the ICC
Both the EU and the US employ a variety of strategies, methods and tools at the unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral level in their direct or indirect relations with the ICC. In light of the policy shift on the US side
the analysis will illustrate, both, the approach of active opposition under the Bush administration and
the consequences for US foreign policy today, as well as the current engagement with the ICC under
the Obama administration. The findings will be juxtaposed with the key aspects of the EU’s policy
towards the ICC.
6.4.3.1 Unilateral measures
United States
Since the establishment of the ICC, the US Congress has passed several acts with regard to the Court
that have subsequently been signed into law by the President. While initial measures were aimed to
restrict US cooperation with the ICC and to obstruct the work of the Court, many provisions were
subsequently repealed or not renewed, and recent examples show Congressional support for the
mandate of the ICC.
American Service-Members’ Protection Act The epitome of US opposition towards the ICC is frequently
exemplified by the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA), signed into law by former
President Bush on 2 August 2002.590 The ASPA was quickly dubbed as the ‘Hague Invasion Act’591 due to
a provision which authorises the President ‘to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about
the release of any person […] who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of
587 Kagan, R., ‘Power and Weakness’, Policy Review No. 113, 2002, p. 3-28.
588 Ibid.
589 Ibid.
590 American Service-Members’ Protection Act, HR 4775, signed into law 2.8.2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ASPA’).
591 Snellen, J., ‘Toward a new beginning with the International Criminal Court’, Naval Law Review Vol. 60, 2010, p. 167-188, p.
167.
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the International Criminal Court’.592 The Act prohibits US entities from cooperating with the ICC, in
particular by responding to requests for cooperation, transmitting letters rogatory, extraditing persons
from the US or supporting the transfer of US citizens or permanent residents to the ICC, and supporting
the Court or using funds to assist it.593 Exceptions can only be made pursuant to a Presidential waiver594
or under the Dodd Amendment which authorises US assistance ‘to international efforts to bring to
justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic, Osama bin Laden, other members of Al Queda, leaders of
Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against
humanity.’595 Furthermore, the Act initially prohibited the provision of any form of military assistance to
State Parties of the ICC, unless the state in question signed a BIA.596 These sanctions soon attracted
criticism and were regarded as harmful for US national interests, in particular concerning the support of
allies in the fight against terrorism. Two amendments passed in 2006 and 2008 repealed the
prohibitions of International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF).597 All other provisions of ASPA remain in force to date. While US cooperation with the ICC thus
remains possible on a limited basis, ‘[a]n institutionalized and systematic program of cooperation by the
United States will require the repeal of ASPA’.598
Emerging US cooperation with the ICC In line with a new sense of US cooperation with the ICC, and
corresponding to the US’s pledge at the 2010 Review Conference to bring to justice the leaders of the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), President Obama signed into law the Lord's Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act on 24 May 2010.599 It provides, among other things,
for the development of a strategy to facilitate the disarmament of the LRA, humanitarian assistance for
the DR Congo, Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic as well as for assistance for recovery,
reconstruction, reconciliation and transitional justice in Northern Uganda. One hundred special
operations soldiers were sent to the Central African Republic in order to assist the local forces in search
for ICC fugitive Joseph Kony in October 2011.600 Another 150 soldiers as well as military aircraft followed
in March 2014.601 The US Ambassador to the African Union Battle stated that ‘we need to capture
[Joseph Kony] militarily. He needs to go before the international criminal court. He needs to be
prosecuted’.602
Another example of increased support for the ICC, is ‘The Department of State Rewards Program
Update and Technical Corrections Act of 2012’,603 adopted by the US House of Representatives on 3
January 2013 and signed into law by President Obama on 15 January of the same year. It expands the
Rewards for Justice program, under which rewards are offered by the US State Department for
592 ASPA, Sec. 2008.
593 ASPA, Sec. 2004.
594 ASPA, Sec. 2003.
595 ASPA, Sec. 2015.
596 ASPA, Sec. 2007. Further exceptions applied to NATO members, major non-NATO allies and Taiwan. In addition the
President was given the authority to waive the prohibition for reasons of national interest.
597 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, HR 5122, S.2766, signed into law 17.10.2006;
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, HR 4986, signed into law 28.1.2008.
598 Snellen, supra, n. 591, p. 168 et seq.
599 Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, S.1067.
600 Gettleman, J., ‘In Vast Jungle, U.S. Troops Aid in Search for Kony’, The New York Times, 29.4.2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/world/africa/kony-tracked-by-us-forces-in-central-africa.html (accessed 27.8.2014).
601 DeYoung, K., ‘U.S. sends Osprey aircraft, more Special Operations forces to hunt Ugandan warlord’, The Washington Post,
24.3.2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2014/03/23/aa468ca6-b2d0-11e3-8020-
b2d790b3c9e1_story.html?tid (accessed 27.8.2014).
602 US Department of State, Conversations With America: U.S. Engagement With the African Union, 16.3.2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/cwa/186035.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
603 The Department of State Rewards Program Update and Technical Corrections Act of 2012, S.2318.
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information on wanted terrorists or terrorist activities,604 to include crimes under ICC jurisdiction.
Providing for the payment of rewards for ‘the transfer to or conviction by an international criminal
tribunal […] of any foreign national accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, as
defined under the statute of such tribunal’ it allows the US to support the work of the ICC through
offering rewards for the Court’s most wanted fugitives while avoiding any direct funding. Still, the Act
also contains two provisions which illustrate that US concerns regarding the ICC have not been entirely
allayed. Firstly, every offer of an award for a crime under ICC jurisdiction must be preceded by a report,
submitted at least 15 days in advance by the Secretary of State to the responsible Congressional
Committee, in which the relevance for the US national interest is explained. Secondly, the Act explicitly
provides that it shall not ‘be construed as authorizing the use of activity precluded under the American
Service Members’ Protection Act of 2002’. Nevertheless, US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
Rap stated that ‘[t]he offer of rewards for I.C.C. fugitives will be the biggest step we’ve taken toward
engagement and support’ of the Court.605
European Union
While ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute remains the sole responsibility of the EU
Member States, the EU has undertaken several measures to enhance cooperation with the ICC.
Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP On 21 March 2011 the Council of the EU adopted Council Decision
2011/168/CFSP which replaced and updated Common Position 2003/444/CFSP in line with pledge No.
4 made at the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute. Its objectives are the promotion of the
universality and integrity of the Rome Statute, support for the independence, effectiveness and
efficiency of the ICC, as well as the strengthening of the cooperation with the Court and of the
implementation of the complementarity principle.606 Based on this Decision, on 12 July 2011 the
Council adopted a new Action Plan,607 replacing its 2004 predecessor.608 It contains provisions on the
internal co-ordination of EU activities, as well as concrete measures to achieve the abovementioned
objectives of the Council Decision. The Council Decision and the Action Plan together form the
backbone of EU action towards the ICC.
Other decisions In addition, the Council has adopted a series of Decisions aimed at strengthening EU-
wide cooperation in the field of international criminal justice. Council Decision 2002/494/JHA set up a
European network of contact points to exchange information with regard to investigations of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA established the
European arrest warrant and Council Decision 2003/335/JHA aimed at strengthening cooperation
between the EU Member States concerning the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes, through information exchange, periodic meetings and organisational
restructuring.
604 See the website of the program http://www.rewardsforjustice.net (accessed 27.8.2014).
605 Simons, M., ‘U.S. Grows More Helpful to International Criminal Court, a Body It First Scorned’, The New York Times,
2.4.2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/europe/us-assists-international-criminal-court-but-still-has-no-
intention-of-joining-it.html (accessed 27.8.2014).
606 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP, supra, n. 580, art. 1(2).
607 Council of the European Union, Action Plan to follow-up on the Decision on the International Criminal Court, 12.7.2011,
Council Doc. No. 12080/11.
608 Council of the European Union, Action Plan to follow-up on the Common Position on the International Criminal Court,
28.1.2004, Council Doc. No. 5742/04.
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6.4.3.2 Bilateral measures
United States
An important part of the Bush administration’s ICC strategy was the conclusion of Bilateral Immunity
Agreements (BIAs) with a large number of countries worldwide. Based on a controversial interpretation
of Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute,609 the US sought to prevent States from detaining, arresting or
extraditing US nationals to the ICC. In total, 102 agreements were signed by the end of the Bush
administration, 52 of them with State Parties to the Rome Statute.610 Support for the BIAs already
declined during the Bush administration. Several influential US politicians considered BIAs to be harmful
for US national interests. Nevertheless, the practice to conclude BIAs was continued throughout the two
terms of the Bush administration. As late as 2007, a BIA was agreed on with the newly independent
Montenegro.611 While the Obama administration did not pursue the negotiation of additional BIAs, 95 of
the previously concluded BIAs remain in force to date.612 Nevertheless, high-level US representatives
have repeatedly made statements to encourage cooperation with the Court. With regard to the
situation in Kenya, President Obama ‘urge[d] all of Kenya’s leaders, and the people whom they serve, to
cooperate fully with the ICC investigation’.613 Similar requests were made with regard to the situation in
Sudan.614
European Union
Mainstreaming ICC policy in its external relations, the EU promotes the inclusion of so-called ‘ICC
clauses’ in its agreements with third countries. The first binding instrument to contain an ICC clause
was the 2005 Cotonou Agreement, which provides in Article 11(7):
‘In promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice, the Parties reaffirm their
determination to:
 share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the ratification and
implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and
 fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due regard to the
Rome Statute.
The Parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute and related
instruments.’
The clause focuses on three aspects: the ratification and the implementation of the Rome Statute as
well as the domestic adjudication of Statute crimes, in line with the principle of complementarity.
Similar clauses have also been included in a series of bilateral agreements, namely in Partnership and
609 ‘Editorial Comments: The European Union, the United States and the International Criminal Court’, Common Market Law
Review Vol. 39, 2002, p. 939-944, p. 941 et seq.
610 Birdsall, supra, n. 541, p. 461.
611 Exchange of diplomatic notes between the US Embassy in Podgorica and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Montenegro, 17 and 19.4.2007, available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/US-Montenegro.pdf (accessed 27.8.2014).
612 United States Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United
States in Force on January 1, 2013.
613 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Obama on the International Criminal Court
announcement, 15.12.2010, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/15/statement-president-
obama-international-criminal-court-announcement> (accessed 27.8.2014); see also US Department of State, Kenya:
Confirmation of International Criminal Court Charges, Press Statement, 23.1.2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/182349.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
614 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Interview of the President by South African Broadcasting Corporation,
13.7.2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/interview-president-south-african-broadcasting-
corporation (accessed 27.8.2014); Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations on the ICC's Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President Bashir, 4.3.2009, available at
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/march/126539.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
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Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), Trade Cooperation and Development Agreements (TDCAs) and
Agreements Establishing an Association (AAs). Their focus depends on the specific circumstances of the
partner country. The 2010 EU-Korea Framework Agreement, for example, focuses on support for the ICC
and the fight against impunity, both at the domestic and international level, given that all parties to the
Agreement had already ratified the Rome Statute. The 2012 PCA between the EU and Iraq, on the other
hand, contained a clause referring to the non-membership of Iraq and the possibility of accession.615
The ICC clauses in bilateral agreements aim to strengthen the ICC by establishing bilateral dialogues
and cooperation, in particular concerning the exchange of best practices. The EU has furthermore
included ICC clauses in a number of Action Plans with partner countries in the framework of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).616
In addition, the EU seeks to promote the universal ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute
through demarches and bilateral dialogue. Between 2002 and 2010 the EU carried out more than 340
demarches in over 100 countries or international organisations.617 For example on 3 April 2007 a troika
demarche was carried out in Armenia, highlighting that ‘for the European Union the ratification of the
Rome Statute by Armenia was not negotiable’.618
6.4.3.3 Measures at the multilateral level
United States
The opposition stance of the Bush administration towards the ICC has found expression in a variety of
measures at the multilateral level.
UNSC resolutions Symptomatic is the US’s 2002 veto of the UNSC resolution on the extension of the
UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) – a country which had become a State
Party of the Rome Statute a few months earlier. Unwilling to subject its service-members to ‘the
additional risk of political prosecution before a court whose jurisdiction the government of the United
States does not accept’619 the US requested immunity for its peacekeepers. In order to settle the conflict
and enable the continued operation of UNMIBH, the UNSC eventually adopted UNSC Resolution 1422
(2002) which contained a deferral under Article 16 of the Rome Statute for crimes perpetrated by
members of UN missions which are not citizens of a State Party to the Statute.620 The Resolution was
renewed for another year by UNSC Resolution 1487 (2003).621 Attempts for a second renewal in May
2004 failed, however, after the incidents in Abu Ghraib had triggered fierce opposition towards the US
request.622 The US finally decided to withdraw its request and announced its intention to rely on
615 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the
Republic of Iraq, of the other part, O.J. L 204, 31.7.2012, p. 0020-0130, art. 7(2).
616 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Speech
on the report on Human rights in the world and the EU's policy on the matter, SPEECH/12/270, European Parliament,
Strasbourg, 17.4.2012.
617 General Secretariat of the Council, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, Expert Series, May 2010, p.
10.
618 Council of the European Union, Declassified COREU CFSP/PRES/BER/0993/07: Armenia-Demarche to promote the
universality of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 22.2.2010, Council Doc. No. 6762/10.
619 Burkeman, O., ‘US veto puts Bosnia mission in jeopardy’, The Guardian, 1.7.2002,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/01/usa.eu2 (accessed 27.8.2014).
620 UNSC Resolution 1422, 12.7.2002, art. 1.
621 UNSC Resolution 1487, 12.6.2003.
622 Birdsall, supra, n. 541, p. 460.
Policy Department DG External Policies
114
continued negotiations of BIAs instead.623 Since then, there have been no similar approaches by the US
in the UNSC.
Similarly, already in 2002 the US had threatened to withdraw its service-members deployed in
peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions around the globe. When the renewal of UNSC Resolution
1487 failed in 2004, the Department of Defense withdrew 9 soldiers from UN peacekeeping missions in
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kosovo.624 All three territories were not covered by BIAs at the time and had
therefore been determined to pose a disproportionate risk for the service-members.625
In the Organization of American States (OAS) the US did not join the consensus on the annual
General Assembly Resolutions concerning the ‘Promotion of the International Criminal Court’
continuously since 2003.626 In statements and reservations, the US referred to its concerns about the
‘seriously flawed’ Court while reaffirming its strong commitment to accountability for international
crimes.
The US support for the referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC has sometimes been regarded to
‘signal a major change in the U.S.'s relationship with the Court’.627 The US participated in the drafting of
UNSC Resolution 1593 and abstained in the final vote. However, it had previously achieved the inclusion
of several contentious provisions. First, the preamble’s reference to ‘agreements referred to in Article
98-2 of the Rome Statute’ has been regarded as a US effort to legitimise the BIAs.628 More
problematically, para. 6 of the Resolution exempts nationals of States which are not parties to the Rome
Statute from ICC jurisdiction and para. 7 precludes any UN funding of the expenses resulting from the
referral.
Policy shift and return to multilateralism? Policy shifted under the Obama administration. Despite the
legal provisions still in force, which restrict full-fledged support for the ICC, US cooperation with the
institution has been increasing. Since 2009 the US has participated as an observer in the annual ASP. It
also sent a sizeable delegation to the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala, where it not only
participated actively in the negotiations of the definition of the crime of aggression, but also pledged to
support rule-of-law and training projects in third States to strengthen domestic judicial systems, as well
as to increase efforts to protect civilians from the LRA and to bring its leaders to justice.629 High-level US
representatives have furthermore repeatedly expressed support for the work of the ICC. On the
occasion of the conviction of rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in March 2012 – the first conviction in
the history of the Court – the State Department recognised the decision as a ‘historic and important
step in providing justice and accountability for the Congolese people’.630 Commenting on the Court’s
conviction of Germain Katanga on 7 March 2014, the State Department declared that ‘the ICC’s DRC
623 United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 110 (04), Remarks by Ambassador James B. Cunningham,
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on the ICC, at the Security Council Stakeout, 22.6.2004, available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/CunninghamJune22_04.pdf (accessed 27.8.2014).
624 Lynch, C., ‘U.S. to Pull 9 From U.N. Peacekeeping Missions’, The Washington Post, 3.7.2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24820-2004Jul2.html (accessed 27.8.2014).
625 Ibid.
626 See the list of General Assembly Resolutions on the website of the Organization of American States,
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/international_criminal_court_GA_resolutions.asp (accessed 27.8.2014).
627 Cf. Fairlie, supra, n. 568, p. 539.
628 Ibid.
629 International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 31 May-11.6.2010, Pledges, RC/9, 15.7.2010, p. 18.
630 US Department of State, ‘ICC Conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Press Statement, 16.3.2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/185964.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
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cases represent a significant step toward delivering justice for victims in the DRC’.631 Going beyond
verbal support, in March 2014, the US facilitated the transfer of ICC suspect Bosco Ntaganda, who
had surrendered in the US Embassy in Kigali and requested to be sent to The Hague.632
In the UNSC, the US supported the 2011 Resolution referring the situation in Libya to the ICC, voting
for the first time in favour of a referral. With the exception of the reference to the BIAs, the language
however resembles the previous referral of the Darfur situation and again includes an exemption of
jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties, as well as a prohibition of UN funding for the
investigations and prosecutions. The US furthermore drafted and voted in favour of Resolution 1888
(2009) on sexual violence in armed conflicts, which contains a reference to the ‘inclusion of a range of
sexual violence offences in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’.633 A few weeks earlier,
then US Ambassador to the United Nations Rice had indicated that the US would ‘no longer oppose
mentions of […] the International Criminal Court’.634
Furthermore, in 2012, the US for the first time since 2003 did not enter a reservation to the annual OAS
resolution on the ICC. Instead, it merely included a clarification stating that ‘The United States
understands that any OAS support rendered to the International Criminal Court will be drawn from
specific-fund contributions rather than the OAS regular budget’635, in line with its domestic restriction
on ICC funding.
European Union
Different to the US ambiguous action throughout the Bush and Obama administration, the EU has
supported the work of the ICC from the very beginning.
EU Participation and Cooperation Agreement The EU regularly participates in the annual ASP,
represented by the EU Presidency. A delegation was also present at the 2010 Review Conference in
Kampala, where the EU pledged to promote the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute, to
further its practice of negotiating ICC clauses, to lend financial support and to review and update its
instruments supporting the Court.636 The EU and the ICC concluded an Article 87(6) ‘Agreement on
cooperation and assistance’ on 10 April 2006, which entered into force on 1 May 2006.637 The EU was
thereby the first regional organisation to sign a cooperation agreement with the ICC. The agreement
contains a general obligation of cooperation and assistance, as well as provisions on information and
documentation exchange. Furthermore, on 31 March 2008 the ‘Security arrangements for the
protection of classified information exchanged between the EU and the ICC’ entered into force.638
631 US Department of State, ‘The Verdict in the Germain Katanga Trial at the International Criminal Court’, Press Statement,
7.3.2014, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223152.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
632 Simons, M., ‘U.S. Grows More Helpful to International Criminal Court, a Body It First Scorned’, The New York Times,
2.4.2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/europe/us-assists-international-criminal-court-but-still-has-no-
intention-of-joining-it.html (accessed 27.8.2014).
633 UNSC, S/RES/1888 (2009), 30.9.2009.
634 US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan E. Rice, ‘A New Course in the World, a New Approach at the
UN’, Remarks delivered at New York University's Center for Global Affairs and Center on International Cooperation,
12.8.2009, available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/august/127953.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
635 OAS, AG/RES. 2728 (XLII-O/12), Promotion of the International Criminal Court, 4.6.2012.
636 Supra, n. 576.
637 Council Decision of 10.4.2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the International Criminal Court and
the European Union on cooperation and assistance, O.J. L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 0049.
638 Council of the European Union, Security arrangements for the protection of classified information exchanged between
the EU and the ICC, Council Doc. No. 8349/1/08, 15.4.2008.
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Financial Support The EU also lends significant financial support to the Court. It covered more than
60% of the costs of the ICC Advance Team which was tasked with setting up the institution, and has
since then contributed funding for, amongst others, the Internship and Visiting Professionals’
Programmes, the Legal Tools Project, training programmes for those lawyers that are included on the
ICC List of Counsel, as well as for infrastructure and library expenses. EU high-level representatives have
repeatedly expressed support for the work of the ICC. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the
adoption of the Rome Statute, High Representative Ashton stressed that ‘The European Union and its
Member States are strongly committed to preserving the independence of the ICC and to promoting
the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute’. She lauded the Court’s judgment in the Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo case as a ‘milestone for international criminal justice’, and valued it as ‘a significant
achievement for the Court’.639 A similar declaration was issued after the sentencing of Germain Katanga
in March 2014.640
Promotion at the UN level At the UN level, the support for the work of the ICC, the promotion of the
universality of the Rome Statute and the fight against impunity have consistently been part of the EU’s
priorities for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) sessions.641 EU representatives regularly issue statements
in the UNGA commenting on the annual report of the Court and support the annual UNGA resolution
on the ICC.
6.4.3.4 Comparison between the EU and the US
Since the ICC came into existence, the EU and US have explored multiple avenues of cooperation,
support or opposition, ranging from unilateral initiatives to measures taken at the multilateral level. EU
and US strategies differed most starkly during the years under the Bush administration, which pursued a
policy of open hostility towards the Court. This included the signing into law of domestic legislation
which prevented US cooperation with the Court and restricted financial support for ICC-friendly third
countries. It also entailed the conclusion of a large number of BIAs in order to protect US citizens from
ICC jurisdiction. At the multilateral level this policy resulted among others in the vetoing of UNSC
peacekeeping mission resolutions, two deferral resolutions of the UNSC and the withdrawal of US
service-members deployed with certain missions.
Different EU-US approaches on various levels of engagement While US policy towards the ICC has
shifted towards an approach of limited support under the Obama administration, the strategies, tools
and methods employed by both actors still differ. The EU, whose Member States have all ratified the
Rome Statute, has adopted a series of measures aimed to enhance the EU-wide cooperation in the area
of international criminal justice and with the Court. In the US, which is not a State Party to the Rome
Statute and in which provisions of the ASPA and other laws prohibit cooperation with the ICC, such
legislative action is absent. However, the US adopted acts providing military and financial support for
the capture of ICC fugitives, thus supporting the work of the Court while avoiding any direct funding. At
the bilateral level, the EU demonstrates a strong record of including ICC clauses in its agreements with
third countries, and raising the matter through demarches and dialogue. The US has not equally
formalised its approach, but high-level officials have repeatedly expressed their verbal support for the
Court and encouraged third states to cooperate with the ICC. Measures aimed at strengthening
domestic justice systems around the world, as well as the financial and military support in the fight
639 Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the occasion of the
fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 12482/1/13 REV1, 17.7.2013.
640 Déclaration du porte-parole de Catherine Ashton, Haute Représentante de l'UE, sur le jugement rendu à l'encontre de M.
Germain Katanga, 7.3.2014, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140307_03_fr.pdf (accessed
27.8.2014).
641 See list of priorities on http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/articleslist_s27_en.htm (accessed 27.8.2014).
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against the LRA similarly indirectly support the work of the ICC. At the multilateral level both the US and
the EU participate in the ICC’s annual ASP, both were present at the 2010 Review Conference and have
made voluntary pledges to further the work of the Court. The EU and US verbally express their support
for the ICC in international fora and vote in favour of respective resolutions. Nevertheless, both actors
differ in that the EU additionally formalised its relationship with the ICC through the conclusion of an
Article 87(6) Agreement and contributes considerably to the ICC’s budget.
Different points of departure While EU and US strategies, tools and methods towards the ICC have thus
gradually converged under the Obama administration they still differ considerably. This is firstly due to
the different points of departures of both actors. The EU is a Union of 28 State Parties to the Rome
Statute, and thus has a staunch political interest and mandate to support the Court and to strengthen
internal and external cooperation. Although its policies towards the ICC have altered over the course of
the past three administrations, the US on the other hand is not a party to the Statute and additionally
has laws in force that prohibit any form of direct support for the Court. US interest to support the Court
is thus not only naturally limited, it also meets legal restrictions. Secondly, strategies differ because both
actors, EU and US, play on their own distinct strengths. The EU places a strong emphasis on technical
and financial assistance, mobilising its considerable economic weight. The US indirectly makes funding
available, but also has the distinct advantage of significant military capacity, which allows it to support
the search for fugitive ICC suspects with personnel, material and know-how. Although both actors
today still differ with regard to the strategies, tools and methods they employ, their direction of impact
has largely converged, therefore permitting a higher degree of cooperation for the benefit of the Court
than in the past.
6.4.4 EU-US cooperation with regard to the ICC – past, present and future
While both the EU and the US initially supported the project of a permanent international criminal
tribunal, the transatlantic positions drifted apart during the Rome Conference and have not yet entirely
converged since then. While the US voted against the Rome Statute, which it deemed fundamentally
flawed for the abovementioned reasons, the EU supported the final draft,642 considered the principles of
the Statute and the Court to be fully in line with the principles and objectives of the Union, and invested
considerable resources towards achieving a speedy entry into force of the Statute.643 When the US
indicated in May 2002 that it would not ratify the Statute, the EU expressed its disappointment,
commenting that US ‘anxieties […] are unfounded’ and expressing ‘the hope that the United States will
continue to work together with friends and partners in developing effective and impartial international
criminal justice and will not close the door to any kind of cooperation with the ICC’.644
Complicated transatlantic relationship Relations deteriorated and tested the EU’s internal cohesion
when the US used its role in NATO as a leverage to achieve the conclusion of BIAs with EU Member
States. The European Commission had previously requested the Member States in a confidential
document not to conclude BIAs, which it considered to be not covered by Article 98(2) of the Rome
Statute, and to take a united stand on this matter. On 16 August 2002, then US Secretary of State Powell
addressed a letter to European governments, in which he urged them to ‘ignore the European Union's
request to wait […] and instead to sign separate agreements with the United States as soon as
642 Austrian Presidency, ‘Statement at the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998’, 17.7.1998, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC3EN.pdf (accessed on 27.8.2014).
643 Council Common Position on the International Criminal Court, Doc. No. 2001/443/CFSP, 11.6.2001.
644 Council of the European Union, Statement of the European Union on the position of the United States towards the
International Criminal Court, Doc. No. 8864/02, 14.5.2002.
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possible’.645 Opinions among EU Member States were divided. While some Member States refused to
sign BIAs, others showed sympathy for the US policy. Romania, a candidate country for EU membership
at that time, signed a BIA, although it never ratified it. The Council was therefore initially unable to come
to a common conclusion, which was seen as ‘a sure source of great embarrassment for the European
Union, which has always shown itself determined to speak with one voice in this matter and to refuse to
give in to U.S. pressure for granting exemptions for its soldiers involved in peace keeping operations’.646
The EP finally adopted a resolution on the ICC on 26 September 2002, stating that it ‘[e]xpects the
governments and parliaments of the Member States to refrain from adopting any agreement which
undermines the effective implementation of the Rome Statute’ and ‘considers in consequence that
ratifying such an agreement is incompatible with membership of the EU’.647 The Council subsequently
adopted a decision on 30 September 2002, in which it reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to the ICC, and
provided guiding principles concerning BIAS, thus formulating a unified EU response against them.648 In
the end, no EU Member State concluded a BIA with the US; however, the differences in opinion
between the Member States had become apparent and hindered a swift EU reaction.
Re-aligning transatlantic partners: more coherence EU and US policies on the ICC have shown more
consistency under the Obama administration. Within certain limits the US has started to support the
work of the Court and the domestic justice systems of its State Parties. As one of the respondents to the
interviews conducted for this study remarked, cooperation between EU and US on the ground can
be quite strong. As an example he cited the cooperation between the US and Italy concerning the
transferal of Bosco Ntaganda from Rwanda to The Hague.649 It has been stated above that the US will
likely not become a member of the ICC in the foreseeable future. That, however, does not have to stand
in the way of an ever closer cooperation between the EU and the US in the field of international criminal
justice. The analysis of the respective transatlantic approaches towards the Court has revealed that
both actors face very different legal and political constraints. It has also revealed a multitude of
techniques employed by both sides to foster international criminal justice within these boundaries. The
challenge and the opportunity consists in coordinating these efforts to ensure greatest possible
consistency and an efficient use of resources. The EU should therefore seek an increasingly close contact
with the US on the issue of the ICC, so that the possibilities for future cooperation can be explored. This
cooperation will not only benefit the work of the Court in terms of finance and clout, but also boost its
credibility.
6.4.5 Conclusions
Though both starting from a strong commitment to international criminal justice, EU and US policies
towards the ICC have taken very different directions over the past 15 years. Concerned about the
Court’s independence, the US voted against the Rome Statute, reluctantly signed it but subsequently
notified its intention that it would not ratify the Statute. Active measures intended to undermine and
isolate the Court during the first years of the Bush administration (in particular the BIAs, ASPA and
action within the UNSC), gave way to a more pragmatic stance in the later years of the administration
and since then to a policy of limited support under the Obama administration. The EU on the other
hand fully supported the ICC from the beginning and has pursued an active policy of promoting the
645 Paraphrase of the original letter in Becker, E., ‘U.S. Issues Warning to Europeans in Dispute Over New Court’, The New York
Times, 26.8.2002.
646 ‘Editorial Comments: The European Union, the United States and the International Criminal Court’, supra, n. 609, p. 941.
647 European Parliament resolution on the International Criminal Court (ICC), 26.9.2002, P5_TA(2002)0449.
648 General Affairs and External Relations Council, Conclusions, 2450th Council session, 30.9.2002, Doc. No. 12134/02.
649 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 28.2.2014.
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universality and integrity of the Rome Statute as well as the work of the Court. A look at the current
approaches towards international criminal justice reveals a multitude of measures, from direct financial
support for the Court by the EU, to military assistance for the capture of ICC fugitives by the US. These
varying strategies allow for an encompassing and effective fight against impunity – if the EU and the US
achieve to cooperate in order to ensure consistency and efficiency.
6.4.6 Recommendations
Recommendations on the EU’s policy towards the ICC
 Ensure EU-wide implementation of the Rome Statute The EU should work towards EU-wide
implementation of the Rome Statute, e.g. through measures of peer pressure, including a
continuous and public comparison of the implementation records of all EU Member States.
 Maintain a strong and open partnership with the ICC The EU should continue its strong support
for the Court, while continuously striving to improve the performance of the institution, in
particular through weighing in on the more problematic aspects of its work, such as the length of
proceedings and internal turf battles.
Recommendations for the EU-US relationship
 Ensure an open EU-US dialogue on issues of international criminal justice The EU should ensure
a continuous and open dialogue with the US on issues of international criminal justice in general
and the ICC in particular. It should address these issues in bilateral dialogues, official statements
and through multilateral fora and work towards a stronger engagement of the US with the ICC.
 Coordinate EU and US measures in the field of international criminal justice In order to increase
consistency and the efficient use of resources the EU should ensure a higher degree of
coordination with US measures. It should aim to explore in what way EU and US measures can
complement each other in order to strengthen international criminal justice.
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this study was to provide a comparative analysis on how human rights are practically
integrated and mainstreamed into external policies of both the EU and the US, using selected case
studies to contextualise the argument.
To this end the study has examined not only the general making and promotion of human rights
policies in the broader context of the EU’s and the US’s external policies, but also various parts of EU
external action, including foreign policy, trade policy, development cooperation and case studies, such
as the EU and US usage of Special Representatives / Special Envoys, EU and US Democracy promotion as
well as the policies of the EU and the US in the context of multilateral institutions, such as the Human
Rights Council and the ICC.
In a first step, the study focused on the legal frameworks regarding the human rights policies in the EU
and the US. With a firm emphasis on human rights in the EU Treaty, the EU has further emphasized
human rights in its post-Lisbon framework by means of the ‘Communication on Human Rights and
Democracy’ by the Commission and the High Representative in 2011. Adopting the communication,
they affirmed that ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the core of the European
Union [and] the protection and promotion of human rights is a silver thread running through all EU
action both at home and abroad’. Moreover, with a detailed list of 36 outcomes and 97 action points,
the Council subsequently adopted a ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and
Democracy’ in order to ‘promote human rights in all areas of external action without exception’.
Comparing the EU to the US, the study finds that the legal framework in the US differs from the EU in
that the basis for human rights in foreign policy lies in various acts of Congressional legislation, rather
than in the Constitution itself. The study found that the US Constitution, while recognizing a variety of
‘individual’ human rights and determining the allocation of competences with regard to foreign policy
decision-making, is silent on the objectives of US external action. At the same time, the study concluded
that this ought to be understood in light of the ‘constitutional limitation’ which was placed on the US
government from its very inception.
With regard to the institutional set-up of the EU and the US in external human rights policies, the study
emphasized the need to take into account the multiplicity of institutional actors in EU and US
foreign affairs who evidently impact on the promotion of human rights of both the EU and the US.
The study found that interests of various legislative and executive actors have to be taken into account
when identifying the EU’s and the US’s stance towards human rights and the role which human rights
play in the conduct of external policies. In view of this multi-actorness and policy diversity, the Lisbon
Treaty foresees that EU external action needs to be coordinated. The study pointed to the functions of
the HR/VP in EU external action which are seen to be designed to guarantee the singleness of the EU’s
external approach, despite a diverse policy-making structure and multiplicity of policy objectives. As
such, the HR/VP’s role is to mainstream human rights coherently into the various external actions
of the EU. At the same time the study identified other relevant actors, such as Commission DGs and
COHOM, to integrate human rights into their respective actions and decisions. It also pointed to the
special role of the European Parliament, which has been portrayed as a champion of human rights and
democracy promotion. Compared to the EU, the US also shows features of multiple actorness. But the
study also found that the presidential office has become the gravity centre of US foreign policy, and
presidential administrations important actors, in determining the role of human rights in US external
action. Congress is often seen as having lost out as against the presidential powers in US foreign affairs,
but the study emphasized that it should not be overlooked that Congress does introduce human-rights
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related legislation, holds the power of the purse and is able to invest and contribute to parliamentary
diplomacy.
With regard to the many instruments of foreign policy which aim to set in place action to achieve EU
and US foreign policy objectives, it becomes evident that the EU and the US can make use of several
similar, but also distinctive tools to promote human rights (EU-US sanctions and EU enlargement
policy). While it may be too simple to state the US as being from ‘Mars’ and Europe as being ‘from
Venus’, the sharpest difference between the two is that the US is militarily equipped and more
advanced to take ‘ultimate action’, while the EU has struggled in building field capacity with regard to
civilian or military missions in the context of CSDP. The study found that the EU’s focus on civilian
missions can be seen as a complementary tool for EU-US security cooperation, e.g. in the field of
rule of law missions which have a direct impact on human rights. Regarding foreign policy in general,
the study emphasized that both the EU and the US will have to invest in soft power, the power of
enticement to persuade other actors to follow their examples and a policy of universal human rights. In
this context, both the EU and the US face challenges as they both have to ensure the coherence of their
own actions, be it internally or externally.
Regarding trade policy, the study found that the EU is a more reluctant enforcer of human rights
provisions through FTAs than the US. The study showed that in the EU’s case, the enforcement of
human rights provisions tends to be rather weak, even in those cases where complaint
mechanisms are available. At the same time the US was seen as taking a more proactive approach.
The study concluded that this divergence might be explained by the FTA model used by the EU and the
US and by the different political processes underlying EU and US decision-making in trade.
Human rights and the broader question of democratisation have become intensely intertwined with
development assistance frameworks of both the EU and the US. The study found that both actors see
development assistance as a tool to discourage human rights violations through suspending
development aid. Moreover, they try to incentivize performance on human rights and democracy
through increasing assistance. The study also concluded that support for strengthening democratic
governance and human rights promotion has increased significantly over the last decade in the EU and
the US alike. Finally, the understanding that human rights, and in particular the rights of vulnerable
groups such as children and women, permeate all areas and sectors of development assistance, has
become an EU and US priority in the management of development projects and programmes. Despite
this overall similarity in development cooperation, the study also demonstrated that the effective use of
development cooperation differs from country to country.
In four case studies the study has emphasized further similarities and differences across EU and US
human rights action. Regarding the usage of Special Representatives in the EU and Special Envoys
in the US, it is interesting to note that the EU has opted for an explicit and transversal Special
Representative whose mandate was 'based on the policy objectives of the Union regarding human
rights as set out in the Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as the
EU Strategic Framework [and] Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy'. The study showed, by
contrast, that the US does not seem to approach human rights from a cross-cutting perspective
when mandating Special Envoys, but rather focuses on sub-thematic priorities within the broader
realm of human rights, including mandates on holocaust issues, anti-Semitism, international disability
rights, and international labor rights.
The case study on democracy promotion identified that despite the temptation of international actors
to advocate stability over reform, democratisation policy remains a viable tool for both the EU and the
US, as it is seen as a) featuring the promotion of their own values and principles, b) fostering peaceful
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international cooperation and c) as strengthening transformations along the ideas of modernization
theories. In this regard, the study showed that both the US and the EU are widely regarded as
promoting a liberal democratic model, while the EU, given the diversity of its own Member States’
democratic systems, is less keen to advocate a specific model vis-à-vis its international partners.
Moreover, both actors have over time invested more and more in the field of democracy promotion.
However, in terms of their implementation, the study demonstrated that the EU’s approach is seen as
being less flexible than that of the US – at least from a US perspective. However, the EU has also
invested in adapting to greater flexibility and effectiveness by enabling the creation of the EED under
the auspices of the Polish presidency of the Council in 2012.
By focusing on the EU and the US in their practices towards the HRC, the study found that the
respective EU and US priorities at the HRC show a significant amount of overlap, both in terms of
country-specific and thematic issues. This, the study pointed out, could be interpreted as evidence that
the EU and the US share similar convictions of which countries should be singled out as the gravest
human rights violators world-wide and thus be addressed through HRC resolutions. At the same time
the study made clear that critics might argue that both actors merely consider it politically expedient to
address certain states instead of others. The analysis also revealed similar goals with regard to civil and
political rights, but a broader scope of the EU concerning ESC rights. Moreover, the different positions
towards the death penalty permeate EU-US bilateral relations and are equally present in multilateral
fora, in particular in the UNGA, but also in the HRC.
Finally, looking at EU and US policies towards the ICC, the study found that US policy during the first
years of the Bush administration intended to actively undermine and isolate the Court. The EU on the
other hand fully supported the ICC from the beginning and has pursued an active policy of promoting
the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute as well as the work of the Court. Looking at the
current approaches towards international criminal justice revealed a multitude of measures, from direct
financial support for the Court by the EU, to military assistance for the capture of ICC fugitives by the US.
The study argued that these varying strategies would allow for an encompassing and effective fight
against impunity, if the EU and the US are able to achieve greater cooperation in order to ensure
consistency and efficiency.
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8. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has firmly anchored the EU’s commitment to integrate human
rights into all areas of its internal and external actions and policies. Several new institutional actors,
policy tools and financial instruments were established, which were highlighted in this study. Most
notably, the Council adopted its landmark Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and
Democracy in June 2012, in which it pledged to implement its human rights agenda by working
towards 36 outcomes and 97 action points.
In light of the Strategic Framework/Action Plan and its follow-up, it is of high value to draw on the
lessons learned from (i) both the EU’s and US’s policy experiences in integrating human rights into their
respective foreign policies, as well as (ii) their collaborative efforts in establishing a transatlantic
approach towards the promotion and protection of human rights. Further to the preceding
comparative analysis, this study formulates three sets of recommendations: on (i) EU-inter-institutional
cooperation on human rights, on (ii) the strengthening of EU human rights policies, and (iii) on greater
EU-US collaboration on human rights. These suggestions advocate for a more coherent, consistent, and
effective pursuit of human rights objectives in the EU’s external action.
Recommendations for EU inter-institutional co-operation on human rights
Recommendation 1: Ensure effective implementation of the Strategic Framework/Action Plan
The Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy has created fertile grounds
for a coherent and effective implementation of the EU’s external human rights agenda. However, the EU
still faces a considerable amount of inter-institutional fragmentation in this respect. In order to ensure
coherent and effective implementation, therefore, all EU institutional actors should take up their
responsibility as allocated by the Action Plan, whilst also forging more systematic collaboration
amongst each other. In particular the HR/VP, with support of the EEAS, should guarantee the
implementation of human rights in all the EU’s external policies. In doing so, the various EU actors, in
particular the EEAS and the European Council will need to play a leading role in formulating EU-wide
action on human rights issues by interacting with and mobilizing Member States. Crucially, the
European Council will need to consistently provide the political weight in placing human rights at the
centre of the Member States’ foreign policies.
Recommendation 2: Encourage the European External Action Service (EEAS) to take up its role
as the ‘guardian of consistency’
The EEAS should take up a more prominent role as the EU’s ‘guardian of consistency’, by systematically
mainstreaming human rights into all areas of EU external action. To this end, the HR/VP and EEAS
should take the lead in providing strategic guidance on human rights mainstreaming, as well as in
coordinating human rights policies between the European Commission, Council and Parliament. The
European Parliament, in turn, should strengthen its role as the ‘human rights watchdog’, by holding the
EEAS accountable in this regard (see also Recommendation 5).
Recommendation 3: Encourage the Council’s Human Rights Working Group (COHOM) to
galvanize support from Member States to mainstream human rights in all areas of EU external
action
The credibility of the EU’s external action largely depends on the extent to which it is able to ‘practice
what it preaches’. Conversely, the human rights track record of Member States can be both an enabler
and a hindrance to more coherent and effective EU human rights policies. Further to its enhanced
Policy Department DG External Policies
124
mandate to ensure that human rights concerns are systematically addressed in the EU’s external action,
COHOM should therefore continue to forge a bridge between the EU and its Member States. To this
end, it should continue to mobilize Member States to provide their respective capacities and expertise
in order to further elaborate a substantive and comprehensive EU human rights agenda during the
designated Human Rights Working Groups.
Recommendation 4: Encourage the Commission to take up its role as the ‘guardian of the
Treaties’
The Commission occupies a pivotal position in both EU decision-making and policy implementation. As
the executive branch of the EU, it disposes of a wide spectrum of policy instruments and tools to ensure
that human rights are effectively promoted in third countries. As such, it retains the primary room for
manoeuvre to integrate human rights into the EU’s external action and, in particular, into its trade and
development policies. As the ‘guardian of the Treaties’, the Commission should ensure that both the
design, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation is in full compliance with human rights
standards. Developing a strong, ‘symbiotic’ relationship with the EEAS, the EP and the Council will be a
pre-requisite for effective EU external action. In order to foster greater transparency and to adequately
address challenges and achievements in integrating human rights in trade and development policies,
the Commission together with the EEAS should present annual reports on the trade-development-
human rights nexus to the EP and the Council. In turn, these reports could then feed into the EP’s
annual reports on human rights in the world.
Recommendation 5: Mobilize the European Parliament (EP) and its members to assertively take
on the role of ‘human rights watchdogs’ of the EU’s external action
Further to the aforementioned role of the EP to act as human rights watchdog, MEPs should seize the
opportunities created by the Lisbon Treaty and mobilize to take their role as human rights actors in
external action to heart. The EP’s competence to review and adopt the EEAS budget, to hold the HR/VP
politically accountable and to use its veto / consent power for the adoption of EU legislation or the
conclusion of international agreements should be put to effective use to scrutinize commitments in the
area of human rights. Moreover, the EP should remind the EU Special Representative for Human Rights
to take its concerns into account, and explore further synergies, such as cooperation in the elaboration
of the EP’s annual reports on human rights in the world (see also Recommendation 6). With regard to the
trade-development-human rights nexus, in which the empowered EP has gained considerable room for
manoeuvre, the EP should watch over the effective implementation of the Strategic Framework/Action
Plan. To this end, it should ensure that all relevant EU decision-making in the trade-development nexus
‘works in a way that helps human rights’. In collaborating with the EEAS, a permanent representation of
the HR/VP in parliamentary settings may be considered to this end. This could consist of a mandate to
carry out a liaising function between the EP and the EEAS, in order to be able to respond swiftly to any
human rights-related inquiries raised by the EP.
Recommendation 6: Clarify the appointment, financing and mandate of EU Special
Representatives
Dubbed ‘free electrons’ in the institutional set-up of EU foreign policy, confusion still prevails as to how
the EU Special Representatives precisely fit into the post-Lisbon structures. In particular with regard to
the EU Special Representative on Human Rights, who occupies the only thematic mandate and is
thereto mandated to pursue transversal policies, the need to ensure a coherent and effective
implementation of EU policy-making is all the more important. Without clarity on their appointment,
financing and mandate, however, EU Special Representatives are likely to continue to be subject to the
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turf battle between the EEAS and the Council in this regard. The conclusion of the ongoing EEAS review
should therefore integrate the revised guidelines on the appointment, mandate and financing of EU
Special Representative, and provide more clarity on inter-institutional cooperation with the EU
institutions and the Member States. Given that it would be both unrealistic and practically impossible to
impose a wide-ranging mandate such as human rights on one individual, the EU could learn from the
US experience in appointing a wide range of different Special Envoys mandated to tackle specific
human rights themes. In addition, the EUSR for Human Rights should have the competence to establish
human rights task forces with a temporary mandate, aimed at tackling the most pertinent human rights
issues of the day. By focusing on specific human rights questions and issues, the EU would be able to
better flag what it considers to be its top priorities in the promotion of human rights abroad.
Recommendations for strengthening EU human rights policies
Recommendation 7: A comprehensive foreign policy strategy on human rights should ensure
greater cohesion between the various tools and instruments at hand
This study has highlighted several unique tools the EU has at its disposal through which it can
strengthen human rights promotion and protection. In contrast with the US, an explicit focus on human
rights mainstreaming is more pronounced, and is embedded in the legal framework provided by the
Treaties. However, effective external action on human rights will need to overcome the ‘pillar’ divide
between CFSP/CSDP on the one hand, and other external policies, such as trade and development
cooperation policies, on the other. The ‘comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’ is a
good example of how the EU can bring together instruments and formulate coherent actions. Such
comprehensive approach should not be limited to security matters or crisis situations. The EU should be
aware that only the coordination of several tools will lead to effective output in the field of human
rights. The various outcomes and actions for EU external action as laid out in the Strategic
Framework/Action Plan should be reassembled into one policy approach covering all EU actors as well
as Member States. At the level of EU Delegations, the elaboration of ‘Human Rights Country Strategies’
is already a step in this direction. However, currently little is known about the content and follow-up of
these policies, or how they constitute a comprehensive approach which also entails input and action by
Member States. More transparency on their impact and implementation would be necessary to build on
this experience. In this sense, the EU could learn from the US in having public Human Rights Country
Reports which contribute to internal strategic planning while at the same time serving as a ‘naming and
shaming’ tool.
Recommendation 8: Ensure greater consistency, coherence and harmonization in the use of
conditionality frameworks to incentivize the human rights performance of partner
governments
The study illustrated how both the US and the EU provide incentives and disincentives to partner
countries based on their human rights track record. In the area of trade and development cooperation,
the EU has in place various conditionality frameworks which integrate human rights. However, in both
the formulation and application several levels of incoherence and inconsistence should be addressed.
Like the US, the EU could consistently apply human rights conditionality in trade by employing the
same standard clauses in all EU international agreements. There is also a lack of coherence in how
human rights are included as an essential element in cooperation agreements, and how human rights
are integrated as a substantive condition for providing more or less EU development assistance. In this
area, the EU should foster greater coherence between EU institutions and Member States in providing
different types of assistance, in particular budget support. As set out in the Strategic Framework/Action
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Plan, the Commission, EEAS and the Member States should develop criteria for the application of the
human rights clauses included in the EU’s partnership agreements to ensure the ‘effective use and
interplay of EU external policy instruments’, given that currently this action has not yet been realized.
Recommendation 9: Consistent monitoring and reporting to ensure both EU actors and
Members States
Current self-reporting on human rights policies should be complemented by a structurally embedded
accountability mechanism, for example through the establishment of an agency, tasked with
monitoring the EU’s conditionality policies which emulates the FRA’s function in the area of external
action. Given the range of human rights considerations stemming from the EU’s international
agreements, the need to foster an ‘institutional memory’ in devising human rights-sensitive policies, can
also be highlighted.
Recommendation 10: Further develop coherent EU action for effective democracy promotion
Although investment in democracy assistance has increased, the EU has been characterized as a more
risk-averse actor than the US, preferring stability and concentrating on gradual ‘state-centric’
governance reforms. More comprehensive engagement with civil society actors and the establishment
of flexible funding mechanisms such as the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) indicate that
the EU is keen on engaging with ‘bottom-up’ democratic reformers. To adequately provide such
support, coordinating the interplay between EU actors will become more crucial. Moreover, strategically
linking conditionality policies, state-centric reform programmes and support for bottom-up democratic
reformers will require the EU to be equipped adequately.
Recommendation 11: Develop and strengthen the coordination of EU-wide action in relation to
the Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court
Unlike the US, the EU has positioned itself as a strong supporter in developing international and
multilateral institutions which address human rights accountability on a global scale. Despite this
commitment, the EU’s position and capacity to support such mechanisms remains hampered by a lack
of strategic cooperation between EU Member States and a lack of internal consistency. In this regard,
the implementation of the Rome Statute by all EU Member States should be a priority. Concerning the
HRC, the EU should strategically exploit its capacity to bring forth a clear EU-wide position, while
continuing to make use of each individual Member State’s voice. The difficult challenge of coming to
diverse, cross-regional coalitions within the HRC might be achieved more effectively if the EU avoids to
profile itself as an ‘overwhelming bloc’. The question of internal consistency is also crucial in enhancing
the EU’s overall credibility as a player in the HRC.
Recommendations for EU-US collaboration in human rights
Recommendation 12: the EU and the US need to coordinate more effectively on their external
policies in the field of human rights at various levels of decision-making
Despite both embracing the notion that the promotion of human rights is a key aspect and objective of
foreign policy/external action, a lack of knowledge and engagement characterizes how the EU and the
US interact with each other in this area. Although both have similar tools and instruments at their
disposal, the study found little evidence of well-embedded strategic coordination between Brussels and
Washington with regards to human rights. At the level of policy formulation, more could be done to
substantiate their common commitment to addressing human rights in third countries. Various levels of
interaction could be explored to develop complementary actions and priorities. The EP and the US
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Congress could use the transatlantic ‘legislators’ dialogue, a forum of open dialogue about differences
and future cooperation based on common objectives, to foster their common understanding and
coordination of human rights policies. At the level of the executive branch, the EEAS and US State
Department (as well as other US departments) could interact more systematically on their respective
instruments, strategies and policies on human rights. Furthermore, greater coordination and exchange
of information between US missions and EU Delegations can be considered essential in the
‘downstream’ implementation of policies on human rights. In a similar vein, the EU Special
Representative on Human Rights should establish a recurring dialogue with its thematic counterparts
amongst the US Special Envoys. The EU could also consider learning from the US experience in placing
more emphasis on thematic mandates, and highlight specific human rights priorities it would like to
promote on the world scene by establishing a designated EU Special Representative thereto.
Recommendation 13: Aligning EU and US conditionality frameworks can enhance joint
leverage and provide greater incentives for partner governments to respect and protect
human rights
Both the EU and the US condition the provision of development assistance and the adoption or
granting of beneficial trade arrangements to partner countries on their human rights track record.
Although coherence and consistency is often lacking in terms of implementation at both sides, there is
ample room for exploring synergies in this area. Forging a stronger partnership on human rights-related
trade policies and aligning conditions on the amount and type of development assistance the EU and
US provide to partner countries, could lead existing efforts to have a much greater impact. Both in
responding to human rights violations by diminishing trade and assistance benefits, or in efforts to set
positive conditionalities for incentivizing compliance and progressive realization of human rights, the
EU and the US could consult and coordinate in a more systematic manner.
Recommendation 14: Coordinate EU and US democracy assistance and human rights promotion
within third countries
The EU and the US are the largest providers of democracy assistance worldwide. None the less, between
the two there seems to be little systematic coordination in terms of global or country level strategies. In
addition to internal coordination between EU mechanisms and coordination with EU Member States,
fostering greater inter-linkages with US democracy assistance actors seems timely as the EU seeks to
become a more prominent supporter of democratic reformers. At the country level, greater stocktaking
of each other’s actions and exploring potential connections between various initiatives would be a first
step. Concerning the various countries which currently find themselves in a fragile transition period (e.g.
Libya, Myanmar, among others), the need to harmonize and step up joint EU-US efforts is pertinent.
Recommendation 15: Explore greater EU-US coordination and complementary action within
the Human Rights Council and with regards to the International Criminal Court
Clear and consistent support from the EU and the US are essential to the functioning of both the HRC
and ICC as global human rights accountability institutions. At the same time, divergent positions have
weakened these mechanisms. Concerning the HRC, the EU and the US have overlapping priorities and
share a similar vision on its institutional set-up and mandate. Closer cooperation during negotiations
can help the EU to play a more prominent role. However, rather than consolidating an ‘EU-US bloc’,
both should coordinate strategically and tactically to foster cross-regional partnerships within the HRC.
In addition, the credibility of the EU and the US suffers when they turn a blind eye to each other’s
human rights record. Given their strong partnership, both the EU and the US should be willing to openly
address sensitive human rights issues such as the US’s use of the death penalty, or each other’s policies
Policy Department DG External Policies
128
towards minorities and the treatment of immigrants. Regarding the ICC, Joint EU-US cooperation
remains problematic, although the more constructive approach of the Obama Administration has
cleared the way for greater synergies. To build on this development, the EU should engage in a
continuous and open dialogue with the US on the ICC and issues of international criminal justice more
generally. Concretely, a higher degree of coordination between EU and US on measures in the field of
international criminal justice can increase consistency and the efficient use of resources.
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10. ANNEX
# Country
/Region
EU Agreement (status) Human Rights
Language
US Agreement (status) Human
Rights
Language
Outcome
and
Concerns
1 Australia N/A N/A US-Australia FTA
(entered into force,
2005)
FTA Chapter
18: Labor650
N/A
2 Bahrain EU-GCC FTA (negotiations
suspended by GCC in 2008)
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates
N/A US-Bahrein FTA
(entered into force,
2006)
FTA Chapter
15: Labor651
Protection
against anti-
union
discriminatio
n
reinforced652
3 Canada EU-Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement
(political agreement reached in
2013)
No final text published US-Canada-Mexico
NAFTA/NAALC (entered
into force, 1994)
FTA Chapter
15: Labor653
N/A
4 Central America EU-Central America Association
Agreement (provisionally entered
into force, 2013)
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama
No final text published US-Central America-
Dominican Republic
FTA (entered into force,
2004)
Costa Rica, El Salvador,
FTA Chapter
16: Labor654
N/A
650US-Australia FTA, text available online: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/australia_FTA_Labor.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
651 US-Bahrain FTA, text available online: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/bahrain/asset_upload_file73_6297.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
652 International Institute for Labour Studies, supra, n. 234, p. 37.
653 US-Bahrain FTA, text available online: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/bahrain/asset_upload_file73_6297.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.
654 US-CAFTA FTA, Chapter 16: Labor, available online: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file320_3936.pdf, accessed on 28.8.2014.

